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Preface
This thesis explores questions in environmental and political economics. Despite much
progress over the last half a century, we still urgently need to better understand
the complex interactions between our environmental, political and economic systems.
The broader context is that there is widespread consensus among economists, and
increasingly the general public, that we need a strong carbon tax or or something
equivalent, but there are deep political frictions and failures that keep society stuck in
a bad equilibrium. Understanding the political economy of environmental protection,
therefore, matters. This thesis aims to offer a small contribution to this effort. The
first two chapters concern the intersection of environmental and political economics.
The third chapter looks at an example of past improvements in the urban environment,
while the final chapter focuses on one particular aspect of our political systems.
In chapter 1, Corporate Lobbying for Environmental Protection (published in the
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management as Grey, 2018), I tackle the
question of how and why some polluting firms may politically support environmental
protection, and what difference this makes to overall welfare. Political support from
firms can be pivotal for governments trying to protect the environment, as we have
seen in the cases of ozone and climate change. I suggest that firms behave as they do
to gain market share from their rivals, but that society can benefit overall from the
greater environmental protection that results.
Chapter 2, Pass-through, Profits and the Political Economy of Regulation, is joint
work with Robert Ritz.1 It presents a new theoretical framework for understanding
the impact of environmental taxes on firm profits, which are central to the political
economy of regulation. We apply the theory in an empirical study of the US aviation
market, and estimate there would be major winners and losers if carbon pricing were
introduced. This, in turn, would shape the political economy of such a policy.
1We are grateful to Research Assistants Pradeep Venkatesh and Shijian Yang.
xviii Preface
Chapter 3, Sanitation and mortality in urban England 1875-1911, is joint work with
Toke Aidt and Romola Davenport.2 It assesses the impact of major changes to the
urban environment in a historical context, industrialising Victorian England. Using a
new dataset constructed from local public accounts and mortality records, we quantify
the extent to which sanitation infrastructure explains declines in urban mortality, the
subject of ongoing debate among both public economists and economic historians.
Chapter 4, The Meaningful Votes: Voting on Brexit in the British House of
Commons (published in Public Choice as Aidt et al., 2019), is joint work with Toke
Aidt and Alex Savu. It aims to increase our understanding of political systems by
investigating empirically the reasons for rebellions by legislators against their governing
parties. We use novel data from the UK parliament’s ‘meaningful votes’ on Brexit
legislation, historic government defeats that allow us to quantify the importance of the
different forces acting on rebellious legislators.
2We are grateful to Research Assistants John Black, Huaxiang Huang, David Hutchinson, Andriy
Levitskyy, and Katie Piner.
Chapter 1
Corporate lobbying for
environmental protection

Abstract
Much of the time, polluting firms lobby against environmental protection, but there
are major exceptions to this rule, for example in the regulation of both ozone and
greenhouse gases. Political support from firms can be pivotal for governments trying
to protect the environment. I offer an explanation for this phenomenon, suggesting
firms behave as they do in order to steal market share from their rivals. I develop a
model in which a polluting firm makes a clean technology investment and then lobbies
successfully for strong environmental protection, since this will shift market share away
from its rival who has not made the clean investment. The key result concerns the
impact of lobbying on the equilibrium outcome: for a region of the parameter space, it
is only because of firms’ lobbying that environmental protection is achieved. This is
because lobbying increases a firm’s returns to going green, by increasing the market
share it can steal. The net effect of this distortion is an increase in welfare.
Keywords: lobbying, environmental policy, political economics.
JEL codes: D72, H23, Q58.
1.1 Introduction
This paper aims to answer the question ‘when might polluting firms support environ-
mental protection, and what difference does this make to the level of environmental
protection a government chooses?’ Lack of political support is a major reason why
environmental regulations are either delayed or permanently weak.1 Political support
for environmental protection can come from a number of places, but it is arguably most
valuable when it comes from business. Many environmental policymakers would go so
far as to say that this is almost a necessary condition for feasible environmental regula-
tion - when there appears to be conflict between ‘the economy’ and the environment,
the environment tends to lose (Stern, 2015).
1Oates and Portney (2003) review the literature on the political economy of environmental
protection.
4 Corporate lobbying for environmental protection
Firms spend significant resources on lobbying2 and there is a general perception
that polluting firms inevitably use their lobbying power to slow down, water down,
or entirely block measures to protect the environment. This is indeed the case much
of the time,3 but there have been major and important exceptions to this rule. The
following two examples motivate much of the paper.
The protection of the ozone layer was arguably the biggest environmental problem
of its time. During the 1980s, regulators were attempting to draw up global rules to
limit the production of ozone-depleting CFCs and encourage investment in cleaner
alternatives. Until 1988, the major ozone-polluting firms had all opposed environmental
regulation and successfully used their influence to limit protection of the ozone layer.
The largest producer, the US firm DuPont, had lobbied for decades against regulation.4
However, in March 1988 DuPont abruptly announced that it no longer opposed
regulation and in fact now wanted a complete phase-out of global CFC production.
DuPont’s new political support for regulation is widely seen as the turning point in the
story of ozone protection (Barrett, 2003). The European producers continued to lobby
against reductions but were unsuccessful: the Montreal Protocol and its successor
treaties achieved a total phase out of CFCs. It has been suggested that DuPont’s
lobbying for regulation may have been in its economic self interest. Since it had already
made investments in cleaner production technologies that would give it an advantage
over its rivals in the clean substitute market, DuPont potentially stood to gain market
share.5 In the words of DuPont director Joseph Glass, ‘when you have $3 billion of
CFCs sold worldwide and 70 percent of that is about to be regulated out of existence,
there is tremendous market potential.’6 A key feature of DuPont’s lobbying was for
controls to be as strong and as international as possible, so that their major European
rivals would be affected.
The DuPont example is perhaps particularly straightforward, but similar dynamics
are also likely to be operating on various levels in the more complex case of climate
2For example, in the US in the five years prior to 2017, $1.7 billion was spent on lobbying over
energy and natural resources, the majority of which was campaign contributions (according to the
Center for Responsive Politics, www.opensecrets.org, accessed on 13 Dec 2017). The EU is far less
transparent, so financial flows are hard to obtain, but according to Dinan and Wesselius (2010) there
are perhaps 30,000 lobbyists in Brussels, the same as the number of EU Commission employees.
3Oreskes (2010) details attempts to block environmental protection by polluting firms.
4Benedick (1998) gives a definitive and first hand account of the history of ozone protection, as he
was the lead US negotiator to the Montreal Protocol.
5DuPont probably had several reasons for making this move; all that is argued here is that profit
is likely to have been one of them. Smith (1998) gives a detailed discussion of DuPont’s potential
motives.
6Quoted in Gilding (2012).
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change. In the run up to the Paris Agreement, a coalition of major oil and gas producers
was among those calling for the introduction of a global carbon price. Europe’s six
largest oil and gas companies (BG, BP, Eni, Shell, Statoil and Total) argued in an open
letter to the UN sent on 29 May 2015 for the introduction of an ambitious carbon price.
If this were introduced, they argued, they could invest in reducing their emissions by,
for example, increasing the proportion of gas they produce (which is relatively clean).
The letter also hints at another effect of the carbon price: ‘reduced demand for the
most carbon intensive fossil fuels’ - that is, coal, their biggest competitor product, with
a market share of global energy supply around 30%.7 A moderately strong carbon
price would shift market share away from coal and towards gas, creating, to paraphrase
the DuPont director, ‘tremendous market potential’. It is hard not to see this lobbying,
at least in part, as an attempt by the oil and gas companies to steal market share
from the coal companies.8 Although climate regulation is on-going, stronger political
support from the private sector is considered by many policy makers to have helped
achieve the Paris Agreement in 2015.9
Hence there are clear examples of major polluting firms lobbying for environmental
regulation of their markets, and this political support can substantially increase the
ability of governments to protect the environoment.10 This paper asks, by modelling
these kinds of situations, when and how a firm like DuPont might choose to invest in a
costly clean technology, knowing it will be able to influence the political process to get
regulations passed that will result in increased market share and so greater profits.
An outline of the model and results presented here is as follows. In the baseline
model there are two identical firms, each of which can invest in a new green production
technology or keep their old polluting technology. A government then chooses the
emissions tax they are subject to, and the firms can influence this choice through
7IEA Key World Energy Statistics (2014).
8This lobbying probably had multiple aims. For example, by participating actively in the political
process of carbon pricing, the oil and gas companies might be able to keep the carbon price from
being too much higher than they would like, or by sorting it out sooner rather than later, they might
be able to reduce uncertainty around long run demand for their product. All that is argued here is
that stealing market share from coal may be one of the reasons for this kind of lobbying.
9For example, Nicholas Stern’s response to the Paris Agreement included: ‘... businesses have
been strongly represented at the Paris climate change summit and have played an important role in
urging governments to achieve a strong agreement.’ (New Climate Economy, newclimateeconomy.net,
accessed on 29 Jan 2016.)
10Barrett (1992) gives other instances of this kind of behaviour. For example, in response to concerns
over the environmental impact of phosphates, the German firm Henkel invested in a phosphate-free
detergent, lobbied for controls and gained market share in France and Germany in the 1980s. Puller
(2006) also details several examples. More generally, this process need not be limited to environmental
regulation.
6 Corporate lobbying for environmental protection
lobbying. The result is that, for a region of the model’s parameter space, competition
between the firms causes one firm to choose to go green and lobby for strong environ-
mental protection, so that it gains market share in the new regulated market, while the
other keeps the old technology and opposes environmental regulation. The lobbying
results in the equilibrium emissions tax being distorted above the Pigouvian level, and
increasingly so as the government becomes more open to lobbying. The key result
concerns the interaction between the political process and firms’ green investment
choices: there are situations where it is only because a firm can lobby, and therefore
secure strong environmental protection, that it will see it as worthwhile to go green.
At the same time, it is only because of a firm’s political support that the government
can take environmental action. Lobbying can therefore induce a switch to a greener
economy.
This is the key result of the paper, but I go on to make five further points. First,
for other regions of the parameter space (for example, when environmental damage is
higher, or green investment costs lower), both firms choose to go green in equilibrium
instead of just one. Here, although no lobbying conflict is observed, the threat of loss
of market share if a firm doesn’t go green, intensified by lobbying, helps to sustain the
equilibrium. Second, the welfare implications of these two types of lobbying-induced
switches to a greener economy are characterised, and I show that if lobbying induces a
switch then it must also be welfare improving. Third, the model can be generalised to
the case of n firms and variants of all the key results developed in the two firm case
continue to hold, though now with coalitions of green and brown firms. The two firm
model is therefore appropriate for examining situations with more than two firms, so
the bulk of the paper focuses on this simpler set up. Fourth, the results are robust to
various different product market assumptions. However, the extent to which lobbying
makes the green investment more attractive to firms falls as demand becomes more
elastic, because the market share effect is partially offset by the total market shrinking.
Fifth, I discuss three reasons why lobbying-induced switches to a greener economy may
not always be observed in practice.
The findings presented here are related to three strands of the economics literature.
First, the paper sits within the wide literature on the political economy of environmental
regulation. Stigler (1971) argued that regulation is largely the result of profit seeking
by firms. Buchanan and Tullock (1975) pointed out that different environmental
regulations vary substantially in their distributional consequences, and suggested that
firms ensure the regulations chosen are those that most increase their profits. One
strand of the contemporary political economy literature builds on these insights by
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focusing on lobbying as the mechanism by which firms influence policy. Grossman
and Helpman (1994) were the first to apply the common agency model of Bernheim
and Whinston (1986) to lobbying, which has now become standard.11 Fredriksson
(1997) and Aidt (1998) first applied it to environmental policy making, showing that
an environmental lobby group can counter the influence of a polluters’ lobby group and
thereby bring about environmental protection. This remains an active and productive
area of research.12 However, the standard result is that polluting firms always lobby
against environmental protection: for the externality to be adequately controlled, a
lobby group with environmental preferences is needed.13 The model presented here,
therefore, offers a novel and complementary explanation of the political processes
behind environmental regulation.
Another branch of the environmental political economy literature follows Salop
and Scheffman (1983), who argued that firms often attempt to raise their rivals’ costs,
as this gives them a competitive advantage. Barrett (1991) discusses this in various
environmental contexts. Sartzetakis (1997) presents a model in which an exogenously
designated ‘leader’ firm can manipulate the price of emissions permits, which raises
rivals’ costs. Aside from its focus on lobbying, my model differs from this in that there
are no exogenous asymmetries between the rival firms, yet in equilibrium they can
behave differently. Puller (2006) analyses the strategic incentives of firms to innovate
in order to influence regulatory standards and so raise their rivals’ costs. He shows
that this effect can counter the well-known incentive to reduce innovation in order to
ratchet down regulation. My paper complements this analysis by looking explicitly at
the role of lobbying in the formation of regulation that raises rivals’ costs.
The second broad area of the literature this paper relates to is the Porter Hypothesis
(the idea that firms often gain rather than lose from environmental regulation). My
11Lobbying can alternatively be thought of as a process of information transmission, and therefore
an application of Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) model of strategic information transmission. Which of
the two types of lobbying takes place in reality is context dependent (see Grossman and Helpman
(2001) for a discussion). This paper focuses on buying influence.
12Damania (2001) shows that polluting firms can use dirty investments as a commitment device to
aid their lobbying efforts; Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) look at the relationship between trade and
environmental regulation when firms can lobby; Wilson and Damania (2005) explore the environmental
impact of corruption at different levels of government; Aidt et al. (2010) shows how recycling revenue
from green taxes can be used strategically by firms seeking to lower their tax burden; MacKenzie and
Ohndorf (2012) show that lobbying considerations may, counterintuitively, make non-revenue raising
environmental regulation the most preferred option for governments; Habla and Winkler (2013) show
how national lobbying can play an important role in international environmental agreements.
13The only exception to this I am aware of is in Fredriksson and Sterner (2005), who show that
when firms can capture the revenue from environmental taxes, some firms support higher taxes. In
my model, this channel is shut down, as no firm receives any revenue from environmental taxes (or,
equivalently under a cap-and-trade scheme, receives any permits for free).
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model gives rise to a version of the Porter Hypothesis without relaxing any of the
optimising assumptions of standard economic theory.14 Hence, it suggests a new
mechanism that can give rise to this familiar result.
Third, this model also shares various features with those in the literature on
competitive R&D and endogenous technical change. In the competitive R&D literature,
firms undertake R&D in an imperfectly competitive market because doing so brings
them a competitive advantage, usually lower relative costs, allowing them to gain
market share (Reinganum, 1983). The approach taken here can be thought of as an
extension of this literature by modelling two sequential investment choices. First, a
standard R&D investment (in clean technology) that impacts firms’ relative costs;
second, a political investment (in a high emissions tax) that is highly complementary
to the R&D. Looked at in this way, it is the complementarity of the investments that
means that, when offered together they will be undertaken, whereas in isolation they
may not. Finally, this paper is relevant to the current literature on endogenous technical
change (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Aghion et al., 2016). For example, Acemoglu et al.
(2016) present and estimate a dynamic model in which formerly polluting producers
choose between investments in clean or dirty production methods. In the absence of
significant R&D subsidies, very high carbon taxes are needed for the transition to
clean technologies. The present paper can be seen as complementing this literature, by
offering one explanation for how such taxes can be politically achieved.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 1.2 the baseline
model is presented. Section 1.3 contains the key results: equilibria are characterised
and discussed. Section 1.4 examines the welfare consesquences of the results. In Section
1.5 the model is generalised to n firms, and robustness is considered. Section 1.6
concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the theory.
1.2 The baseline model
The baseline model contains two firms and a single government who play a three stage
game. First the firms choose whether or not to invest in costly, but emissions-free
production technology. Then in the second stage the government sets an emissions
tax, which the firms attempt to influence through lobbying. In the third stage firms
produce and earn profits.
14Porter and van der Linde (1995) give the original statement of the argument, which holds that
‘$10 bills are waiting to be picked up’, that is, in reality firms are not profit maximising. Other
explanations consistent with optimising behaviour are based on market power, asymmetric information
and R&D spillovers (see Ambec et al. (2013)).
1.2 The baseline model 9
1.2.1 The economy
There are two firms, 1 and 2. Each firm i ∈ {1, 2} produces a quantity xi of a single
homogenous good. They each face an initial choice over their production technology
fi ∈ {G,B}. They can choose the clean, ‘green’ production technology fi = G, in
which case production by the firm results in no emissions. Alternatively they can
choose the dirty, ‘brown’ technology fi = B, in which case production is polluting
and each unit of output results in a unit of emissions. Choosing fi = G costs s > 0.
This could represent the building of a new factory or power station, some kind of
R&D, or any other step to reduce emissions. Choosing fi = B is free, reflecting the
idea that the current technology is polluting and can continue to be used with no new
investment required. Note that the cost structure of the firms is otherwise unaffected
by this investment choice; the only purpose of investing in clean technology is to reduce
emissions to zero.15 Each firm has emissions per unit of output ei given by:
ei(fi) =
0 if fi = G1 if fi = B (1.1)
The firms face an emissions tax τ , resulting in a tax bill of τeixi. From the firm’s
point of view, the green investment can be thought of simply as a way to switch off
the emissions tax τ .
The firms have identical and strictly convex production costs. For tractability, I
take costs to be given by 12kx
2
i , and normalise k to 12 .
16 Denote by πi profits from
production (as distinct from total firm payoffs which include investment and lobbying
costs). Given any pair of technology choices by the two firms f ∈ {G,B}2 and emissions
tax τ , firm i chooses output xi to maximise profits from production:
πi(xi | τ, f) = pxi − 14x
2
i − τeixi (1.2)
The market structure is as follows. First, demand is linear and given by:
x = 1− bp (1.3)
15In reality investment in new green technology does often have an impact on marginal cost, and
this can be a major investment incentive or disincentive. Abstracting away from this allows the paper
to isolate a separate reason for green investments.
16The only assumption important for the results is that costs must be strictly convex, of which a
quadratic cost function is the simplest, and
∑
ki = 1 gives the simplest analytical solutions. Convex
costs ensure the government faces an interesting tradeoff following f = (G,B); i.e., so that it would
not always simply set the tax to push the brown firm entirely out of the market.
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where x = x1 + x2, and b ≥ 0. Many of the proofs and examples will begin with the
case where b = 0, that is where demand is inelastic and equal to 1. Fixing the total
size of the market in this way generates simple analytical solutions that are useful
for understanding how competition for market share drives the key results. This low
elasticity benchmark is then contrasted with a high elasticity case and the results are
shown to be robust.
The second product market assumption is that firms are price takers. This ensures
there is no strategic behaviour at the production stage, and so allows the model to focus
cleanly on the strategic interactions between the firms at the investment and lobbying
stages.17 The results are robust to this assumption: in Appendix 1.D the model is
re-solved for Cournot competition, giving qualitatively equivalent but analytically less
tractable results. The price taking assumption also fits naturally with the n firm
generalisation of the model presented in Section 1.5.1.
1.2.2 The political process
After the investment choices have been made, the emissions tax τ is set by a government
with two aims: to maximise social welfare and to collect political donations from
lobbyists. Social welfare W is the utility of a representative citizen plus the impact
of environmental damage. Demand curve (1.3) implies that the representative citizen
has quasilinear utility of the form u(x, y) = 1
b
(x − 12x2) + y, where y is wealth (or
consumption of a numeraire good).18 Wealth y is equal to total profits (π1+π2), minus
expenditure on x (px), plus emissions tax revenue (τ ∑ eixi). Environmental damage
is given by η∑ eixi, where η ≥ 0 gives marginal environmental damage.19 Combining
17Any assumption other than price taking will lead to production market failures, and the government
will therefore use the emissions tax partly as an instrument of competition policy, which would not be
an interesting or helpful feature of the model.
18The above utility function is not defined for b = 0. A complete specification of the utility
function for all b ≥ 0 implied by demand equation (1.3) is: u(x, y) =
{
1
b (x− 12x2) + y if b > 0
v(x) + y if b = 0
,
where v(x) =
{
0 if x = 1
−∞ if x ̸= 1 . This discontinuity in the utility function does not affect any real
quantities in the economy, even for b = 0, because demand is continuous at b = 0. It matters only
when calculating welfares in Section 1.4. A final assumption needed to infer this quasilinear utility
function from linear demand is that it is everywhere the result of an interior solution to the consumer’s
utility maximisation problem.
19Linear environmental damage is likely to be a realistic assumption only for emissions within a
limited range: most environmental damage functions are ultimately convex (see Ackerman et al. (2009)
for a discussion). However the qualitative nature of the results would be the same in either case, so
the simplest specification is used here.
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the above gives welfare:
W (x, τ |f) = 1
b
(x− 12x
2) +
∑
πi − px+ τ
∑
eixi − η
∑
eixi (1.4)
The government also cares about political contributions c1 and c2 from the two
firms, who lobby the government over the level of τ . Bernheim and Whinston (1986)
give an analysis of games of common agency, which Grossman and Helpman (1994)
apply to lobbying, and I follow this now standard approach here. The problem is one
of two firms (the principals) attempting to influence the actions of the government
(the common agent). They do this through lobbying, which is represented by a
contribution function Ci(τ) specifying how much firm i will pay as a political donation
to the government for each level of τ . The government therefore seeks to maximise
W (τ) + λ(C1(τ) + C2(τ)), where λ ≥ 0 determines the relative weight the government
gives to political contributions compared to social welfare. λ is the openness to lobbying
of the government: λ = 0 represents an incorruptible government only interested in
social welfare; as λ rises the government and its policies become increasingly ‘for sale’.
Determining the effect of λ on the equilibrium outcome is the main aim of this paper.
1.2.3 The overall game
Combining the above components, the model can be summarised as a three stage game:
Stage 1: Investment
• Firms i ∈ {1, 2} simultaneously choose production technologies fi ∈ {G,B}.
Stage 2: Lobbying
• Firms i ∈ {1, 2} simultaneously choose contribution functions Ci(τ),
• The government then chooses emissions tax τ ∈ R.
Stage 3: Production
• Firms i ∈ {1, 2} simultaneously choose outputs xi ∈ R≥0.
• Prices are taken as given and the market clears.
Payoffs at the end of the game for government and firms are
Ugov = W + λ(C1 + C2) (1.5)
Ui = πi − Ci − s(1− ei) for i ∈ {1, 2} (1.6)
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1.3 Equilibria
The relevant solution concept for a sequential game of this kind is the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.20 It is found by backward induction, starting at stage 3.
Stage 3: Production
Taking as given the investment choice f and emissions tax τ chosen earlier in the
game, each firm maximises profits (1.2) and prices adjust so that supply equals demand
(1.3). This gives equilibrium outputs x∗i (τ, f), price p∗(τ, f) and profits π∗i (τ, f) as
a function of choices made earlier in the game. Appendix 1.A contains a complete
summary of the analytical solutions to this and subsequent stages of the game.
Given the symmetry of the two firms, there are three different technology choices to
consider: f ∈ {(G,G), (G,B), (B,B)}.21 The production subgame following f = (G,G)
is the simplest. Both firms have made the clean technology investment, so produce no
emissions: ei = 0. The emissions tax therefore has no effect, and output is high and
split evenly between the two firms.
Next, consider the subgame following f = (G,B), where one firm goes green
by investing in the clean technology and the other stays brown by keeping the old
technology. Denote, with an abuse of notation, outcomes for the firm that chose fi = G
with a subscript G, and outcomes for the firm that chose fi = B with a subscript B.
The green firm causes no emissions, eG = 0, but the brown firm continues to pollute,
eB = 1, and so must pay emissions tax τ for every unit of production. This gives
interior22 equilibrium output, price and profits, which depend on the emissions tax τ
as follows:
d
dτ
x∗G(τ, (G,B)) > 0,
d
dτ
x∗B(τ, (G,B)) < 0,
d
dτ
p∗(τ, (G,B)) > 0, (1.7)
d
dτ
π∗G(τ, (G,B)) > 0,
d
dτ
π∗B(τ, (G,B)) < 0,
d
dτ
∑
π∗i (τ, (G,B)) > 0 (1.8)
Increasing the emissions tax τ has two effects on the goods market: shifting market
share from the brown firm to the green firm, and increasing the price. The green firm
would like a high emissions tax τ since it will gain both market share and environmental
rents resulting from the price rise. These gains to the green firm can, loosely, be thought
20Throughout the paper, I restrict my attention to pure strategies only.
21Because the two firms are ex ante identical, the (G,B) and (B,G) outcomes are equivalent.
22The solution to the game will be an interior equilibrium if, given the tax rate, each firm chooses
non-negative production. We will see a corner solution following (G,B) if the tax is pushed up to
the point where the brown firm ceases production. Throughout the main text I focus on the interior
solution, with the corner solution given in Appendix 1.E.
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of as a kind of first mover advantage if this simple static game were interpreted in a
richer dynamic context. The brown firm would like a low τ since this lowers its loss of
market share, and limits the fall in its net of tax price. The sum of profits is increasing
in τ since production is shifted to the firm receiving a higher net of tax price. This
means that the green firm benefits more from an emissions tax increase than the brown
firm loses. This result is an important feature of the production subgame, and one
that will underpin many of the final results, so is summarised in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Following investment f = (G,B), total profits are increasing in the
emissions tax τ , d
dτ
∑
π∗i (τ, (G,B)) > 0. That is, the green firm gains more from
increasing τ than the brown firm loses.
Finally, consider the subgame following f = (B,B). Both firms keep the old
technology, so both pay emissions tax τ . The firms produce equal output x∗B(τ, (B,B))
and earn profits π∗B(τ, (B,B)). For any b > 0, both output and profits decrease as the
government increases the emissions tax, which shrinks total output in the usual way.
For b = 0, demand is inelastic, so total output is fixed, and the tax has no effect on
each firm’s output or profits.
Stage 2: Lobbying
In this stage, each firm seeks to influence the emissions tax, while the government
balances its two objectives of maximising social welfare and collecting political con-
tributions from each firm. Following the common agency approach of Bernheim and
Whinston (1986), this situation is characterised by the decision of a single agent (the
government) affecting two principals (the firms). Each firm announces a contribution
function Ci(τ) which specifies how much it will donate to the government for any
level of τ that might be chosen.23 Each firm designs its contribution function Ci(τ) to
encourage the government to distort the tax in the direction that increases its own
profits. The government observes the contribution functions and chooses τ to maximise
W (τ) + λ∑Ci(τ).
An outcome of this lobbying subgame will be an equilibrium if the government
cannot choose a better tax rate given the contribution functions it faces, and if each
firm cannot offer a contribution function that gives it a better payoff, given the function
offered by the other firm. More formally, given any f , a subgame perfect equilibrium of
23The contribution function is formally equivalent to the kind of standard incentive contract offered
in the context of performance related pay. In reality lobbyists do not normally offer explicit contracts
in such a transparent way, but an implicit contract of this type underpins their use of political
contributions to secure favourable policies (see Grossman and Helpman (2001) for further discussion).
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this lobbying game is a tax rate τ ∗, and pair of contribution functions (C∗1(τ), C∗2(τ))
such that:
1. For the government τ ∗ is a best response to (C∗1(τ), C∗2(τ)). That is,
τ ∗ ∈ argmax
τ∈R
W (τ) + λ(C∗1(τ) + C∗2(τ)).
2. For each firm i ∈ {1, 2}, C∗i (τ) is a best response to C∗j (τ). That is, there
is no other τ ′ and C ′i(τ) such that τ ′ is a best response to (C ′i(τ), C∗j (τ)) and
πi(τ ′, f)− C ′i(τ ′) > πi(τ ∗, f)− C∗i (τ ∗).
With no restrictions on Ci(·) this game has many equilibria. Following the now standard
approach in Grossman and Helpman (1994), equilibria are limited to those where firms
offer contribution functions of the form Ci(τ) = πi(τ) + ai, where ai is a constant.
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) term such strategies ‘truthful strategies’ and show that
the resulting equilibria are focal among the set of all possible equilibria, since only
they are stable to non-binding communication.
I can now find the equilibria of the lobbying subgame following each choice of
f ∈ {(G,G), (G,B), (B,B)}. First, consider the subgame following f = (G,G). As
mentioned above, the production outcomes in equation (1.13) are independent of the
emissions tax in this case, so no firm will spend resources lobbying and the government
can choose any tax, which has no impact on welfare. The equilibrium outcomes are
therefore τ ∈ R, c∗G(G,G) = 0.
Now, consider the lobbying subgame that follows f = (G,B). Substituting profit
functions (1.13) into the truthful contribution functions Ci(τ) = π∗i (τ, (G,B)) + ai,
equilibrium condition (1) gives the equilibrium emissions tax τ ∗(G,B). Condition (2)
gives the level of contribution c∗i = C∗i (τ ∗) from each firm needed to maintain this as
an equilibrium. The equilibrium tax rate and two of its properties are:
τ ∗(G,B) = 8η + b(6η + bη − λ)8(1− λ) + b(6− 4λ− bλ+ b) , τ
∗(G,B)|λ=0= η, d
dλ
τ ∗(G,B) > 0
(1.9)
The contributions c∗i (G,B) are given by equation (1.14) in Appendix 1.A. To
understand this result, consider the case where the government is not open to lobbying,
λ = 0. The government maximises social welfare and ignores potential lobbying, giving
outcome τ ∗ = η and c∗i = 0 for each i; we observe Pigouvian taxation and no political
contributions.24 As λ increases, i.e. as the government becomes more open to lobbying,
24We would expect the Pigouvian tax because, given f , there is one market failure (environmental
damage) and an instrument (the emissions tax) which can implement the first best solution.
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τ ∗ rises and so the tax rate increasingly exceeds the Pigouvian level. This result is a
consequence of Lemma 1 (that ∑ πi is increasing in τ following f = (G,B)). The green
firm would like a higher τ and so chooses a contribution function that rewards the
government for increasing τ , and the brown firm will likewise reward the government
for reducing τ . But by Lemma 1, the green firm gains more than the brown firm loses
from an increase in τ , so the green firm lobbies harder than the brown. That is, the
sum of the contributions will be increasing in τ and so in equilibrium the lobbying
distorts it upwards: the more the government is open to lobbying the more the green
firm gets its way. This result can be generalised in the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. For any technology f , in equilibrium lobbying distorts the emissions tax
τ above the Pigouvian level if and only if total industry profits are increasing in the
emissions tax; i.e. when λ > 0, τ ∗(f) > η ⇐⇒ d
dτ
∑
π∗i (τ, f) > 0.
This result is very general since it holds for any f , any number of firms and any
market structure. A proof of Lemma 2 follows almost immediately from contribution
functions being truthful, so that ∑C∗i (τ) = ∑π∗i (τ) + a, where a is a constant. If the
sum of profits is increasing in τ then the sum of contributions will be too, so including
it in the government’s objective function (condition (i) above) will therefore increase
the equilibrium tax above the level optimal for social welfare alone (τ = η). Lemma 2
also identifies when lobbying would distort the emissions tax below the Pigouvian level:
in any situation where the market structure is such that ∑ π∗i (τ) is decreasing in τ .
Equilibrium contributions c∗G and c∗B are strictly positive for λ > 0, but their
derivatives with respect to λ are ambiguous. As λ rises the firms have more influence
and therefore are willing to spend more to get more, but the government also needs less
compensation from firms for losses in social welfare resulting from distortions in τ . In
other words distorting the tax becomes cheaper. These two effects tend to respectively
increase and decrease c∗i as λ rises.
Now consider the lobbying subgame following f = (B,B). Following the same
procedure as above, equilibrium condition (1) gives the equilibrium emissions tax
τ ∗(B,B) and condition (2) gives the level of contributions. The tax rate is:
τ ∗(B,B) = 4η + bη − λ4 + b− bλ , τ
∗(G,B)|λ=0= η, d
dλ
τ ∗(G,B) ≤ 0 (1.10)
and the contributions c∗B(B,B) are given in equation (1.14). As in the previous case,
in the absence of lobbying, the government implements a Pigouvian tax. However, now
the firms gain from a lower tax, so as the government becomes more open to lobbying,
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the firms push the tax below the Pigouvian level: d
dλ
τ ∗(G,B) ≤ 0.
Stage 1: Investment
Now consider the initial subgame, where each firm decides whether to invest in the
new green technology or keep the old brown technology, given their knowledge of how
the game will be played following each decision.
Substituting profits (1.13) at tax rate and political contributions (1.14) into firm
payoffs (1.6), gives the reduced form payoffs for each firm following each investment
outcome. The payoffs are summarised in Table 1.1, and a full analytical description
given in Appendix 1.A.
Table 1.1 Payoff matrix for the investment subgame.
Firm 2
G B
Firm 1 G
π∗G(G,G)− s
π∗G(G,G)− s
π∗G(G,B)− c∗G(G,B)− s
π∗B(G,B)− c∗B(G,B)
B
π∗B(G,B)− c∗B(G,B)
π∗G(G,B)− c∗G(G,B)− s
π∗B(B,B)− c∗B(B,B)
π∗B(B,B)− c∗B(B,B)
Notes: See Appendix 1.A for the full analytical results.
The Nash equilibria of this reduced form game, along with τ ∗ and {C∗i (τ), x∗i }i∈{G,B}
from the next two stages, are the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the whole game.
I will henceforth refer to an equilibrium of the whole game by its investment choices f ,
omitting for brevity the corresponding τ ∗(f), C∗i (f) and x∗i (f). An intuitive summary
of the possible equilibria is as follows. If firms choose (G,G), then production profits
are high and symmetric, no political contributions are made, and both firms pay
green investment cost s. If firms choose (B,B) then production profits are low and
symmetric, both firms lobby the emissions tax below the Pigouvian level and both
firms avoid the investment cost s. If firms choose (G,B), then the green firm gains
profits from increased market share and higher prices (π∗G(G,B) > π∗B(B,B)), it must
pay a political contribution (c∗G(G,B)) to push the tax up and stop its opponent firm
from pushing it down, and it must pay green investment cost s. The brown firm loses
profits from loss of market share and lower net of tax prices (π∗B(G,B) < π∗G(G,G)),
it must pay a political contribution (c∗B(G,B)) to keep the emissions tax from being
even higher, but it avoids investment cost s.
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The equilibria of the reduced form investment subgame can now be found. I focus
on two equilibria: (G,B) and then (G,G).
1.3.1 The (G,B) equilibrium
The asymmetric equilibrium (G,B) is of particular interest, since this features political
conflict between the firms. Using the payoff matrix in Table 1.1, the no-deviation
conditions for the two firms are:
s ≤ π∗G(G,B)− π∗B(B,B)− c∗G(G,B) + c∗B(B,B) (1.11)
s ≥ π∗G(G,G)− π∗B(G,B) + c∗B(G,B) (1.12)
The (η, λ, b, s) parameter space that gives rise to the (G,B) equilibrium can now
be characterised. For any (η, λ, b), let S be the set of values of investment cost s
that satisfy no-deviation conditions (1.11) and (1.12). That is, let S = {s ∈ R :
inequalities (1.11) and (1.12) hold}. Denote by |S| the absolute size of S, so that it is
the range of investment costs that leads to (G,B) in equilibrium, and is a function of
the remaining parameters, (λ, η, b).
To make progress in deriving tractable results, it is useful to consider the case where
b, and therefore the elasticity of demand, is small. In the extreme case, with demand
inelastic and so b = 0, the size of the market is fixed and the model can concentrate
purely on market share effects, which are the focus of this paper. The analytical results
in the following propositions are derived for small b ≥ 0; Section 1.3.3 demonstrates
the robustness of these results to high demand elasticities.
Proposition 1 (Existence of (G,B) equilibrium). For η sufficiently large, and b small:
(i) The (G,B) equilibrium exists, that is S is non-empty.
(ii) (G,B) is the equilibrium for a greater region of the parameter space as the
government becomes more open to lobbying, that is d
dλ
|S|> 0.
Proposition 1(i) confirms the intuition outlined in the Introduction that market
share considerations can indeed lead to one firm going green and the other staying
brown. It is the gain in market share that makes it profitable for one firm to go green;
the second firm would not find it profitable also to go green because they would not
see this gain in market share, and therefore stays brown. That such an asymmetric
equilibrium exists is not a foregone conclusion in a model where the firms are ex-ante
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identical, and is therefore of interest. A firm needs no initial technological advantage
(or head start of any other kind) over their rival to find it profitable to go green and
lobby for increased market share.
Proposition 1(ii) shows that as λ rises, a greater range of parameters give rise to
the (G,B) equilibrium. Interpreting this result more broadly and loosely, the (G,B)
outcome can be thought of as becoming in some sense more likely. The intuition for
this result is that the ability of firms to lobby - understood as the equilibrium response
to the government’s interest in political contributions - makes green investment more
attractive.25 The green firm is willing to lobby harder than the brown firm for the
emissions tax to rise, so τ is increasing in λ (Lemma 2). This extra lobbying results in
an increase in profits that outweighs the increased lobbying bill, so the green investment
becomes more attractive. Hence, the firm will be willing to make the green investment
at higher costs s, tending to increase |S|. The brown firm’s behaviour will be impacted
by rising λ too, since staying brown involves an ever larger loss of market share, tending
to decrease |S|. However, this loss is smaller than the green firm’s gain, so the overall
effect is an increase in |S|.
These same results can be understood graphically, as shown in Figure 1.1. The
Figure shows the regions of the (λ, s) parameter space that give rise to different
investment choices in equilibrium (holding η and b fixed). The solid line is the
indifference curve of a firm whose competitor has stayed brown (condition (1.11)).
At points below the line, green investment costs are low enough that it is profitable
to go green, above the line it is better to stay brown. The thick dashed line is the
indifference curve of a firm whose competitor has gone green (condition (1.12)), with
optimal technology choices likewise above and below the line. As expected, when green
investment cost s is low, both firms prefer to go green since this requires only a small
investment and avoids market share being stolen by their competitor. As s rises one
firm will at some point find it profitable to stay brown, and eventually s will be so
prohibitively high that both firms will prefer to stay brown.
Proposition 1(i) is demonstrated by the fact that the indifference curves lie one
above the other in the order they do: |S| is the vertical distance between the two lines.
Proposition 1(ii) is demonstrated by the fact that the vertical space between the lines
grows with λ.
These results indicate that there are situations where is it only because of lobbying,
i.e. λ > 0 rather than λ = 0, that the economy ends up in equilibrium at (G,B) and
25My use of the phrase ‘ability of firms to lobby’ here and subsequently refers only to the size of λ;
it is not a restriction on the contribution functions Ci they can offer.
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Figure 1.1 Equilibrium investment outcomes.
Notes: Equilibrium investment outcomes are shown as a function of the parameter space (λ, s), plotted
for (b=0, η=0.3). The thick solid line shows the indifference curve of a firm whose competitor has
played B, the thick dashed line likewise if the competitor has played G.
not (B,B). I will describe such economies as featuring a ‘lobbying-induced switch’
from (B,B) to (G,B). (This description refers only to a comparative statics-type
switch, not to a transition in the dynamic sense.) To formalise this idea, it is helpful
to define a new set: for any (η, λ, b), let S ′(λ) = S(λ) \ S(0). That is, S ′(λ) is the set
of investment costs s that result in (G,B) when openness to lobbying is λ, but would
have given (B,B) if λ were 0. Proposition 2 gives two key properties of S ′.
Proposition 2 (Lobbying-induced switches to (G,B)). For η sufficiently large and b
small:
(i) Parameter constellations exist such that (G,B), and not (B,B), is the equilibrium
outcome, that is S ′ is non-empty.
(ii) The parameter space giving rise to a lobbying-induced switch to (G,B) from (B,B)
expands as the government becomes more open to lobbying, that is d
dλ
|S ′|> 0.
Figure 1.1 illustrates this result graphically. Proposition 2(i) is demonstrated by
the existence of a wedge between the solid line and the thin dotted line labelled |S ′|,
and Proposition 2(ii) is demonstrated by the size of this wedge increasing with λ.
In order to summarise these results (which are the main contribution of the paper)
and illustrate the importance of lobbying, consider the following comparative statics.
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Suppose an economy has a government not at all open to lobbying (λ = 0) and green
investment costs s, such that the economy is at point P in Figure 1.1. A firm thinking
of going green knows that if it were to do so it would gain market share and increase its
profits due to the introduction of an emissions tax. But it also knows this emissions tax
(τ ∗ = η) will not be high enough to compensate it for the large green investment cost
s, hence the equilibrium is for all firms to stay brown and no environmental protection
is achieved. If, however, the government were to be somewhat open to lobbying, say
λ = 14 , with the same green investment cost the economy would be at point P
′. Now
the firm considering going green would reason that, if it were to invest in the green
technology, it could use the political process to push up the emissions tax (to τ ∗ = 43η
for the parameter values used in Figure 1.1), and this would be sufficient to cover the
investment cost plus the political contribution needed to push up the tax. The other
firm will lobby to reduce τ , which keeps it from being even higher, but it would prefer
to lose some market share rather than pay the green investment cost itself and so will
stay brown. Hence, it is only the ability of a firm to influence the political process and
secure a high emissions tax that gives it an incentive to invest in the green technology,
and it is only because of the firm’s political support that the government takes strong
action on the environment. The welfare implications of this are given in Proposition 4
below.
1.3.2 The (G,G) equilibrium
So far I have focused on the asymmetric (G,B) equilibrium, since it involves firm
conflict in the lobbying subgame. However, the model may also help describe situations
where all firms make the green investment together and no market share ends up being
fought over, that is (G,G) is the equilibrium outcome. In this case, it is the threat of
having its market share stolen that will make each firm more likely to go green. Using
an analogous approach to that in Section 1.3.1, the properties of this equilibrium can
be characterised as follows. Let T be the set of investment costs that lead to (G,G)
in equilibrium. That is, for any (η, λ, b), let T = {s ∈ R : inequality (1.12) holds}.
Unlike in the previous case, the existence of the (G,G) equilibrium should not itself be
a surprising result: given small enough green investment costs, each firm will prefer to
make the small green investment in order to avoid emissions tax τ . I therefore move
straight to the question of whether lobbying makes the (G,G) outcome more likely, in
the sense that it expands the parameter space that supports this equilibrium.
For any (η, λ, b), let T ′(λ) = T (λ) \T (0). That is, let T ′(λ) be the set of investment
costs that result in (G,G) when openness to lobbying is λ, but would not have given
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(G,G) if λ were 0. T ′ captures those situations where (G,G) is the outcome only
because a government is open to lobbying, i.e. we have a lobbying-induced switch. The
following results can now be given.
Proposition 3 (Lobbying-induced switches to (G,G)). For any η, and b small:
(i) Parameter constellations exist such that (G,G), and not (G,B), is the equilibrium,
that is T ′ is non-empty.
(ii) The parameter space giving rise to a lobbying-induced switch to (G,G) from (G,B)
expands as the government becomes more open to lobbying, that is d
dλ
|T ′|> 0.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The more open a government is to
lobbying, the further the tax will be distorted above the Pigouvian level following
(G,B), and hence the more market share a firm will lose if it stays brown while its rival
goes green. This threat of an increasingly damaging emissions tax means firms become
increasingly willing to go green as λ rises. This point is made graphically in Figure 1.1.
An economy with no lobbying is shown at point Q, and is in equilibrium at (G,B).
An otherwise identical economy, except that the government is more open to lobbying,
is shown at point Q′, and is in equilibrium at (G,G). This result formalises the idea
that, even when all firms in an industry go green together in a seemingly ‘cooperative’
way, it may well be that it is only the threat of losing substantial market share that
keeps each individual firm from deviating. The welfare consequences of this are given
in Proposition 5 below.
1.3.3 The high elasticity case
The elasticity of demand is determined by the parameter b, from demand equation
(1.3). The above results were derived analytically for small b (starting with b = 0
and then exploiting the continuity of the relevant expressions in b) and are shown in
Figure 1.1 for b = 0. The complexity of the final analytical expressions when b > 0 (see
Appendix 1.A) makes closed form versions of the above and subsequent propositions
difficult to obtain when b is large. In this section, I show that the qualitative results
continue to hold for large b, though for increasingly narrow (η, λ, s) parameter spaces.
First, note that the production and political stages still have tractable analytical
solutions when b is large. In particular, Lemmas 1 and 2 hold for all b, and it can
also be shown that d
db
d
dτ
∑
π∗i (τ, (G,B)) < 0. That is, when b is large, increasing the
emissions tax still increases total profits, but by a smaller amount than when b is small.
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Intuitively, when the total size of the market is very price sensitive, the green firm has
less to gain from a tax rise because the corresponding fall in total quantity is large:
the market stealing effect is somewhat offset by a market size effect. This means the
equilibrium tax τ ∗(G,B)) falls in b, and approaches the Pigouvian level from above.
Hence, the impact of lobbying, qualitatively the same as in the previous sections, falls
as b rises.
Figure 1.2 Equilibrium investment outcomes with elastic demand.
Notes: Equilibrium investment outcomes are shown as a function of the parameter space (λ, s). The
black lines show indifference curves when b = 0.75; for comparison the light grey lines show the b = 0
case (and are the same as those in Figure 1.1). As before, η = 0.3 in both cases.
Figure 1.2 demonstrates numerically for large b what Propositions 1-3 proved
analytically for small b.26 A region of the parameter space gives rise to (G,B) in
equilibrium, and this region expands as λ rises (Proposition 1), though the total size of
the region is smaller than in the b = 0 case. Likewise, regions of the parameter space
give rise to lobbying-induced switches to (G,B) and to (G,G), and the sizes of the
regions rise with λ (Propositions 2 and 3); once again in each case, however, the region
is smaller for b > 0 than when b = 0.
These results demonstrate that lobbying that supports environmental regulation
might be more prevalent in industries where the demand elasticity is low. If it is too
high, strong environmental protection shrinks the total market too much, offsetting
26The Figure is plotted for b = 34 , chosen as it balances the need to for b to be large with the desire
to retain interior solutions for much of the parameter space (larger b give rise to corner solutions at
smaller values of λ).
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any firm’s potential gain in market share and therefore making green investments less
attractive.
1.4 Welfare
Section 1.3 showed that the ability of firms to lobby can cause the economy to end up
in a greener equilibrium than in the absence of lobbying. In this section I ask whether
these lobbying-induced switches are welfare improving. In each case there are trade-offs
between increased environmental protection on the one hand, and investment costs
and distortions to the production profile of the economy as a result of lobbying on the
other.
Using equilibrium outcomes from stages 2 and 3 in welfare equation (1.4), define an
indirect welfare function W (f) that depends only on technology profile f ; this includes
all political and production outcomes, but not investment cost s. Then define social
preference ≻ over all technology profiles such that for any two technology profiles
f, f ′ ∈ {G,B}2, f ≻ f ′ if and only if W (·) minus any green investment costs is higher
for f than f ′.
1.4.1 The (G,B) equilibrium
It can now be asked when being in equilibrium at (G,B) rather than (B,B), for
example P ′ rather than P in Figure 1.1, is socially preferable.27 Using the above
definitions, (G,B) ≻ (B,B) if and only if W (G,B)− s > W (B,B). For any (η, λ, b),
let Y = {s ∈ R : (G,B) ≻ (B,B)}. Y is the set of investment costs for which the
greener (G,B) is socially preferred to the dirtier alternative (B,B). Recall that S ′ is
the set of investment costs for which the economy is in equilibrium at (G,B) rather
than (B,B). Hence, all such lobbying-induced switches will be socially preferable if
any economy in S ′ is also in Y , that is if S ′ ⊂ Y .
Proposition 4 (Welfare of lobbying-induced switches to (G,B)). For b small, any
lobbying-induced switch from (B,B) to (G,B) is socially preferable, that is S ′ ⊂ Y .
To understand this result, consider the social costs of being in equilibrium at (G,B)
rather than (B,B). In the (B,B) equilibrium, firms produce an equal share of output
but they lobby the tax below the Pigouvian level, resulting in too much environmental
damage. In the (G,B) equilibrium, lobbying distorts the tax above the Pigouvian level,
27Note that λ does not have a direct effect on welfare in this set up. Its only effect is to introduce
distortions into the economy through τ∗.
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which reduces environmental damage. But it also distorts the production profile of the
economy, both by giving the green firm more than its efficient market share (convex
cost functions making this socially undesirable) and also by shrinking total output
below the optimal level (for b > 0).
Proposition 4 shows that if the green investment cost s is large enough to induce a
switch from (B,B) to (G,B), then the net gain in welfare, from reduced environmental
damage plus increased product market distortion, more than compensates for s. All
such switches are therefore socially preferable.
1.4.2 The (G,G) equilibrium
The same welfare analysis can be used to compare the (G,B) and (G,G) equilibria.
(G,G) ≻ (G,B) if and only if W (G,G) − s > W (G,B). For any (η, λ, b), let Z =
{s ∈ R : (G,G) ≻ (G,B)}. Recall T ′ is the set of investment costs for which lobbying
induces the economy to be in (G,G) rather than (G,B). Hence any lobbying-induced
switch will be socially preferable if all economies in T ′ are also in Z, that is if T ′ ⊂ Z.
Proposition 5 (Welfare of lobbying-induced switches to (G,G)). For b small, any
lobbying-induced switch from (G,B) to (G,G) is socially preferable, that is T ′ ⊂ Z.
This result is perhaps less surprising than the previous proposition. As outlined
above, the (G,B) outcome features product market distortions, both in the firms’ shares
of production and total output. In contrast, there is no product market distortion in
the (G,G) case, since both firms have clean production technologies and so output
is shared evenly and at the socially optimal level. Moving from (G,B) to (G,G),
therefore, reduces both environmental damage and product market distortions. Hence,
if the investment cost is such that a lobbying-induced switch occurs, it will be more
than compensated for by the above two welfare gains.
1.5 Extensions and robustness
1.5.1 Generalisation to n firms
In this section I generalise the model by allowing the number of firms to be any n ∈ N.
The results for the special case of n = 2 characterised in the previous sections are
shown to qualitatively hold in the more general case. Let nG be the number of firms
that chose fi = G in stage 1. Solving the model in an analogous way to the n = 2
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case in Section 1.3 gives equilibrium outcomes as a function of nG at each stage. The
details are given in Appendix 1.C.28
Proposition 6 (n-firm equilibrium existence). For any η, b = 0, λ sufficiently close
to 0, and any n ∈ N:
(i) Any number of green firms can be supported as the unique equilibrium. That
is, for all nG ∈ {0, ..., n} there exist regions of (η, λ, s) space such that S(nG) is
non-empty.
(ii) The equilibrium number of green firms n∗G decreases with the green investment
cost s.
The results in the above proposition are demonstrated numerically in Figure
1.3, plotted with n = 5. Like Figure 1.1, this shows which regions of the (λ, s)
parameter space give rise to different n∗G equilibria. Proposition 6(i) is demonstrated
by each number of green firms nG ∈ {1, ..., n} being supported by some different green
investment s for small λ. Proposition 6(ii) is demonstrated by the number of firms
going green in equilibrium falling as the green investment becomes more expensive, for
intuitively straightforward reasons.
The n-firm case more closely describes the real world examples discussed in the
Introduction. In the case of the ozone layer and DuPont, n∗G = 1 and n ≈ 5, with just
DuPont lobbying for environmental protection and a handful of others opposing. In
Figure 1.3, points P and P ′ illustrate the importance of lobbying for the equilibrium
outcome. In the case of climate change and the European oil and gas companies,
n∗G = 6 and n is large. However, the key insights gained from the two-firm model
remain largely in tact in the n-firm case.
1.5.2 Cournot and other models of competition
The baseline model assumes firms take prices as given. As discussed, by abstracting
away from strategic product market behaviour, this allows the model to focus cleanly
on the political and investment stages of the game. In this section I demonsrate
the robustness of these results, by outlining the solution to the model with Cournot
competition in the production stage. Appendix 1.D contains further details.
28I focus on the case where λ is close to 0, which (hopefully) represents many modern economies.
Goldberg and Maggi (1999), among others, estimate Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) trade protection
model. They estimate, for the US, openness to lobbying λ to be positive but small, around λ = 0.02.
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Figure 1.3 Equilibrium outcomes for multiple firms.
Equilibrium outcomes are shown as a function of the parameter space (λ, s), plotted for n = 5 and
with (b=0, η=0.2).
Consider the setup in Section 1.2, but now suppose firms know that prices depend
on quantity according to demand equation (1.3). Substituting this into their profit
equations and maximising gives equilibrium outputs such that Lemma 1 continues
to hold. In the lobbying stage, compared to the previous case, the equilibrium taxes
are distorted downwards, as the government addresses the market failure resulting
from Cournot competition. This use of an environmental tax as an instrument of
competition policy complicates the solutions, but they retain the key properties needed
for the final results: τ ∗(G,G) ∈ R, d
dλ
τ ∗(G,B) > 0, and d
dλ
τ ∗(B,B) < 0. Solving the
investment stage establishes that the (G,B) equilibrium exists and becomes more likely
as λ increases. Appendix 1.D gives further details.29
A final point to make about market structure is a more general one. Abstracting
away from specific assumptions, the results found here will qualitatively hold so long
as total profits are increasing in the government’s environmental protection instrument.
Instead of a tax, this instrument could most obviously be a reduction in permits under
a cap and trade scheme. Hepburn et al. (2013) characterise quite general conditions
under which the equivalent of d
dτ
∑
π∗i > 0 holds. That it does often hold should not be
29The model can be re-solved for other competitive environments. Hotelling competition gives
particularly concise analytical solutions. Again, the results continue to hold, though they are inevitably
made more complex by the government using the emissions tax as an instrument of competition policy
as well as environmental policy.
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too surprising a result: environmental protection frequently involves putting a price on
externalities where previously there was none, generating environmental rents which
can at least partially accrue to firms. Reinforcing this effect, governments often give
away large quantities of permits to firms, especially as a scheme is introduced. Hence,
though environmental regulation can sometimes shrink markets, getting a share of the
new rents often ensures the winners gain more than the losers lose. Therefore Lemma 1
or its equivalent is arguably a more general property of economies than might initially
be supposed.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper presented a model of environmental protection in a situation where firms
can lobby the government over the level of an emissions tax and use it as a means
to potentially steal market share from their competitors. The paper focused on the
equilibrium where one firm goes green, lobbies for a high emissions tax and gains
market share from its rival, who stays brown and lobbies to try to lower the tax. The
equilibrium tax is increasingly distorted above the Pigouvian level as the government
becomes more open to lobbying. I show there are situations where it is only because
of lobbying that the economy ends up with one green firm instead of none. The
equilibrium where both firms go green is also characterised, and here the threat of
loss of market share helps to sustain the equilibrium. In both cases, lobbying-induced
switches to a greener economy are welfare improving.
The findings in this paper illustrate a broader point, that we ought to think care-
fully about why there might be conflict between corporate interests and environmental
protection, and whether it is inevitable. Certainly profit maximising behaviour, partic-
ularly when it comes to minimising costs,30 can mean these two forces pull in opposite
directions. But the creation of environmental rents and the opportunity to use regula-
tion to gain a competitive advantage over a rival are both powerful reasons for profit
maximising firms to support environmental protection. Such political support can have
a major impact on the extent to which the environment is protected.
I have argued this model explains some otherwise puzzling examples of environmental
lobbying by polluting firms. However, the model is also a bad predictor of the political
economy of environmental protection much of the time - since polluting industries are
30The 1984 Union Carbide chemical leak in Bhopal was a particularly deadly and long lasting
environmental disaster (see Dhara and Dhara (2002)). Aggressive cost cutting is often said to be its
cause, as it was with the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
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often united in opposing regulation - a fact which is itself interesting since it suggests
that there may be other important effects at work. Three potentially plausible frictions
that would generate this result are as follows.
The first, and perhaps most interesting, explanation could be collusion. Firm
collusion in the product market has been extensively studied, but it is not the only
arena in which firms may be more or less competitive. The model presented here features
a highly competitive political stage (in the sense that lobbying is non-cooperative), but
perhaps in reality the firms collude, at least to some extent. If the determinants of
political collusion are similar to the those of product market collusion, concentrated,
established industries that cooperate on other matters might be expected to collude
politically and stay brown rather than maximise their individual profits and go green.
Both industry and environmental lobbyists often emphasise the practical importance
of Trade Associations, the industry-wide lobby groups through which much of each
firm’s lobbying in reality takes place. In order to function, these institutions foster
consensus and cooperation among their members, or, in other words, collusion. Firms’
lobbyists are often not keen to deviate from a collusive outcome, either for rational
repeated game-type reasons, or perhaps for ingrained social and institutional ones.31
A second plausible explanation could be due to uncertainty over government policy.
The green firm needs the tax to stay in place and not be changed by future governments,
which is the case by construction in the simple model presented here. In reality, however,
governments behave less predictably and newly elected governments, for example, often
cancel taxes or subsidies introduced by their predecessors. Going green is therefore a
risky investment, and companies may decide they don’t want the uncertainty in their
revenues and may rationally choose to stay brown.
Third, it may be that (due to asymmetries not modelled above) the firms that
stand to lose are large incumbents, and those that stand to gain are either small
incumbents or entrants. Such firms are likely to be liquidity constrained in their
lobbying activities, and may face other barriers to lobbying such as less developed
networks with policymakers. In such circumstances, lobbying may not in equilibrium
result in a large enough environmental tax for a firm to choose to go green. Whatever
the exact mechanism, some additional friction or imperfection is needed before it can
be shown that corporate lobbying inevitably harms the environment. Given this may
often have large consequences, further, perhaps empirical, work in this area may be
fruitful.
31Wider social and cultural factors may also play a role in determining the extent of collusion, for
example in explaining why European oil and gas producers lobbied for a carbon price in 2015 when
their US counterparts did not.
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Appendix 1.A Full analytical solutions to the sub-
games
x1 x2 p π1 π2
(G,G) 2
b+4
2
b+4
1
b+4
1
(b+4)2
1
(b+4)2
(G,B) 4τ+2
b+4
2−(2+b)2τ
b+4
2τ+1
b+4
(2τ+1)2
(b+4)2
(1−(2+b)τ)2
(b+4)2
(B,B) 2(1−bτ)
b+4
2(1−bτ)
b+4
4τ+1
b+4
(1−bτ)2
(b+4)2
(1−bτ)2
(b+4)2
Production subgame equilibrium outcomes (1.13)
τ ∗ c∗1 c
∗
2
(G,G) ∈ R 0 0
(G,B) 8η+b(6η+bη−λ)8(1−λ)+b(6−4λ−bλ+b)
4λ(b+2)(2η−λ+1)2
(b−2λ−bλ+4)(8λ−6b+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8)2
λ(b+2)2(2λ−b+4η+4bη+b2η−2)2
(b2+6b−4λ+8)(8λ−6b+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8)2
(B,B) 4η+bη−λ4+(1−λ)b
bλ(bη−1)2
(2b−bλ+8)(b−bλ+4)2
bλ(bη−1)2
(2b−bλ+8)(b−bλ+4)2
Lobbying subgame equilibrium outcomes (1.14)
G B
G
1
(b+4)2 − s
1
(b+4)2 − s
(b+2)(2η−λ+1)2
−(b−2λ−bλ+4)(8λ−6b+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8) − s
(2λ−b+4η+4bη+b2η−2)2
(−6b+8λ+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8)(−6b+4λ−b2−8)
B
(2λ−b+4η+4bη+b2η−2)2
(−6b+8λ+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8)(−6b+4λ−b2−8)
(b+2)(2η−λ+1)2
−(b−2λ−bλ+4)(8λ−6b+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8) − s
2(bη−1)2(b+4)
(2b−bλ+8)(b−bλ+4)2
2(bη−1)2(b+4)
(2b−bλ+8)(b−bλ+4)2
Investment subgame payoff matrix (1.15)
Appendix 1.B Proofs
Lemma 1
Proof. Using production equilibrium outcomes (1.13), we find d
dτ
∑
πi(τ, (G,B)) =
2(8τ−b+4bτ+b2τ)
(b+4)2 , which is positive if τ >
b
4b+b2+8 ∈ [0,
√
2−1
4 ] for all b ∈ R≥0. The results
from the next stage verify that, in the equilibria of interest, τ always satisfies the above
inequality.
Proposition 1
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Proof. (i) There are parameters for which S is non-empty if |S|> 0. Let ss = max S,
obtained by substituting values from payoff matrix (1.15) into no-deviation condition
(1.11). Likewise let ss = minS, obtained by substituting values from payoff matrix
(1.15) into no-deviation condition (1.12). |S|= ss−ss, but the full analytical expression
for |S| and subsequent quantities is long, so I proceed in this and the next two proofs as
follows. First, I demonstrate the relevant result at b = 0, i.e. when demand is inelastic.
Second, if the relevant expression is continuous in b at b = 0, then any result true
at b = 0 must also be true for b > 0 but close to 0. (The large b case is considered
graphically in Section 1.3.3.) Proceeding in this way, |S|b=0= λ2−λ+8η28(1−λ)(2−λ) , which is
positive if η > (λ(1−λ)8 )
1
2 . η >
√
2
8 ≈ 0.18 guarantees |S|> 0 for all λ ∈ R≥0 that give an
interior solution. Finally, limb→0(|S|) = |S|b=0, so |S| is continuous in b at b = 0.
(ii) Differentiating gives d
dλ
|S|
∣∣∣
b=0
= (12−8λ)η2−(1−λ)24(1−λ)2(2−λ)2 which is positive for η >
1−λ
2(3−2λ)1/2 .
η >
√
3
6 ≈ 0.29 guarantees ddλ |S|> 0 for all λ ∈ R≥0 that give an interior solution.
Finally, limb→0( ddλ |S|) = |S|b=0, so ddλ |S| is continuous in b at b = 0.
Proposition 2
Proof. (i) S ′ is non-empty if |S ′|> 0, where |S ′(λ)|= ss(λ)− ss(0). Using maximum
investment cost ss(λ) from the above proof, |S ′|b=0= 8η+λ2−λ+8η2−8λη16(1−λ)(2−λ) . Hence |S ′|> 0 if
η > λ−1+
√
2
√−3λ+λ2+2
2(3−λ) ; η >
1
6 ensures this holds for all λ ∈ R≥0 that gives an interior
solution. Finally, limb→0(|S ′|) = |S|b=0, so |S ′| is continuous in b at b = 0.
(ii) Differentiating and then setting b = 0 gives d
dλ
|S ′|
∣∣∣
b=0
= (2η+1−λ)(λ+6η−4λη−1)8(1−λ)2(2−λ)2 . This
is positive if η > 1−λ2(3−2λ) ; η >
1
6 ensures this holds for all λ ∈ R≥0 that gives an interior
solution. Finally, limb→0( ddλ |S ′|) = ddλ |S ′|
∣∣∣
b=0
, so d
dλ
|S ′| is continuous in b at b = 0.
Proposition 3
Proof. The form of the proof is the same as for Proposition 2. (i) T ′ is non-empty
if |T ′|> 0, where |T ′(λ)|= sT (λ) − sT (0) and sT = max T ′. Substituting payoff
matrix (1.15) into no-deviation condition (1.11) gives sT , which then gives |T ′|b=0=
λ(4η−λ−12η2−4λη+4λη2+1)
16(1−λ)(2−λ) . Hence |T ′|> 0 if η >
1−λ+√2
√
(1−λ)(2−λ)
2(3−λ) , which holds for all
(λ, η) ∈ R2≥0 that give an interior solution. Finally, limb→0(|T ′|) = |T |b=0, so |T ′| is
continuous in b at b = 0.
(ii) Differentiating and then setting b = 0 gives d
dλ
|T ′|= (1−λ+6η−4λη)(1−λ−2η)8(1−λ)2(2−λ)2 . Again this
is positive if η < 1−λ2 , which holds for all (λ, η) ∈ R2≥0 that give an interior solution.
Finally, limb→0( ddλ |T ′|) = ddλ |T ′|
∣∣∣
b=0
, so d
dλ
|T ′| is continuous in b at b = 0.
Proposition 4
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Proof. Let sY = max Y , that is sY is the largest investment cost for which (G,B) ≻
(B,B). S ′ ⊂ Y when sY > sS. Using indirect welfare function W (f), we can calculate
sY = W (G,B) −W (B,B). The limits as b → 0 are limb→0(sY ) = η(−2λ+η+λ2−2λη+1)2(λ−1)2
and limb→0(sS) = (
λ2−λ+8η2)
8(λ2−3λ+2) . Using these results, in the b→ 0 limit, sY (λ) > sS holds
if (16λ2 − 32λ + 8)η2 + (24λ2 − 8λ3 − 24λ + 8)η + (λ3 − 2λ2 + λ) > 0. Solving for
η, it can be shown that this holds for any (λ, η) ∈ R2≥0 that give an interior solution.
Note that at b = 0, for welfare analysis we must use the part of the utility function
specified in footnote 18. This then ensures continuity in all the relevant expressions at
b = 0.
Proposition 5
Proof. Let sZ = max Z, that is sZ is the largest investment cost for which (G,G) ≻
(G,B). T ′ ⊂ Z when sZ > sT . Using indirect welfare function W (f), we can calculate
sZ = W (G,G)−W (G,B). The limits as b→ 0 are limb→0(sZ) = η(−2λ−η+λ2+2λη+1)2(1−λ)2 and
limb→0(sT ) = λ−λ
2−8λη−8η2+8η
16(1−λ)(2−λ) . Using these results, in the b→ 0 limit, sZ > sT holds if
η ∈ [ (1−λ)(−4λ+2λ2+1−
√
2L(λ))
4(2λ2−4λ+1) ,
(1−λ)(−4λ+2λ2+1+√2L(λ))
4(2λ2−4λ+1) ] where L(λ) =
√−9λ+ 16λ2 − 10λ3 + 2λ4 + 2.
Any η giving an interior solution lies in the above interval. Note that at b = 0, for
welfare analysis we must use the part of the utility function specified in footnote 18.
This then ensures continuity in all the relevant expressions at b = 0.
Appendix 1.C Generalisation to n-firms
Stage 3: Production
Let nG be the number of firms that chose fi = G in stage 1. The investment profile
f ∈ {G,B}n is therefore summarised by nG. Given nG and tax τ chosen in stages 1 and
2, firms choose their level of output xi to maximise their profits. Assuming all firms that
made the same investment choice behave in the same way, and denoting as before vari-
ables for a firm that chose fi = G with a G subscript and those that chose fi = B with
a B subscript, the stage 3 equilibrium is given by outputs x∗G(τ, nG), x∗B(τ, nG), with
corresponding prices and profits p∗(τ, nG), π∗G(τ, nG), π∗B(τ, nG). As before, any firm
that has gone green gains from a higher tax and those that stayed brown gain from a
lower tax. Lemma 1 continues to hold since the sum of all firms profits is increasing in τ .
Stage 2: Lobbying
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Knowing how a tax will impact their profits and taking nG as given, the firms non-
cooperatively choose their lobbying contribution functions Ci(τ).32 The government
maximises a weighted sum of social welfare and political contributions as before. The
equilibrium is an emissions tax τ ∗ and pair of contribution functions (C∗G(τ), C∗B(τ))
that satisfy the two equilibrium conditions set out in Section 1.3. When b = 0, solving
gives τ ∗(nG) = η1−λ , and values of c
∗
i (nG) that are generalisations of the n = 2 case. As
in the two firm case, lobbying results in the emissions tax being increasingly distorted
above the Pigouvian level. This is a consequence of Lemma 2, which it was previously
noted holds for any n and therefore applies in this setting.
Stage 1: Investment
Having shown that green firms will successfully lobby to distort the emissions tax
above the Pigouvian level, it only remains to show that some firms will in equilibrium
choose to go green in the investment stage. An equilibrium of the investment subgame
is a profile of choices f ∈ {G,B}n, or equivalently a value of nG ∈ {0, ..., n}, such that
no firm gains from unilaterally deviating. That is, given the choices of the other firms,
no firm choosing G could gain from deviating to B and no firm choosing B could gain
from deviating to G, as given respectively by
π∗G(nG)− c∗G(nG)− s ≥ π∗B(nG − 1)− c∗B(nG − 1) (1.16)
π∗B(nG)− c∗B(nG) ≥ π∗G(nG + 1)− c∗G(nG + 1)− s (1.17)
An equilibrium is a value of nG that satisfies both equations. In principle all the results
in the propositions in Section 1.3 can be replicated using the equations derived in this
section, but most of the analytical solutions are not tractable. I therefore present, in
the main body of the article, the small λ case analytically, and then give a graphical
example of the more general case to demonstrate the comparative statics. Following
Section 1.3, define set S(nG) = {s ∈ R≥0 : nG satisfies (1.16) and (1.17)}. That is,
S(nG) is the set of investment costs that supports nG firms going green in equilibrium.
Proposition 6
Proof. Part (i): Consider the case where λ = 0, giving |S(nG)|= 2η2n2 (n−1), which is inde-
pendent of nG. |S(nG)|> 0 therefore holds for all nG and any n ≥ 2. limλ→0(|S(nG)|) =
|S(nG)|λ=0, so |S(nG)| is continuous in λ at λ = 0, hence the above results continue to
32For example, all the green firms don’t form a special interest group and coordinate their lobbying.
This implicitly assumes the firms have not solved the collective action problem that prevents them
from colluding at the lobbying stage. This issue is briefly discussed in Section 1.6.
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hold for small λ. Part (ii): follows from |S(nG)|= 2η2n2 (n− 1) when λ = 0, and |S(nG)|
being continuous in λ at λ = 0.
Appendix 1.D Cournot competition
Consider a set up identical to that in Section 1.2, except that each firm maximises its
profits believing that its own and the other firm’s output affects prices according to
demand equation (1.3). For analytical simplicity, consider the b = 1 case. Solving in
exactly the same way as in Section 1.3, we get:
ss =
11 005λ+ 13 836η + 14 375λ2 − 53 125λ3 + 15 625λ4 + 582η2 −
33 750λ2η2 − 83 260λη + 17 880λη2 + 112 500λ2η − 12 500λ3η − 3168
5(λ− 1)(λ− 2)(145λ− 47)(125λ− 47)
,
(1.18)
ss =
25(−400λ2 − 4900λη + 605λ− 6125η2 + 5390η − 744)
49(47− 145λ)(47− 20λ) (1.19)
Using these and subsequent expressions, it is possible to obtain the results in the
Propositions in the main text. Given the complexity of these expressions, numerical
examples (not included in this thesis) are the easiest way to establish many of the
results.
Appendix 1.E Corner solutions
A corner solution in the production subgame is a possibility following f = (G,B). If the
emissions tax τ is high enough then the brown firm will want to choose negative output
by (1.13) when τ > 1
b+2 . Given equilibrium tax rates (1.14) from the lobbying stage,
we have a corner solution if η > b−2λ+24b+b2+4 . Intuitively, if the environmental problem
is too severe, the government will want to set a tax that entirely prohibits polluting
production. The corner solution to the production and lobbying subgames is given by:
x∗G(G,B) =
2
b+′ 2 , x
∗
B(G,B) = 0, π∗G(G,B) =
1
(b+ 2)2 , π
∗
B(G,B) = 0
τ ∗(G,B) = 1
b+ 2 , c
∗
G(G,B) =
(2η + bη − 1)2
λ(b+ 2)(b− 2λ− bλ+ 4) , c
∗
B(G,B) = 0
(1.20)
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These results can then be substituted into production outcomes (1.13) and welfare
equation (1.4) to give investment subgame reduced form payoffs. The corner solutions
do not feature in the analytical results, but they are shown in the graphical results.
Chapter 2
Pass-through, profits and the
political economy of regulation

Abstract
Government regulation, such as the pricing of externalities, often raises firms’ unit
costs and its impact on their profits is important to its political economy. We introduce
“generalized linear competition” (GLC), a new reduced-form model that nests existing
models of imperfect competition. We show how firm-level cost pass-through is a
sufficient statistic for the profit impact of regulation. In an empirical application on
US airline markets, we find considerable intra-industry heterogeneity in pass-through
and profit impacts. GLC sidesteps estimation of a consumer demand system, firm
mark-ups and conduct parameters. We derive a political-equilibrium emissions tax
that incorporates firms lobbying a government “for sale”.
Keywords: Cost pass-through, regulation, carbon pricing, airlines, political economy.
JEL codes: D43, H23, L51, L92, Q54.
2.1 Introduction
We present a new approach to estimating the impact of regulation on firms’ profits. It
is based on a new reduced-form model of imperfect competition that unifies existing
models using weaker assumptions. We apply the theory to understand the political
economy of carbon pricing for the US airline industry, and quantify its winners and
losers.
Government regulation often raises the production cost of regulated firms. In some
cases, this is an explicit objective of regulation, for example, when it puts a price on
an externality such as carbon emissions or uses an import tariff to protect domestic
producers. In other cases, it is an inevitable consequence of a broader policy objective;
examples are minimum wage legislation and capital requirements for banks. In addition
to their effects on social welfare, such regulations have an important impact on the
profits of the firms being regulated.1
1See Draca, Machin & Van Reenen (2011) for a recent empirical study of the profit impacts of
minimum wage legislation using UK data. In a distortion-free Modigliani-Miller world, the profit
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This profit impact is critical to understanding the political economy of regulation.
On the extensive margin, regulation that substantially lowers an industry’s profitability
is often unlikely to be introduced. On the intensive margin, firms may lobby the
government to influence the equilibrium level of the regulation enacted. The profit
impact is also important, for obvious reasons, to the shareholders of any regulated firm.
For instance, major central banks are now among those warning institutional investors
about the risks to asset values arising from climate-change policy (Carney, 2015).
Estimating this firm-level profit impact is, however, not straightforward. Regulation
raises the costs of a regulated firm and may also affect, to different degrees, the costs of
its competitors. In general, its profit impact will depend on the firm’s own production
technology, the structure of demand, and its rivals’ responses. The last factor is
particularly problematic because modeling it may require information on the identities
of all firms, each of their production technologies, the nature of product differentiation,
what variables the firms compete on, how competitive or collusive the market is, and
so forth. Our aim here is to present an approach that radically simplifies this problem.
The main part of this paper introduces “generalized linear competition” (GLC) in
the spirit of an “aim to build the theory in such a way as to focus attention on those
predictions which are robust across a range of model specifications which are deemed
reasonable” (Sutton, 2007, pp. 2305-2306). GLC makes weaker assumptions than
typical models of imperfect competition. It assumes that firm i, but not necessarily
any other firm, is a cost-minimizer that takes input prices as given and operates a
technology with linear production costs. The core assumption is that firm i follows a
linear product-market strategy; in standard models, this corresponds to a linear supply
schedule as implied by its first-order condition. GLC also allows firm i to reduce its
exposure to the regulated factor: under environmental regulation, this is switching to
cleaner inputs; faced with minimum-wage legislation, it is using less labour-intensive
processes.
GLC makes no assumptions on the consumer demand system, no assumptions on
the technologies and strategies of firm i’s rivals, and imposes no particular concept of
“equilibrium”. In this sense, our approach is consistent with notions of bounded ratio-
nality on the part of both firms and consumers (Ellison, 2006). A further implication
is that we can leave open (i) how many firms and products there are in the market; (ii)
the extent to which firms’ products are substitutes or complements in demand; (iii)
impact of bank capital regulation is zero; in practice, banking is characterized by imperfect competition
alongside other market failures such as asymmetric information (see, e.g., Vives 2016).
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the extent to which firms’ products are strategic substitutes or strategic complements
(Bulow et al., 1985).
We use GLC to characterize the impact of regulation that raises firm i’s unit
cost and affects those of its rivals in an arbitrary way. In doing so, we allow for
“complete” regulation that covers an entire industry as well as “incomplete” regulation
that exempts a subset of firms. We show how firm-level cost pass-through, i.e., the
fraction of i’s cost increase that is passed onto i’s price, is a sufficient statistic for
the profit impact of regulation.2 That is, all relevant information on i’s demand and
supply conditions is contained in this single metric. We show that higher pass-through
implies a more favourable profit impact; a firm’s profit falls with tighter regulation if
and only if its pass-through is below 100%. Up to this point, we treat pass-through as
a parameter; it can be endogenized by assuming a particular mode of competition or
estimated empirically.
To see the idea underlying GLC, consider firm i which competes à la Cournot in a
differentiated-products market, with marginal cost MCi = ci + τ and a demand curve
pi = α− βxi − δ∑j ̸=ixj (with δ ≤ β). Make no assumptions on its rivals’ technologies
or strategies. Firm i’s first-order condition for profit-maximization implies a linear
supply schedule xi = 1β (pi − ci − τ). Now suppose that regulation τ raises i’s own
marginal cost by dτ and those of its rivals in an arbitrary way. How does this affect i’s
profits? By construction, i’s pass-through rate ρi ≡ (dpi/dτ)/(dMCi/dτ) captures the
impact on its profit margin (pi −MCi). Moreover, due to the linear supply schedule,
the change in its sales xi is proportional to this pass-through rate. Rivals’ cost shocks
and competitive responses matter only insofar as they affect i’s price—but this is
precisely what is captured in i’s pass-through rate. We show how to derive i’s profit
impact in a way that does not require knowledge of the demand parameters (α, β, δ)
or of i’s other costs ci.
This basic logic extends to a rich class of oligopoly models. GLC’s structure nests,
among others: Cournot-Nash, Stackelberg and conjectural-variation models (with
linear demand); Bertrand and Cournot models with linear differentiated products;
two-stage models such as Allaz and Vila (1993)’s model with forward contracting; a
linear-symmetric version of the supply function equilibrium (Klemperer and Meyer,
1989); behavioural theories of competition such as Al-Najjar et al. (2008)’s model
with sunk cost bias; and models with common ownership of firms (O’Brien and Salop,
2We differ from the “firm-specific” rate of pass-through used in merger analysis (Ashenfelter et al.,
1998); this asks how much of the cost saving achieved (only) by the merging firms is passed onto
consumers. We also differ from a firm-specific pass-through rate based on a cost shock always incurred
only by that single firm. Our setting allows for arbitrary cost changes across firms.
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2000) which feature prominently in the current debate on the competitive impacts of
cross-industry shareholdings of large institutional investors (Azar et al., 2018).
While it is intuitive, the critical role played by pass-through is also far from obvious.
In influential work, Weyl and Fabinger (2013) show, in a general class of symmetric
oligopoly models, that a market-wide rate of cost pass-through is a useful tool to
understand market performance; in light of this, it can also serve as a bridge between
structural and reduced-form models (Weyl and Fabinger, 2013; Atkin and Donaldson,
2015; Bergquist, 2017; Miller et al., 2017). As Miller et al. (2017) write: “the effect on
producer surplus [of a market-wide cost shock] depends on pass-through and a conduct
parameter that equals the multiplicative product of firm margins and the elasticity of
market demand”. By contrast, within GLC, the firm-level profit impact depends solely
on pass-through—no additional information about conduct parameter(s) is needed.
This simplification of incidence analysis is the primary attraction of GLC. On one hand,
GLC makes heavy use of the assumption that firm i employs a linear product-market
strategy; on the other hand, it allows for near-arbitrary heterogeneity across firms.
We present several extensions and robustness checks. First, we endogenize the extent
of emissions regulation in a welfare-maximizing setting that combines (i) a second-
best distortion due to market power (Buchanan, 1969) and (ii) corporate lobbying a
government “for sale”(Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Second, we show that GLC’s
central pass-through result extends to settings with: (i) network competition, (ii) price
discrimination, and (iii) multiproduct oligopoly using the upgrades approach (Johnson
and Myatt, 2003, 2006). Third, we use Monte Carlo analysis to argue that GLC’s
results can offer a reasonable approximation in the presence of model misspecification
due to non-linearities in demands and/or costs.
The second part of the paper illustrates the utility of the theory in an empirical
setting. We estimate the profit impacts of (future) carbon pricing in the US aviation
industry. This setting is important in its own right: emissions from airline travel are
projected grow well into the 21st century and economic regulation is likely as more
countries seek to implement climate targets in a cost-effective manner. At our baseline
price of $30 per ton of carbon dioxide, the annual “value” of domestic US airline
emissions is almost US$4 billion.3
Like many other industries, aviation is characterized by important heterogeneities
between firms in terms of demand, costs and conduct. First, airlines’ products are
differentiated and consumers may also have complex preferences: a passenger might
3Our baseline $30/tCO2 carbon price is illustrative but reasonably close to (a) recent prices in
the European carbon market, and (b) estimates of the social cost of carbon (Nordhaus, 2017; IAWG,
2016). Our estimated profit impacts generally scale linearly with the carbon price.
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regard a Delta flight from B to C as a complement to an American flight from A
to B even if American and Delta are substitutes on the A-to-B route. Second, an
airline’s operating costs depend, among other things, on the fuel efficiency of its aircraft
fleet—which varies widely across carriers. Carbon pricing can therefore lead to a
heterogeneous cost shock on the same route. Third, airlines operate different route
portfolios and conduct may be heterogeneous at the airline- and route-level (i.e., the
same carrier competes differently on different routes). Hence it is difficult to know
with confidence which specific model of competition is best suited to individual airlines
and their routes.
We begin with an econometric estimation of pass-through for individual carriers.
Our data are quarterly ticket prices for 1,334 domestic US carrier-routes over 2004
to 2013, yielding 36,650 observations. We have detailed information on fuel costs
at the carrier-route level; we use variation in fuel prices to estimate fuel cost pass-
through, from which we predict carbon cost pass-through.4 Our baseline specification
is an unbalanced panel with fixed effects for each carrier-route and each year-quarter.
We control for variation in demand conditions, non-fuel costs, and in the number of
competing firms.
Our results show considerable intra-industry heterogeneity in cost pass-through.
The four large legacy carriers (American, Delta, United and US Airways) have pass-
through of 62%, on average, across their routes. By contrast, the major low-cost
carrier Southwest has a much higher pass-through rate of 141%.5 We confirm the
robustness of this heterogeneity finding in the corresponding balanced panel (in which
each carrier-route is operated continuously over the period), and using an alternative
econometric approach that estimates a separate regression for each carrier-route.6
Leveraging GLC, we use these pass-through estimates to derive the profit impacts
of carbon pricing. We provide a detailed discussion of the considerations that arise in
moving from GLC theory to empirical application—while remaining agnostic about the
mode of competition and structure of consumer demand across routes. At a $30/tCO2
4Other recent work, like us, relies on variation in fuel costs as a proxy for future US carbon pricing
(e.g., Bushnell and Humber, 2017; Miller et al., 2017). For airlines, the conversion is simple, as 1
gallon of jet fuel produces 0.00957 tons of CO2 when burned.
5Pass-through above 100% is more readily interpretable in our setting than in other literature.
First, we estimate pass-through rates (i.e., the $-price response to a $1 unit cost increase) rather than
pass-through elasticities (i.e., the %-price response to a 1% unit cost increase) which are always lower.
Second, our firm-level pass-through reflects asymmetries in the cost shocks experienced by different
firms; all else equal, a firm that experiences half the cost increase of a rival has pass-through twice as
high.
6We also provide a simple three-factor decomposition of this pass-through heterogeneity into
differences in (i) airlines’ route portfolios, (ii) the fuel efficiency of aircraft, and (iii) consumer demand.
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carbon price, reflecting its pass-through above 100%, we find a profit gain due to
regulation for Southwest of 1.4% of revenue. Overall, however, the industry’s profits
decline modestly as losses incurred by legacy carriers offset Southwest’s gain. These
findings suggest that airlines will have very different incentives to influence regulation.
Plan for the paper. Section 2.2 explains how this paper contributes to the literature.
Section 2.3 sets out GLC, relates it to existing models, and derives our main result
on firm-level pass-through as a sufficient statistic. Section 2.4 presents further theory
results, and section 2.5 assesses the robustness of the theoretical results. Section
2.6 presents our empirical analysis of pass-through for US airlines, and section 2.7
applies theory to give profit impacts. Section 2.8 concludes. Appendix 2.A gives proofs,
Appendix 2.B contains additional information on our data, and Appendix 2.C gives
further details on our empirical results and robustness tests.
2.2 Related literature
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we introduce a different
approach to the kind of structural modelling typically employed in industrial organiza-
tion (Bresnahan, 1989; Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2001; Reiss and Wolak, 2007; Einav
and Levin, 2010). By estimating a full set of primitives, structural models can be
widely deployed to estimate merger impacts, the consumer value of new products, and
so on. As Reiss and Wolak (2007, p. 39) put it: “The inferences that IO researchers
draw about competition from price and quantity data rest on what researchers assume
about demand, costs, and the nature of firms’ unobservable strategic interactions”.7
In this paper, we sidestep estimation of a differentiated-products demand system
(and also the well-known challenge of determining an appropriate market definition),
make no assumptions about the precise mode of strategic interaction, and show how
firm-level pass-through is sufficient information to “close the model”.8 In our set-
ting, pass-through therefore also captures the import of any departures from Nash
7A typical structural IO model has three main ingredients: (i) the consumer demand system, often
specified in a logit form; (ii) firms’ production technologies, often relying, like us, on linearity of
costs; and (iii) the mode of competition, often chosen as Bertrand-Nash. It then estimates own- and
cross-price elasticities of demand as well as the competitiveness of the market via firms’ first-order
conditions.
8Put differently, consider a market with n firms. Structural IO modeling, in general, requires
specification and estimation of n demand equations as well as n supply equations. With GLC, we
specify only i’s supply curve and show how i’s profit impact is fully captured by i’s pass-through
rate—which contains all relevant information about the remaining 2n− 1 model equations.
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and/or profit-maximizing behaviour. A drawback is that we are not able to perform
counterfactual analysis.9
Second, we add to a rich empirical literature spanning macro- and microeconomics
that has estimated pass-through in response to a variety of cost shocks, including to
excise taxes, input prices, and exchange rates. Empirical work typically reports a
single rate of cost pass-through at the market-level. Depending on the detailed market
context, it finds evidence of “incomplete” pass-through below 100% (e.g., De Loecker
et al., 2016), “complete” 100% pass-through (e.g., Fabra and Reguant, 2014) as well
as pass-through above 100% (e.g., Miller et al., 2017).10 In this paper, we show the
value of shifting attention to how pass-through behaves at the level of an individual
firm. While prior work has emphasized inter-industry heterogeneity in pass-through
due to differences in competition, demand and technology (Ganapati et al., 2016), our
empirical results highlight intra-industry pass-through heterogeneity.
Third, our paper adds to a growing environmental-economics literature that studies
the impacts of emissions pricing on industry. This literature has so far mostly focused
on markets with limited product differentiation: electricity and heavy industry such
as cement and steel. A key theme is that, due to pass-through, the profit impacts
of carbon pricing at the industry-level are typically modest; this has been found in
general equilibrium (Bovenberg et al., 2018), event study (Bushnell et al., 2013), and
Cournot-style oligopoly (Hepburn et al., 2013).11 From a policy perspective, therefore,
only a relatively small fraction of emissions permits in a cap-and-trade system needs
to be freely allocated so as to preserve industry profits; any higher free allocation leads
to “windfall profits”. Our GLC-based analysis extends the theory to richer modes
of competition with differentiated products. Our empirical findings confirm that the
profit decline is modest at the industry-level but also show that this masks substantial
variation in the sign and extent of profit impacts across firms. More broadly, our
9Pass-through also plays a central role in the analysis of cartel damages. The “passing on” defense
states that a plaintiff is not harmed by an upstream cartel overcharge to the extent that it is able to
pass this onto its own downstream customers. Verboven and Van Dijk (2009) highlight the additional
output-contraction effect that arises due to pass-through and further reduces a plaintiff’s profits. Our
work shows that, for the GLC class of oligopoly models, the output-contraction effect is negative for
any firm that does not fully pass on the cartel overcharge. Thanks to Natalia Fabra for this pointer.
10See Weyl and Fabinger (2013) for a useful discussion of the diverse set of empirical pass-through
results. In earlier theoretical work, Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) explain pass-through for a monopolist
while Anderson et al. (2001) generalize this analysis to different oligopolistic environments.
11Another strand of work examines the impacts of incomplete regulation in which only a subset of
firms is subject to carbon pricing. This tends to worsen the profit impacts experienced by regulated
firms and has important consequences for the efficiency and design of environmental regulation (Fowlie
et al., 2016). GLC theory developed in this paper allows for such incomplete regulation, while our
empirical application to airlines involves a setting in which regulation is complete.
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paper suggests that the political economy of carbon pricing for differentiated-products
industries may differ substantially from well-studied markets like electricity.
Fourth, we contribute to the industrial-organization literature on competition in
the airline industry. This literature has been primarily concerned with estimating the
competitiveness of the industry and issues of market structure (Brander and Zhang,
1990; Kim and Singal, 1993; Berry and Jia, 2010) and the role and impact of financial
constraints (Busse, 2002; Borenstein, 2011); recent work has also highlighted differences
between legacy and low-cost carriers and the special role played by Southwest (Goolsbee
and Syverson, 2008; Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009). This paper finds new evidence showing
that large heterogeneity across carriers exists in terms of pass-through as well. We
also provide a formal economic assessment of future US climate regulation on this
industry that highlights how different carriers have different incentives to influence this
regulation.12
2.3 Generalized linear competition (GLC)
This section introduces a simple reduced-form model which we call the “generalized
linear competition” (GLC). We developed GLC to respond to Sutton’s (2007) call for
economists to derive “predictions which are robust across a range of model specifications
which are deemed reasonable.” We first set out and discuss GLC’s key features and
place it in the context of existing models. We then derive our main result on the profit
impact of regulation.
As discussed in the introduction, we have in mind a regulation that leads to an
increase in regulated firms’ unit costs. Examples are the government putting a price
on an externality or imposing minimum wage legislation in the labour market. The
following exposition applies to a range of different types of regulation; as discussed in
the introduction, we place particular emphasis on the case of environmental regulation.
2.3.1 Setup of GLC
Firm i competes in an industry, selling an output quantity xi of its product at a price
pi. Let ei be one of the inputs that i uses in production. Regulation imposes a cost τ
12Our empirical analysis uses an average ticket price across passengers for each carrier-route; our
data are not rich enough to estimate the impacts of regulation on price dispersion (Borenstein and
Rose, 1994; Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009). Our extension of GLC to second-degree price discrimination,
where early buyers pay less for their tickets, shows that the profit impact of regulation remains exactly
as in our main analysis, with i’s pass-through defined in terms of the change in i’s average price.
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on each unit of this input ei. In the case of environmental regulation, the regulated
factor corresponds to firm i’s emissions (e.g., of carbon dioxide); it is standard in
the literature to view emissions as an input to production (Baumol & Oates 1988).
Regulation then corresponds to putting a price τ on the environmental externality.
The regulation may also apply to all (“complete regulation”), some or none of the
other firms in the industry (“incomplete regulation”). More specifically, let φk ∈ {0, 1}
be an indicator variable which equals 1 if firm k is subject to the regulation and equals
0 otherwise. Our setup has φi = 1 for firm i but does not rely on any assumptions
about the φjs of its rivals (j ̸= i).
In general, firm i’s profits can be written as Πi = pixi −Ci(xi, ei)− τei, where pixi
is its sales revenue and its total costs are made up of its operating costs Ci(xi, ei) plus
its regulatory costs τei.
GLC makes four assumptions about the production technology and supply behaviour
of firm i. These are taken to hold over some interval τ ∈ [τ , τ ] of interest over which
the extent of regulation varies:
A1. (Input price-taking) Firm i takes input prices, including the regulation τ , as given.
A1 is a standard assumption which is appropriate for many forms of regulation,
including a tax on emissions. (We endogenize the extent of regulation later on in this
section.)
A2. (Cost-minimizing inputs) Firm i chooses its inputs, including the regulated factor
ei, optimally so as to minimize its total costs Ci(xi, ei) + τei of producing output xi.
A2 is a canonical assumption in microeconomic theory. For market-based environmental
regulation, it implies the textbook result that, at the optimum, the emissions price
equals i’s marginal cost of reducing emissions, that is, − ∂
∂ei
Ci(xi, ei) = τ .13
A3. (Constant returns to scale) Firm i’s optimized total costs faced with regulation
τ are linear in output Ci(xi, ei) + τei = ki(τ)xi, with unit cost ki(τ) = ci(τ) + τzi(τ)
where ci(τ) is its per-unit operating cost and zi ≡ ei/xi is its “regulatory intensity”
(use of the regulated factor per unit of output).
A3 is a more substantive assumption but is also common in the literature, including in
pass-through analysis (Bulow and Pfleiderer, 1983; Anderson et al., 2001; Weyl and
13If regulation applies to multiple firms (φj = 1 for at least one firm j ̸= i) their marginal costs
of emissions reductions are equalized, yielding the well-known efficiency property of market-based
regulation.
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Fabinger, 2013), in environmental regulation under imperfect competition (Requate,
2006; Fowlie et al., 2016; Miller et al., 2017) and in the analysis of the profit impacts
of a minimum wage (Draca et al., 2011). It rules out, at least over the range τ ∈ [τ , τ ],
the presence of (binding) capacity constraints.
Combining A1–A3, standard production theory shows that, in response to tighter
regulation τ ′′ > τ ′, zi(τ ′′) ≤ zi(τ ′) and ci(τ ′′) ≥ ci(τ ′). In other words, the firm
reduces its use of the regulated input and instead uses more of other inputs; this
saves on direct regulation-related costs (lower zi) but incurs higher unit costs on
other inputs (higher ci).14 For environmental regulation, this represents emissions
abatement: a lower emissions intensity zi(τ ′′) ≤ zi(τ ′) comes at a per-unit abatement
cost [ci(τ ′′)− ci(τ ′)].15 If such factor substitution is infeasible or unprofitable then
zi(τ ′′) = zi(τ ′).
A key implication is that, by the envelope theorem, dki(τ)/dτ = zi(τ), that is,
firm i’s unit cost increase arising from a small tightening in regulation is given by
its optimized regulatory intensity at that level of regulation. At the optimum, the
increased costs due to input substitution are of second order. Therefore, if the extent
of regulation rises from an initial level τ to a higher τ , the corresponding increase in
i’s optimal unit cost equals ∆ki(τ , τ) =
∫ τ
s=τzi(s)ds.
Remark 1. While our exposition focuses on regulation that is effectively an input tax,
GLC nests an output tax as a special case where firm i’s regulatory intensity per unit
of output satisfies zi(τ) ≡ 1 for all τ ∈ [τ , τ ].
Remark 2. GLC can also apply to command-and-control regulation for which the
government mandates a particular usage of inputs. An example is the mandatory
blending of biofuels into petrol. In such cases, i’s unit cost increase dki(τ)/dτ = zi(τ)
arises from a regulation τ that is not an input price (and zi(τ) = zi if no factor
substitution is feasible).
Remark 3. In an earlier version of this paper (Grey and Ritz, 2018), we showed
that our key results also holds under an alternative specification of A3, namely an
“end-of-pipe” abatement technology under which firm i can make an investment that
cleans up production ex post.
14We do not require any specific functional-form assumptions on the relationship between zi and ci.
15GLC abatement technology is consistent with standard properties from the environmental-
economics literature. Write i’s operating costs as Ci(xi, ei) = ci(τ)xi, where emissions ei are optimally
chosen given output xi; equivalently, the emissions intensity zi ≡ ei/xi is optimally chosen given
output xi. It follows that emissions and output are complements: ∂∂xiCi(xi, ei) = ci(τ) and so, given
xi, higher ei implies higher zi and hence lower ci, that is, ∂
2
∂xi∂ei
Ci(xi, ei) < 0.
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Remark 4. To see another application, consider minimum wage regulation (following
Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979; Draca et al., 2011). Firm i’s regulated factor is labour,
denoted by ei. Firm i takes the minimum wage, denoted by τ , as given (A1) and chooses
the quantity of labour employed optimally to minimize its costs (A2). It operates a
production technology for which the unit cost of output ki(τ) = ci(τ)+τzi(τ) is constant
(A3), where zi ≡ ei/xi is the labour intensity of its output. In response to a higher
minimum wage τ , firm i may respond by using more capital-intensive processes, reducing
its labour intensity zi(τ) but raising other costs ci(τ).
The final assumption is the defining feature of GLC:
A4. (Linear product market behaviour) Firm i’s product market behaviour satisfies
xi(τ) = ψi [pi(τ)− ki(τ)], where ψi > 0 is a constant and [pi(τ)− ki(τ)] > 0 is its
profit margin.
A4 says that firm i behaves such that its output is in (fixed) proportion to the profit
margin it achieves. Intuitively, it sells more or prices higher into a more attractive
market: its supply curve is (linearly) upward-sloping. The substantive restriction
here is that the proportionality factor ψi does not vary with the regulation τ . While
regulation can shift firm i’s supply schedule it does not alter the slope of that schedule.
GLC makes no assumptions on the technology, behaviour or rationality of firm
i’s rivals. These firms need not be input price-takers (A1), need not choose inputs
optimally (A2), have constant-returns technologies (A3) or employ a linear product-
market strategy (A4). Regulation may also affect the set of i’s rivals, that is, induce
new entry and/or exit.
GLC also makes no assumptions on the demand system in the industry or on the
nature of consumer behaviour. An implication is that we can leave open (i) how many
competing firms/products there are in the market; (ii) the extent to which other firms’
products are substitutes or complements to i’s; (iii) the extent to which firms’ products
are strategic substitutes or strategic complements to i’s. We therefore also do not have
to restrict attention to a particular market definition.
Hence GLC has no equilibrium concept; it does not necessarily restrict attention to
a Nash equilibrium (or some variation thereof). In this sense, it is much more general
than standard models in which all firms are assumed to be Nash profit-maximizers.
Moreover, A4 is consistent with “rule-of-thumb” behaviour by firm i that may itself
not be profit-maximizing (though we do require cost-minimization as per A2).
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2.3.2 Special cases of GLC
To illustrate its scope, we set out examples of well-known oligopoly models for which
A4 is satisfied. In these models, given A1–A3 and a linear demand structure, each
firm’s first-order condition for profit-maximization yields a linear supply schedule that
takes the form of A4.16
• Cournot competition with a linear market demand curve p = α − β∑ixi. It
is easy to check that Nash behaviour implies ψi = β−1 (∀i). Including a firm-
specific conjectural variation vi ≡
(∑
j ̸=idxj
)
/dxi (Bresnahan, 1989) leads to
ψi = [β(1 + vi)]−1, still consistent with GLC. This also nests as a special case the
linear Stackelberg model with multiple leaders and multiple followers (Daughety,
1990).
• Bertrand or Cournot competition with horizontal and/or vertical product dif-
ferentiation. Let firm i’s demand pi = αi − xi − δ∑j ̸=ixj, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is
an inverse measure of horizontal differentiation and αi ̸= αj reflects vertical
differentiation; this leads to ψi = 1 (∀i) for Cournot and correspondingly to
ψi = [1 + δ(n − 2)]/[(1− δ)[1 + δ(n− 1)]] (∀i) for Bertrand (Häckner, 2000).
The latter is independent of τ as long as the set of active firms and degree of
product heterogeneity are unaffected.17 A richer “semi-linear” demand system
pi = αi − βixi − fi(x1, ..., xj ̸=i, ..., xn) remains part of GLC, for any cross-price
effects implied by the function fi(·).
• Linear competition with common ownership between firms (O’Brien and Salop,
2000). If the shareholders of firm i also own a fraction ωi of its rival firm j, then
the incentives of i’s managers will be to maximize Πi+ωiΠj . The implications of
such shareholder diversification have recently received attention for US airlines
(Azar et al., 2018) and several other industries. With Cournot competition, linear
demand, and assuming symmetry, this yields ψi = [β(1 + ω)]−1 (∀i).
• A linear version of supply function equilibrium (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989).
Demand is linear p = 1 −∑ixi and firm i has a linear supply schedule of the
form xi = σi + µ(p − k), where it chooses σi and firms’ marginal costs are
identical ki = k (∀i) (Menezes and Quiggin, 2012). Even though the strategy
16It will be clear that the following listing is not exhaustive; other models with similar linear
structures are also members of GLC.
17Similarly, it is not difficult to check that spatial models of competition, such as Hotelling and
Salop, can also be consistent with GLC as long as the distribution of consumer valuations is uniform
(which generates linear demand, and, given A1–A3, hence also A4).
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space has an affine supply function, the symmetric equilibrium features A4 with
ψi = [1 + (n− 1)µ] (∀i).18
GLC is more flexible than standard models along important dimensions. First,
firms within GLC may think they are playing a different game. Second, they may be
using different choice variables (e.g. one firm chooses price and another firm chooses
quantity). Third, by allowing ψi to vary across firms, GLC does not impose that a
firm with a higher market share necessarily has a higher profit margin. This feature is
“baked in” to many standard oligopoly models via the restriction ψi = ψ (∀i).
Remark 5. GLC can represent the outcome of tacit collusion but not necessarily the
strategies supporting it. On one hand, appropriate choice of firm-level conjectural
variation parameters makes it is possible to generate collusive quantities and prices. On
the other hand, it is not possible to use A4 to explicitly feature the underlying trigger
strategies that might support a collusive outcome.
In a similar way, GLC applies to multi-stage models in which product-market
competition occurs at the final stage. The key point is that, given A1–A3 and the
choices of prior stages, the final stage still yields supply schedules consistent with A4.
Examples of well-known models include:
• Forward contracting and vertical integration (Allaz and Vila, 1993; Bushnell
et al., 2008). In the first stage, firms sell forward contracts on their production; in
the second stage, firms compete à la Cournot given their forward positions (Allaz
and Vila, 1993).19 This model is widely used in the study of liberalized electricity
markets. A variant has a first stage in which vertically-integrated producers sign
long-term contracts with retail customers (Bushnell et al., 2008). In both setups,
with linear demand p = α − β∑ixi, the subgame-perfect equilibrium features
ψi = (β/n)−1 (∀i) (Ritz 2014); this is again independent of τ as long as n is fixed.
• Competition with behavioural biases: misallocation of sunk costs (Al-Najjar et al.,
2008). Firm i maximizes accounting profits which “erroneously” include some
of its fixed costs, at a rate of si > 0 per unit of output. In the first stage, firms
learn about the impacts of costing in a distortion game before product-market
18We have modified the setup of Menezes and Quiggin (2012) slightly, by dropping their normalization
in terms of production costs, without affecting any of the conclusions. The equilibrium price in
our specification is p∗ = (1 + nk [1 + (n− 1)µ]) /(1 + n [1 + (n− 1)µ]), which tends to the Cournot
solution as µ→ 0 and to the Bertrand paradox as µ→∞.
19To be more precise, this involves a three-stage game: (1) the extent of regulation is determined;
(2) firms engage in forward contracting; and (3) firms compete in the product market.
50 Pass-through, profits and the political economy of regulation
competition in the second stage. With differentiated Bertrand competition with
linear demand Di = a−bpi+g∑j ̸=ipj , the first-order conditions feature a constant
ψi = ψ (∀i) and si = s∗ > 0 in symmetric equilibrium: to soften competition,
firms partially set prices based on costs that are sunk.20
Remark 6. GLC is conceptually distinct from classes of oligopoly models that are
aggregative games (Corchón, 1994; Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013) or potential games
(Monderer and Shapley, 1996). To see this, note that Cournot-Nash competition with
linear market demand p = α − β∑ixi is an aggregative game, a potential game and
also a member of GLC. However, with differentiated-products demand for firm i of
pi = α − βixi − ∑j ̸=iδijxj, it is no longer aggregative nor a potential game (unless
δij = δji for all i ̸= j) but still yields A4.
2.3.3 Profit-neutrality technique
We wish to quantify the impact of regulation τ on firm i’s profits Πi, and now use a
simple modelling device to pin this down. Suppose that the extent of regulation rises
from initial level τ to a higher τ . Of particular interest are the special cases in which
(i) a new regulation is introduced, that is, τ ≡ 0, and (ii) regulation is tightened by a
small amount, that is, (τ − τ)→ 0.
Let Πi(τ) denote firm i’s profits as a function of regulation, and similarly ei(τ) is
the quantity of the regulated factor. Observe that (τ − τ)ei(τ) is the “static” cost of
regulation associated with firm i’s initial quantity of the regulated factor.
Now define a profit-neutrality factor γi for firm i such that:
Πi(τ) + γi [(τ − τ)ei(τ)] ≡ Πi(τ). (2.1)
In other words, γi is constructed such that firm i’s profits under tighter regulation
plus “compensation” of γi [(τ − τ)ei(τ)] are equal to its initial profits under weaker
regulation. Hence the change in firm i’s profits equals ∆Πi(τ , τ) ≡ Πi(τ)− Πi(τ) =
−γi [(τ − τ)ei(τ)], so sign{−∆Πi(τ , τ)} = sign{γi(τ , τ)}. If firm i does not respond
to the tightening of regulation in any way, and its rivals do not respond either, then
its profits simply fall as implied by its initial exposure, ∆Πi(τ , τ) = −(τ − τ)ei(τ) or,
equivalently, γi(τ , τ) = 1.
The profit impact is therefore determined by three components: the extent of
regulatory tightening (τ − τ), firm i’s initial exposure ei(τ), and the profit-neutrality
20Specifically, using the results in Section 5 of Al-Najjar et al. (2008), ψi = [b/(2b +
g)]
[
b (1 + g/[2b− (n− 1)g])− (n− 1)g2/[2b− (n− 1)g]].
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factor γi(τ , τ). As is standard, we take the first component as given for now. The
second component is typically available to policymakers and analysts dealing with
regulation; for example, information on firms’ historical emissions is collected in the
run-up to environmental initiatives. The remainder of this section determines the final
component: firm i’s profit-neutrality factor γi(τ , τ).
2.3.4 Main result on the profit impact of regulation
We next present our main result on the magnitude of γi(τ , τ ) within GLC. We will see
that cost pass-through plays a central role for the profit impact of regulation. Define
firm i’s marginal rate of cost pass-through as:
ρi(τ) ≡ dpi(τ)/dτ
dki(τ)/dτ
. (2.2)
The denominator captures by how much i’s optimal unit cost ki(τ) responds to a
small tightening in regulation; as explained above, given A1–A3, the envelope theorem
implies dki(τ)/dτ = zi(τ). The numerator captures by how much i’s product price
changes. This will, in general be driven by a combination of i’s own cost increase and
the cost increases and product-market behaviour of i’s rivals (also depending on the
extent to which they are regulated, i.e., the φjs (j ̸= i)).
In standard oligopoly models, if all n firms are regulated, i’s equilibrium price is a
function of the marginal costs of all of its rivals, pi(k1(τ), ..., ki(τ), ...kn(τ)). Therefore
the price-response dpi(τ)/dτ also captures any relevant changes in these costs. Our firm-
level pass-through rate thus reflects the impact of regulation on all players, including
any cost heterogeneity across firms. It is distinct from the market-wide pass-through
rate considered in much of the literature (for which firms’ costs rise uniformly).21
Remark 7. Despite the linearity of A4, GLC does not imply that the pricing function
pi(k1(τ), ..., ki(τ), ...kn(τ)) is necessarily linear in its arguments. For example, with
standard Nash differentiated-products competition with linear demand pi = αi − xi −
δ
∑
j ̸=ixj the pricing function is indeed linear but for semi-linear demand pi = αi −
βixi − fi(x1, ..., xj ̸=i, ..., xn) it is not.
Let ρi(τ , τ) ≡ 1(τ−τ)
∫ τ
s=τ [ρi(s)] ds denote i’s average rate of cost pass-through over
the interval τ ∈ [τ , τ ]. We thus obtain our main result:
21If both demand and costs are symmetric across firms, and A1–A4 apply to all firms, then our
measure of pass-through typically coincides with market-wide pass-through.
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Proposition 1. In GLC defined by A1–A4, the profit impact on firm i of regulation τ
tightening from τ to τ satisfies ∆Πi(τ , τ) ≡ −γi(τ , τ)(τ − τ)ei(τ) where:
(a) if (τ − τ) is small, then γi(τ , τ) ≃ 2[1− ρi(τ , τ)], where ρi(τ , τ) ≃ ρi(τ);
(b) in general, γi(τ , τ) ≤ max{2[1− ρi(τ , τ)], 0}.
Proposition 1 gives a very simple expression that makes precise how firm i’s rate
of cost pass-through alone is a sufficient statistic for the profit impact of regulation.
It holds across all models that are part of the GLC. Conditional on the extent of
regulation and firm i’s “historical” use of the regulated factor, firm-level pass-through
is the only thing that matters: ∆Πi(τ , τ) ≃ 2[1− ρi(τ , τ)](τ − τ)ei(τ).
Firm i’s pass-through rate captures all relevant information on the production
technologies of i’s rivals, the degree of product differentiation, what variables the firms
compete on, how competitive or collusive the market is, any entry or exit by rivals,
and so on. Whatever their other differences, if any two theories within GLC imply
identical pass-through for firm i, then they also imply an identical profit impact. For
a “small” regulatory tightening in part (a), this argument holds exactly; for a “large”
regulation in part (b), the profit impact is bounded above by the same expression.
What is the intuition for the result? The profit impact is made up of two effects:
that on i’s profit margin and that on its sales. The first role of i’s pass-through rate is
that, by construction, it captures the impact of regulation on its own profit margin. Its
second role is that, due to the linear supply schedule given by A4, the change in its sales
is proportional to its pass-through rate. Rivals’ cost shocks and competitive responses
matter only insofar as they affect i’s price—but this is precisely what is captured in i’s
pass-through rate. These two roles are what drives γi(τ , τ) ≃ 2[1− ρi(τ , τ)].
Two corollaries are immediate. First, pass-through signs the profit impact: i’s
profits fall whenever pass-through is incomplete, sign(∆Πi) = sign(ρi − 1). In such
cases, the firm’s profit margin shrinks and, by A4, it also experiences weaker sales.
Conversely, with pass-through above 100%, the firm benefits from tighter regulation:
both its profit margin and sales volume rise. Second, all else equal, a lower rate of
pass-through implies that regulation has a worse profit impact.
From an empirical perspective, the crucial feature of the result is that the profit
impact ∆Πi(τ) is independent of the proportionality term ψi from A4. As we have
seen, different theories of imperfect competition within GLC differ in terms of the their
implied ψi. Yet Proposition 1 tells us that this does not matter for the profit impact.
The reason is scaling: by A4, the level of xi(τ) = ψi [pi(τ)− ki(τ)] and the change
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∆xi(τ) = ψi [∆pi(τ)−∆ki(τ)] are both proportional to ψi. But the corresponding use
of the regulatory factor ei(τ) = ψizi(τ) [pi(τ)− ki(τ)] is also proportional to ψi. This
means that the profit impact per unit of the regulatory factor ei(τ), as incorporated
into γi(τ , τ), does not depend on ψi. This is also one reason for why Proposition 1
applies without requiring information about own-price and cross-price elasticities of
demand.
Of course, industry characteristics such as the degree of product differentiation are
likely to affect the pass-through rate ρi—so they can certainly matter indirectly for ∆Πi.
The point of Proposition 1, is that, even if they also affect i’s supply behaviour, via
A4’s proportionality term ψi, this aspect is irrelevant for the profit impact (conditional
on ρi).
While it is intuitive, this critical role played by pass-through is also far from obvious.
Weyl and Fabinger (2013) present, for a general class of symmetric oligopoly models,
a simple formula for the impact of a market-wide cost change on aggregate producer
surplus (see also Atkin and Donaldson, 2015; Miller et al., 2017). The profit impact
depends on a market-wide rate of pass-through as well as on a “conduct parameter”
that incorporates the level of firms’ profit margins and the price elasticity of market
demand. By contrast, within the GLC, the firm-level profit impact depends solely on
pass-through—no additional information about conduct parameter(s) is needed. This
further simplification of incidence analysis is the primary attraction of GLC. Compared
to the existing literature, GLC allows for near-arbitrary heterogeneity across firms but
makes heavy use of the linear structure implied by A4. In our setting, pass-through
therefore also captures the import of departures from Nash and/or profit-maximizing
behaviour—including any player “irrationality”.
Remark 8. One interpretation is that GLC is a semi-parametric model in which
information on pass-through is, in effect, sufficient to “close the model”. Consider a
market with n firms selling differentiated products. Standard industrial-organization
models specify n demand equations and, based on Nash profit-maximization, then derive
n supply equations. With GLC, we specify only i’s supply curve and show how i’s
profit impact is fully captured by i’s pass-through rate—which contains all relevant
information about the remaining 2n− 1 model equations.
Up to this point, we have treated i’s pass-through rate as a parameter. In general,
it can depend on a wide range of factors, including the number of firms in the market,
their strategies and the intensity of competition, the degree of product differentiation,
and on how strongly i’s cost rises relative to other firms. To progress further, there
are three basic approaches. The first is to select a specific model of competition and
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derive the theoretical rate of pass-through. The second is to try to utilize existing
estimates of cost pass-through from the empirical literature; given that these are
typically market-level pass-through estimates, they would have to be converted into
firm-level pass-through, perhaps again relying on guidance from a specific theory model.
The third is to combine the structural result from Proposition 1 with estimates of
firm-level pass-through; we pursue this approach in our empirical analysis of the US
airline industry.
2.3.5 Political economy, lobbying and endogenous regulation
So far we have focused on a regulation τ that is exogenous. We now show how, for
the case of an emissions tax, regulation can be endogenized using the GLC’s structure.
This brings together two strands of prior research: (1) an influential literature following
Grossman and Helpman (1994) in which firms lobby a government “for sale”; (2)
a classic literature following Buchanan (1969) on emissions taxes under imperfect
competition.22
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), the government cares about social welfare
W and political contributions by regulated firms. Let Ki(τ) denote firm i’s political
contribution as a function of the emissions price τ . The government’s payoff is
Ugov(τ) = W (τ) + λ
∑n
i=1Ki(τ), where the parameter λ ≥ 0 measures its openness
to lobbying, and larger values of λ mean policy is increasingly for sale. Following
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (1994), the equilibrium of
the lobbying game is for each firm i to offer a contribution function Ki(τ) = Πi(τ) + ui,
where ui is a constant. Substituting into the government’s payoff function, the first-order
condition for the “political equilibrium” emissions tax τ ∗(λ) is given by:
dUgov(τ)
dτ
= dW (τ)
dτ
+ λ
∑n
i=1
dΠi(τ)
dτ
= 0. (2.3)
We assume that this problem is well-behaved, and focus on the interesting case of
an interior solution with τ ∗(λ) > 0. As will become clear, this includes the standard
property that an emissions tax reduces aggregate emissions, dE(τ)/dτ < 0.
To make further progress, some additional assumptions are needed. First, we assume
that GLC’s A1–A4 now hold for each of n ≥ 2 firms. Second, we assume that consumers
are utility-maximizers, with aggregate consumer surplus S = V (x1, ..., xn)−∑ni=1pixi,
22By assumption, the government does not have access to another policy instrument (such as a
price control) to directly address market power. See Requate (2006) for a useful survey of emissions
pricing under perfect competition.
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where V (·) is gross consumer utility; unlike much literature on second-best emissions
pricing, this allows firms’ products to be differentiated. Third, environmental damages
D(E) depend on aggregate emissions E = ∑ni=1ei and obey the standard properties
D′(·), D′′(·) > 0.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, firms choose their contributions Ki.
Second, the government sets the emissions price τ . Third, firms compete according to
GLC—now taking τ as given, as per A1.
Social welfare can therefore be written as in terms of the emissions price as follows:
W (τ) = V (x1(τ), ..., xi(τ), ..., xn(τ))−
∑n
i=1Ci(xi(τ))−D(E(τ)),
as firms’ revenues ∑ni=1pixi are a transfer from consumers and firms’ emissions costs τE
are a transfer to government. As a benchmark, recall the standard Pigouvian tax τ ∗
under perfect competition (i.e., marginal utility equals price, and price equals marginal
cost) is to set the emissions price at the social marginal damage, τ ∗ = D′(E(τ ∗)).
Define the emissions-weighted average rate of pass-through across firms as ρ˜(τ) ≡∑n
i=1
ei(τ)
E(τ)ρi(τ), and let η(τ) ≡ d lnE(τ)d ln τ < 0 be the tax elasticity of industry emissions.
Proposition 2. At an interior solution, the third-best political-equilibrium emissions
tax that maximizes government utility Ugov satisfies:
τ ∗(λ) =
 D
′(E(τ))
1− (1 + 2λ)
η(τ) [1− ρ˜(τ)]

τ=τ∗(λ)
.
For all models consistent with GLC, the distortion of the equilibrium tax τ ∗ away
from the Pigouvian rule is driven by the industry pass-through rate ρ˜. To understand
the result, observe that in the Buchanan problem, industry profits reflect the extent of
the market-power distortion while in the Grossman-Helpman problem, profits drive the
incentive to make political contributions. By Proposition 1, firm-level pass-through
pins down firm-level profit impacts—and so the industry-level analog is driven by a
weighted average of pass-through across firms.23
Proposition 2 generalizes existing literature to richer modes of competition and
provides a unifying result in terms of pass-through. Intuitively, lower firm-level pass-
through ρi means that firm i contracts output more strongly, creating greater deadweight
23Under perfect competition, each firm’s pass-through is 100% so the Pigouvian rule τ = D′
applies—and there is no political lobbying (even if λ > 0) since no firm is making any profit.
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losses and suffering larger profit losses, thus pushing τ ∗ downwards—more strongly for
large, high-emissions firms (i.e., larger ei(τ)
E(τ) ). Relatedly, where the government is more
open to lobbying (higher λ), and the industry is opposed to the regulation (ρ˜ < 1),
this pushes the political equilibrium tax downwards.
We can therefore apply Proposition 1 to calculate the profit impacts of an endogenous
regulation, by letting τ = 0 and τ = τ ∗(λ). Indeed, Proposition 2 shows how it is
possible to derive an expression for τ ∗(λ) that does not directly hinge on knowledge
of consumers’ utility function V (·) (which, of course, may indirectly matter both for
pass-through ρ˜ and for the emissions elasticity η.)
2.4 Extensions: Multiple markets, products, and
prices
In the baseline GLC, firm i sells a single product into a single market at a single price.
Our extensions in this section show how GLC’s basic insight—firm-level pass-through
as a sufficient statistic for the profit impact of regulation—applies in richer settings
with multiple products, markets and prices. While GLC, of course, cannot be a fully
general model of competition—given its reliance on supply-side linearity—these further
results considerably extend its scope.
2.4.1 Network competition
Firms often compete by selling their products across multiple markets (Bulow et al.,
1985). For example, airlines decide how to deploy their aircraft fleet across different
routes. Recent work in the networks literature has sought to understand how strategic
interaction and network structure affect market outcomes (Bramoullé et al., 2014). We
here outline a simple linear model of network competition to illustrate (i) how our main
results from GLC apply in this context, and (ii) how GLC compares to approaches
taken in the networks literature.
Consider a setting in which n ≥ 2 firms sell into m ≥ 2 markets.24 Firm i has
production capacity Ki and sells xil = σilKi units into market l, where
∑m
l=1σil = 1, so
σil ∈ [0, 1] reflects i’s presence in market l. Given firms’ overall capacities K, the price
in market l is given by a linear demand curve pl(K) = αl−βXl, where Xl = ∑ni=1σilKi
and the demand parameter αl may vary across markets. Firm i’s overall sales to all m
markets are xi =
∑m
l=1xil = Ki.
24Our exposition here builds on part of Elliott & Galeotti (2019).
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We assume that firm i’s unit cost satisfies GLC’s A1-A3, given regulation τ , with an
optimized unit cost ki(τ) and emissions intensity zi(τ) ≡ ei(τ)/xi(τ). Firm i chooses
its capacity Ki to maximize its overall profits Πi(K; τ) =
∑m
l=1[pl(K) − ki(τ)]σilKi,
which yields the first-order condition:
∑m
l=1[pl(K)− ki(τ)]σil − β
∑m
l=1σ
2
ilKi = 0
that defines i’s optimal capacity as a function of the network structure as well as
demand and cost conditions.
The networks literature now proceeds by characterizing the Nash equilibrium. It
would typically define gij ≡ (∑ml=1σilσjl)/∑ml=1σ2il as a key measure of the closeness
of competition between firms i and j across the m markets so that the n× n matrix
g represents the network of interaction.25 The central results in the literature then
use different network measures—such as Bonacich centrality—to characterize Nash
equilibrium (Ballester et al., 2006; Bramoullé et al., 2014).
The idea behind GLC leads down a different route based on pass-through. Let
pi ≡
∑m
l=1σilpl be i’s weighted-average price across its markets, and use this to rewrite
i’s first-order condition as:
pi(τ)− ki(τ) =
(
β
∑m
l=1σ
2
il
)
Ki(τ),
now also making explicit dependencies on regulation τ . The key observation is that
this supply schedule has exactly the same form as the GLC’s A4, with a constant slope
parameter, β∑ml=1σ2il, that reflects the production network and demand conditions.
Now let ρi ≡ [dpi(τ)/dτ ]/[dki(τ)/dτ ] denote i’s corresponding weighted-average
rate of cost pass-through across markets. For notational convenience, we focus on the
“small τ” case (that is, τ = 0 and τ = τ → 0) and thus define i’s profit-neutrality
factor in the familiar way as γi(0) ≡ (− [dΠi(τ)/dτ ]τ=0) /ei(0).
Proposition 3. Under linear multimarket network compeitition, regulation τ affects
firm i’s profits according to:
γi(0) = 2[1− ρi(0)].
This shows how our basic result on firm-level pass-through generalizes to a multi-
market setting. In this linear setup, GLC’s A1–A4 hold and a weighted-average rate of
pass-through is a sufficient statistic for i’s network-wide profit impact.
25If i and j serve distinct subsets of markets, then σilσjl = 0 for all l and so also gij = 0; if they
serve identical markets, then σil = σjl for all l and so gij = 1.
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At a conceptual level, the main difference compared to the networks literature is
that Proposition 3 is derived by making assumptions only about firm i itself. There
are no assumptions as such on the technology or behaviour of i’s rivals; insofar as these
are relevant, they are captured in i’s pass-through rate ρi. Therefore, pass-through
also captures the salient characteristics of the production network—for example, in
our empirical application to airlines. In other words, firm-level pass-through ρi is
a sufficient statistic for information contained in the production network g, in the
m+ 1 demand-side parameters, and in all n firms’ cost functions and product-market
strategies—including any “irrationality on the network”. By contrast, the networks
literature (i) fully specifies the game, and (ii) derives Nash equilibrium results.
A substantive restriction, also employed in the linear-quadratic games that are
widely studied in the networks literature, is that the network structure g is effectively
fixed; in our case, it does not vary with regulation τ .
2.4.2 Multiproduct competition
We next use a simplified version of the upgrades approach (Johnson and Myatt,
2003, 2006) to extend our main GLC result to a multiproduct setting. Each of
n ≥ 2 firms offers two product qualities: low-quality q1 and high-quality q2, where
qU ≡ (q2 − q1) > 0.26
We consider a special case that yields linear demand structures for both products.
A consumer of type θ has willingness-to-pay v(θ, q) = θq for a single unit with quality
q ∈ {q1, q2}. There is a unit mass of potential buyers with uniformly distributed
types θ ∼ U [0, 1]. Let Y i1 denote the combined number of low- and high-quality units
produced by firm i, let Y i2 be the number of high-quality units, so that (Y i1 − Y i2 ) is the
number of low-quality units. Let Y1 =
∑n
i=1Y
i
1 be the industry supply of both qualities
and Y2 =
∑n
i=1Y
i
2 that of high-quality; the former can be interpreted as the number
of “baseline” units while the latter is the number of “upgrades”. The marginal buyer
of the low-quality product is indifferent to instead buying nothing and has type θ(Y1)
so the price of the low-quality product satisfies p1(Y1; q1) = v(θ(Y1), q1) = (1− Y1)q1.
The marginal buyer of an upgrade is indifferent between buying low or high quality
and has type θ(Y2) so the price of upgrading to the high-quality product satisfies
p2(Y2; qU ) = v(θ(Y2), q2)− v(θ(Y2), q1) = (1− Y2)qU . Observe that both demand curves
26Our exposition here mainly follows recent work by Johnson and Rhodes (2018). Similar to the
preceding extension, a substantive restriction is that regulation τ does not alter the quality levels
q1, q2 offered by firms (or the number of firms n).
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p1(Y1) and p2(Y2) are linear. The total price of the high-quality product is the baseline
price plus the upgrade price, p1 + p2.
We assume that GLC’s A1–A3 are satisfied for each of firm i’s products. A1
(regulation τ taken as given) and A2 (cost-minimization) apply straightforwardly while
A3 (constant marginal cost) can be reformulated for a multiproduct setting. Slightly
adjusting notation, firm i’s unit cost for the low-quality product is ki1(τ) = ci1(τ)+τzi1(τ)
while it is kiU(τ) ≡ [ki2(τ) − ki1(τ)] = ciU(τ) + τziU(τ) for the upgrade, where both of
the regulatory intensities, zi1 ≡ ei1/Y i1 and ziU ≡ ei2/Y i2 , are optimally chosen given τ .
Hence, by the envelope theorem, dki1(τ)/dτ = zi1(τ) and dkiU(τ)/dτ = ziU(τ).
Firm i’s overall profit is given by:
Πi(τ) = [p1(Y1)− ki1(τ)](Y i1 − Y i2 ) + [p1(Y1) + p2(Y2)− ki2(τ)]Y i2
= [p1(Y1)− ki1(τ)]Y i1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Πi1
+ [p2(Y2)− kiU(τ)]Y i2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Πi2
,
where it separately chooses Y i1 and Y i2 (subject to Y i1 ≥ Y i2 ). Given the linear demand
structure, firm i’s first-order conditions will mean that GLC’s A4 is met for each of its
products.
Two questions can be addressed. The first is how regulation τ affects profits only
on a single product, Πik(τ), for which we show that Proposition 1 applies (k = 1, 2).
The second is how τ affects overall profit, Πi(τ) ≡ Πi1(τ) + Πi2(τ), for which we derive
a straightforward generalization. We define profit-neutrality factors (“small τ”) for
both questions in the familiar way:
γik(0) =
− dΠ
i
k(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=0
eik(0)
and γi(0) =
−
(
dΠi1(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=0
+ dΠ
i
2(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=0
)
[ei1(0) + ei2(0)]
.
Let firm i’s rates of cost pass-through for the baseline and upgrade products, respectively,
as ρi1 ≡ [dp1(τ)/dτ ]/[dki1(τ)/dτ ] and ρi2 ≡ [dp2(τ)/dτ ]/[dkiU(τ)/dτ ].
Proposition 4. Under multiproduct competition in a linear version of the upgrades
approach, regulation τ affects firm i’s profits according to:
γik(0) = 2[1− ρik(0)] for product k = 1, 2
γi(0) = ωi1(0)γi1(0) + ωi2(0)γi2(0) for both products,
where ωik ≡ eik/(ei1 + ei2) ∈ (0, 1) is the share of product k in firm i’s overall emissions.
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As GLC’s A1–A4 hold for each of firm i’s products, a firm-product rate of pass-
through ρik is a sufficient statistic for the firm-product profit impact dΠik. The upgrades
approach has the key feature that the baseline units and upgrades are neither sub-
stitutes nor complements; in our empirical application to airlines, this will provide
a microfoundation for abstracting from “upgrades” to business-class tickets. The
multiproduct profit impact is then determined by a weighted-average of product-level
pass-through rates.
As in the previous extension, it is worth stressing that Proposition 4 is derived by
making assumptions only about firm i itself—there are no restrictions on its rivals’
products, technologies or behaviour.
2.4.3 Price discrimination
In practice, consumers often pay different prices for the same good; for example,
airlines sell tickets at different prices depending on when a customer buys. Building on
Hazledine (2006), we here show how Proposition 1(a) extends to a Cournot oligopoly
with price discrimination.
Consumers have unit demand for a homogeneous product (e.g., an economy flight
from A to B), with a distribution of v(X) = 1−X (so the Xth keenest consumer has
value 1−X). There are H ≥ 2 price buckets with class h priced at ph = 1−X1−...−Xh,
where Xh is the number of units sold in class h. Each firm i chooses how much of
each bucket to supply {xih}Hh=1. We assume that A1–A3 are met for each firm and, for
simplicity, that marginal cost k(τ) = c(τ) + τz(τ) is symmetric across firms. Given
the linear demand structure, A4 will be met for each firm and each price bucket.
Firm i’s profits Πi =
∑H
h=1Πih =
∑H
h=1[ph − k(τ)]xih so defining the (“small τ”)
profit-neutrality factor in the familiar way:
γi(0;H) =
1
ei(0)
(
−∑H
h=1
dΠih(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=0
)
,
where xi ≡ ∑Hh=1xih is firm i’s total production across price buckets. Let ρh ≡
dph(τ)/dτ)/(dk(τ)/dτ) denote the (symmetric) pass-through rate of bucket h.
Proposition 5. Under price discrimination with H price buckets, at symmetric Nash
equilibrium, regulation τ affects firm i’s profits according to:
γi(0;H) = 2[1− ρave(H)] = 2[1− ρave(1)] = γi(0; 1) for any H ≥ 2,
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where ρave(H) ≡ ∑Hh=1 xih(0)xi(0) ρh is the average rate of cost pass-through across price
buckets.
The firm-level profit impact is driven by a simple average pass-through rate across
buckets. Price discrimination (higher H) raises (lowers) the prices paid by high-value
(low-value) consumers but, due to the linear model structure, leaves the average price
unchanged.27 Similarly, cost pass-through to high-value (low-value) consumers declines
(rises) but average pass-through ρave(H) does not change with H. Hence the uniform
pass-through rate ρave(1) pins down the firm-level profit impact.
This extension provides a microfoundation, within the context of GLC, for working
with pass-through based on an average of dispersed market prices. In our empirical
application to airlines, this will provide support to an analysis that, due to data
availability, is based on an average ticket price. A familar substantive restriction is
that regulation τ does not alter the number of price buckets H (or the number of firms
n).
It is also worth noting that this extension is subtly different from those with
multiple markets/products. In the previous extensions, given A1–A3 and a linear
demand structure, firm i’s first-order condition directly implied the GLC’s A4 in each
market/product—without requiring any assumptions about its rivals. By contrast,
this model of price discrimination has a more complex demand structure in which
the price for one bucket depends on prices for other buckets. Nonetheless, at the
Nash equilibrium, GLC’s A4 is met for each individual price bucket—and hence our
pass-through result obtains.28
2.5 Robustness to model misspecification
We now explore GLC’s robustness to model misspecification. First, we discuss its
properties in comparison with logit demand structures (for which A4 is violated).
Second, we analyze the quantitative implications of non-linear costs (A3 fails) and/or
non-linear demand (A4 fails) in an augmented Cournot model.
27Price discrimination still benefits firms because sales expand to otherwise excluded low-value
consumers.
28Proposition 5 can be be further generalized to allow cost asymmetries between firms and to more
general conduct parameters (building in part on the results of Kutlu 2017).
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2.5.1 Comparison with logit demand structures
In a differentiated-products context, the empirical industrial-organization literature
(Bresnahan, 1989; Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2001; Reiss and Wolak, 2007; Einav
and Levin, 2010) employs structural models with discrete choice and a logit demand
structure. This literature typically makes assumptions, for each firm, that are equivalent
to GLC’s A1–A3; firms are cost-minimizers which take input prices as given and operate
production technologies with constant marginal cost. However, the logit demand
structure implies a particular form of demand non-linearity that results in a firm’s
first-order condition for profit-maximization departing from GLC’s A4.
The implications of functional-form assumptions on demand have been explored
in the literature on merger analysis which seeks to predict, with reasonable accuracy,
the price and welfare impacts of horizontal mergers. Using simulations, a number of
papers have found that logit demand systems give quantitatively similar results to
linear demand. In early work, Crooke et al. (1999) calibrate pre-merger equilibria
under different demand systems to “known” values of own- and cross-price demand
elasticities. More recently, Miller et al. (2016) explore the theoretical finding of Jaffe
and Weyl (2013) that pass-through estimates combined with information on demand
elasticities can provide a good approximation of the price impact of a merger. Their
Monte Carlo simulations assume that the true demand system is logit and calibrate
demand parameters to randomly generated market structures. Both papers find that
the price changes resulting from a merger are roughly equal under linear and logit
demand.
To understand these simulation findings, write si(p) ∈ (0, 1) as the probability that
a consumer will choose firm i’s product where p is the vector of firms’ prices, generated
by a standard discrete choice model with M consumers and random utility shocks that
are iid across products according to a Generalized Extreme Value distribution; firm i’s
demand Di(p) = Msi(p) and its market share satisfies ∂si/∂pi = −si(1− si)/µ < 0
with ∂2si/∂p2i = si(1 − si)(1 − 2si)/µ2 T 0, where µ > 0 is a measure of product
differentiation (see, e.g., Anderson et al., 1992). The key observation is that, for a
range of different market shares, the non-linearity of this logit market-share function
is not too pronounced; this helps explain why merger simulation often finds similar
results for logit demand and linear demand (for which ∂2Di/∂p2i ≡ 0).29
Two important points follow if logit demand is indeed the true model. First, GLC’s
qualitative prediction that firm-level pass-through signs the profit impact remains
29Unfortunately, closed-form solutions for pass-through and profits are not available for the logit
model.
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correct. To see this, write firm i’s profits as Πi(p) = (pi−ki)Msi(p) where its first-order
condition is:
∂Πi(p)
∂pi
=M
[
si(p)+
∂si
∂pi
pi
]
= 0⇒ (pi − ki) = µ(1− si) ⇒ (ρi − 1)
dki
dτ
= µ(1− si)2
dsi
dτ
,
recalling our definition ρi ≡ (dpi/dτ)/(dki/dτ). It follows that sign(dsi/dτ) = sign(ρi−
1) = sign(dΠi/dτ). This is exactly as in GLC: a firm’s sales and margin shrink
if and only if its pass-through is below 100%. Hence the winners and losers from
regulation are still correctly identified. Second, GLC entails no systematic bias in that
sign(∂2Di/∂p2i ) = sign(12 − si) always varies across firms of different sizes.
In general, of course, any parametric model can be sensitive to functional-form
misspecification. Crooke et al. (1999) and Miller et al. (2016) both find that demand
systems with more extreme curvature (such as constant-elasticity demand) can lead to
significantly different predictions than both logit and linear demand. In this respect, a
potential advantage of GLC is its semi-parametric nature: Proposition 1 requires such
functional-form assumptions to be made only for firm i.
2.5.2 Non-linearities: Monte Carlo results
We now further explore the quantitative implications of GLC being misspecified.
Following Hepburn et al. (2013), suppose it is known that the true model is an
augmented version of homogenous-product Cournot competition. The setting features
two departures from GLC: each firm has non-constant marginal cost (A3 fails) and the
demand system may be non-linear (A4 fails).
The salient additional model parameters are as follows. The inverse demand curve
is p(X) where X is total industry output; let ξ ≡ −Xp′′(X)/p′(X) be an index of
demand curvature, so demand is convex (concave) if ξ ≥ 0 (ξ < 0), and firm i’s market
share is given by si ≡ xi/X ∈ (0, 1). There is a competitiveness parameter θ > 0 which
nests Cournot-Nash behaviour when θ = 1 and lower values of θ correspond to more
intense competition. Finally, the slope of the marginal cost function is given by m and
is identical across firms, and m ≡ −m/p′ is a measure of cost convexity.
Translating Hepburn et al.’s (2013) results into our context yields firm i’s true
profit-neutrality parameter γ˜i faced with a small tightening of regulation:
γ˜i(τ , τ)|τ→τ = 2(1− ρi) +
θ
(θ +m)θsiξρi −
m
(θ +m)(1− ρi),
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where (θ +m) > 0 (by stability of equilibrium). The underlying equilibrium firm-level
rate of cost pass-through is given by:
ρi =
n
[n+ θ(1− ξ) +m]
1
zi
,
and is driven by market structure (n), demand curvature (ξ), cost convexity (m), and
firm i’s cost shock (zi) relative to the industry-average cost shock ( 1n
∑n
j=1 zj), namely
zi ≡ zi/
(
1
n
∑n
j=1 zj
)
.
With linear demand and constant marginal costs (ξ = m = 0), A3 is met and each
firm’s first-order condition satisfies A4 so Proposition 1 holds: γ˜i = 2(1− ρi) = γi. The
first additional effect stems from demand: if true demand is convex with ξ > 0 then
this pushes γ˜i up so GLC’s γi underestimates the adverse profit shock. This effect is
quantitatively modest if either the market is very competitive (low θ) or firm i’s market
share si is small or the pass-through rate ρi itself is small. The second additional
effect arises from costs: if these are convex with m > 0 this pushes down γ˜i (as long as
ρi ≤ 1) so GLC then yields an overestimate.
Two conclusions follow. First, GLC again exhibits no systematic bias: depending on
the precise way in which A3 and/or A4 are violated, it may over- or under-estimate the
true firm-level profit impact of regulation. Second, the impacts of plausible departures
from A3 may partially offset those of A4. It is probably true that convex demand is
more likely than concave demand—and indeed this applies for most demand curves
commonly used by economists. In addition, it is probably true that the case of convex
costs, at equilibrium, is more likely than concave costs (especially for emissions-intensive
industries). These two departures from GLC tend to work in opposite directions such
that γ˜i ≈ 2(1− ρi) = γi may still be a reasonable approximation.
We now explore quantitatively the impacts of model misspecification using Monte
Carlo analysis. In the following design, we create 10,000 hypothetical industries for
which, on average, A3 is violated for each firm and so A4 is also violated for each firm.
The design is such that there is significant heterogeneity in firms’ marginal costs and
emissions intensities.30
For each industry, we draw the following six sets of parameters to reflect model
uncertainty underlying GLC:
1. The number of firms is drawn uniformly as n ∈ [2, 8], with an integer constraint,
to create a relatively concentrated market structure;
30Firms’ second-order conditions and stability conditions are always satisfied given our parameter
assumptions below.
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2. The market competitiveness parameter is drawn uniformly as θ ∈ [0, 1] so that
competition, on average, lies mid-way between Bertrand and Cournot-Nash;
3. For each of the n ∈ [2, 8] firms in the industry, firm i’s market share is drawn
uniformly as si ∈ (0, 1); then firms’ market shares are re-normalized so that they
sum to 100%;
4. The cost convexity metric is drawn uniformly according m ≡ m/[−p′(X)] ∈ [0, 1]
leading to modestly convex costs (thus violating A3);
5. Demand curvature ξ is drawn uniformly from five discrete values {−1,−12 , 0, 12 , 1},
in line with the common assumption from economic theory that demand is log-
concave ξ ≤ 1. This range (i) includes three convex demand systems used in
an influential paper by Genesove and Mullin (1998): linear (ξ = 0), quadratic
(ξ = 12), exponential (ξ = 1). While linear demand (ξ = 0) remains focal, A4 is
nonetheless violated as A3 is already violated;
6. For each of the n ∈ [2, 8] firms in the industry, firm i’s relative emissions intensity
zi is drawn uniformly as zi ∈ [12 , 32 ] so that each firm is somewhere between 50%
cleaner or 50% dirtier than the industry average.
We then drawn one firm from each industry, such that we have 10,000 firms, and
complete the analysis of the true model and the misspecified GLC in four steps. For
each firm, we calculate: (1) the true firm-level rate of cost pass-through ρi(n, θ, ξ, zi)
(“true CPT”), (2) the true profit-neutrality factor γ˜i(ρi, θ, si, ξ,m) (“true PNF”), (3)
GLC’s estimated profit-neutrality factor γi(ρi) = 2(1 − ρi) (“GLC PNF”), and (4)
GLC’s error εi ≡ γi− γ˜i. An important point is that GLC’s PNF picks up the variation
in the true CPT even if some or all of these assumptions A1–A4 are violated.31
Table 2.1 summarises paramter draws and results. Firm-level cost pass-through
rates ρi vary widely between around 30% up to almost 200%, partly driven by variation
in emissions intensities, that is, in the size of firms’ cost shocks relative to their rivals.
Similarly, there is large variation in true profit-neutrality factors, with some firms being
hit hard (γ˜i > 1) and others benefitting from regulation (γ˜i < 0). Overall, the average
GLC PNF of γi = 0.205 lies close to the average true PNF of γ˜i = .0156. Figure 2.1
is a kernel density plot of the true PNF and GLC PNF over all draws. The means
(shown in grey) are strikingly close. The true PNF has a a slightly larger spread, but
their overall distributions are similar in shape.
31See Miller et al. (2017) for an analysis of noisy or biased pass-through estimation.
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Table 2.1 Monte Carlo parameter draws and results.
Mean Min Max
Parameters drawn
Number of firms n 4.998 2.000 8.000
Demand curvature ξ 0.004 -1.000 1.000
Cost convexity m 0.500 0.000 1.000
Market share s 0.247 0.000 0.998
Competitiveness θ 0.502 0.000 1.000
Relative emissions intensity z 1.001 0.500 1.500
Results
True pass-through ρ 0.897 0.316 1.959
GLC profit neutrality factor γ 0.205 -1.918 1.367
True profit neutrality factor γ˜ 0.156 -1.843 1.123
GLC error ϵ 0.049 -0.860 0.523
Number of firm draws 10,000
Herfindahl Index H 0.317 0.128 0.998
Figure 2.1 Density plots of the true PNF and GLC PNF.
Notes: Vertical lines in grey indicate the means of the distributions. Kernel densities plotted over all
10,000 draws.
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In sum, this analysis suggests that if a researcher knows the true pass-through
rate then GLC can perform reasonably well even in situations with significant model
misspecification on the demand and/or cost side.
2.6 Empirical analysis of cost pass-through for US
airlines
In this section we estimate cost pass-through rates for US airlines. In Section 2.7
we use these estimates in the theoretical results for GLC, to obtain predicted profit
impacts for carbon pricing.
2.6.1 Background on aviation and climate change policy
Airlines currently produce around 2.5% of global CO2 emissions (McCollum et al.,
2009); as these emissions occur high up in the atmosphere, an effect known as climatic
forcing means that the proportion of “effective” emissions is around twice as high.
Airline emissions are projected to grow well into the 21st century due to rising global
demand for air travel and limited scope for large-scale substitution away from jet
engines to low-carbon technologies. As other sectors of the economy, such as electricity
generation, decarbonize more quickly the role of aviation in future climate policy is set
to grow. Economic regulation appears increasingly likely as countries seek to implement
internationally-agreed climate targets in a cost-effective manner.32
In this paper, we study the domestic US airline market. This is the world’s largest
aviation market, producing around 28% of global aviation emissions, but has so far not
been subject to carbon pricing. We study the domestic market because international
aviation is regulated under a separate organization and set of agreements. At a baseline
carbon price of $30/tCO2, the level proposed by the US Government’s IAWG (2016),
aviation’s 2013 emissions of 120 million tCO2 would have had a value of $3.6 billion.
There is a rich literature that explores many important features of US aviation
markets, principally the presence of market power and firm heterogeneity. The number
32Aviation is already subject to carbon pricing in some international jurisdictions. Intra-EU flights
have since 2012 been included in the EU ETS. However the impact on airlines has been limited by a
low carbon prices. Aviation has recently also been included in some regional trading schemes in China,
though again with very low carbon prices. In 2018 Sweden introduced an additional carbon tax, on
all flights departing from Sweden, that operates alongside the EU ETS. The first global aviation
emissions reduction agreement was negotiated by the UN’s International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) and signed by its 191 member nations in October 2016; it amounts to a carbon-offset scheme
for emissions growth after 2020.
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of firms competing on a given route is typically small, and it is widely acknowledged
that despite deregulation airlines continue to exercise market power (Brander and
Zhang, 1990; Borenstein and Rose, 2007; Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009). Over the period
we study, US aviation was dominated by four large legacy carriers (American, Delta,
United and US Airways) and a single large low-cost carrier, Southwest Airlines. Legacy
airlines were established on interstate routes before deregulation in 1978; they tend to
operate hub-and-spoke networks with relatively high costs and high levels of service
while low-cost airlines tend to offer direct flights at lower prices (Borenstein, 1992). A
recurring theme in the literature is the importance of this heterogeneity and the central
role played by Southwest, sometimes labelled the “Southwest is special” effect. From
the 1980s onwards, Southwest’s low costs, innovative business model and generally
astute management have made it an especially disruptive and profitable competitor,
with large impacts on incumbent prices and profits (Borenstein, 1989; Morrison, 2001;
Borenstein and Rose, 2007; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008; Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009).33
We follow this literature by ensuring potential heterogeneity between Southwest and
the legacy carriers is captured in our analysis.
2.6.2 Description of the data
Our unit of analysis is at the individual-product level. As is standard in the airline
literature, we take a product to be a seat on a flight by airline i on route j at time t. Our
dataset is a panel of price and cost data for airlines over the period 2004Q1–2013Q4.34
For each carrier i, route j and quarter t, we have the average ticket price pijt, the
average per-person fuel cost kijt, and a vector of covariates. All monetary quantities
are in real 2013Q4 USD. We restrict our attention to the four large legacy carriers
(American, Delta, United and US Airways) and one large low-cost carrier (Southwest)
operating throughout the period.35 The resulting dataset is an unbalanced panel, with
N = 1, 334 carrier-routes and T = 40 quarters, a total of 36,650 observations. The
routes in our sample make up 27% by revenue of all domestic US aviation activity over
the period.
33The “Southwest is special” effect is widely recognised beyond the economics literature. See, for
example, Heskett and Sasser (2010) and Tully (2015).
34The start year was chosen to exclude the effects of 11 September 2001 from our dataset. The end
date avoids the 2015 “mega merger” between American Airlines and US Airways.
35A third type of carrier in the US market, the regional airline, is not included in our analysis.
There are now many more low-cost carriers than only Southwest, but these were either very small or
non-existent at the start of our period, so we do not include them.
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We construct our data by combining elements of three datasets from the US Bureau
of Transportation Statistics. Price data come from the DB1A Origin and Destination
Survey, a 10% sample of all airline tickets sold.36 Prices are for a one-way trip; all
round-trip tickets are split equally into two one-way observations. A route is defined
by its origin and destination airports, regardless of direction. Following much of the
airlines literature, we exclude indirect flights.37 Finally, we exclude carrier-routes that
carried fewer than 1,000 passengers per quarter (i.e. 83 per week). For the resulting
observations we calculate pijt, an average of all fares purchased on carrier-route ij in
quarter t.
The remaining datasets (T-100 and Form 41) are used to construct kijt, the average
per-passenger fuel cost for flying with carrier i on route j in time t.38 This is the
total fuel cost for a given flight divided by the number of passengers on that flight.
(Appendix 2.B describes this procedure in more detail.) Our ultimate objective is to
obtain estimates of carbon cost pass-through – the dollar increase in prices following
a $1 increase in carbon costs. Given there is currently no variation in carbon prices
for US airlines away from zero, our empirical approach is to estimate fuel cost pass-
throug – the dollar increase in prices following a dollar increase in fuel costs. For a
cost-minimising airline, fuel and carbon costs are equivalent and pass-through rates
should therefore be the same.39
The value of fuel cost kijt is determined by three factors: (i) the market price
of jet fuel, which tracks the crude oil price; (ii) the fuel efficiency of the passenger’s
journey, driven by the type and age of aircraft used, the configuration the seating and
the proportion of seats filled (any other variation in the airline’s physical operating
36We use a cleaned version of the DB1A provided by Severin Borenstein. The following ticket
types are excluded: international, first class, frequent flier (those with a price less than $20), entry
errors (price higher than $9,998 or five times the industry standard for that route-time), and open or
circular itineraries. Observations are aggregated up to the carrier-route-time level. (In section 2.4.2,
we provide a microfoundation for the widespread approach in the literature of analyzing economy-class
tickets in a separable way from business or first-class tickets.)
37Indirect flights—involving a change of aircraft at another airport en route, using the airline’s
hub-and-spoke network—are well-known to have different economic characteristics to direct flights.
Excluding indirect flights is, therefore, commonplace in the airlines literature (e.g. Borenstein and
Rose, 1994; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008; Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009).
38The overlap between the DB1A and T-100 is good but not perfect (see Goolsbee and Syverson,
2008, for a fuller discussion). Merging with data from T-100 results in around 10% of DB1A revenue
being dropped.
39A similar approach of using variation in other input costs to estimate the impact of future
environmental costs is also taken by Miller et al. (2017). In related work, Ganapati, Shapiro & Walker
(2016) estimate the pass-through of energy input prices across six US manufacturing industries while
Bushnell and Humber (2017) focus on the pass-through of natural gas prices in the fertilizer industry
and its implications for the allocation of carbon emissions permits.
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Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics.
Southwest Legacy
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Quarterly av. statistics
Price ($) 154.73 40.76 63.07 298.91 227.75 70.89 72.80 599.11
Fuel cost ($) 32.95 17.86 5.61 129.81 52.98 28.74 2.05 366.63
Distance (miles) 717 466 133 2,298 1,044 629 130 2,724
Emissions (tCO2) 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.41 0.20 0.10 0.01 0.71
Emissions cost ($/tCO2) 4.00 1.84 1.03 12.44 6.02 2.89 0.18 21.22
Passengers (000s) 42 39 1 289 30 29 1 245
Competitors (#) 2.24 2.40 0.00 16.00 2.82 2.29 0.00 16.00
LCC competitors (#) 0.40 0.73 0.00 4.00 0.67 0.97 0.00 5.00
Revenue ($million) 5.46 4.37 0.12 32.12 5.85 5.84 0.11 53.87
Whole sample statistics
Revenue in sample (%) 56 43
Observations (#) 13,199 22,451
Carrier-routes (#) 416 918
Notes: Data are quarterly, over the period 2004Q1-2013Q4. Price, fuel cost, emissions and emissions
cost are per passenger. Emissions cost are calculated at a carbon price of $30/tCO2. Whole sample
statistics are aggregated over all N and T . Revenue in sample is the proportion of all US aviation
revenue (ie all flights on all airlines) in the sample over this period. The legacy carriers are American,
Delta, United and US Airways. All averages are unweighted.
procedures can also influence this factor); and (iii) the carrier’s use of hedging or other
financial instruments when buying fuel. This varies significantly between carriers and
over time for a given carrier. For example, in our sample period, Southwest was known
for its extensive use of hedging, while US Airways never hedged. Carriers therefore
ended up paying very different prices: in 2008 (when oil prices were rising) US Airways
paid 30% more for each gallon of fuel than Southwest, whereas in 2009 (when oil prices
fell) it paid 18% less.40
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics on airlines’ prices, costs and other variables
related to competition and environmental performance. The four legacy carriers are
grouped together (Table 2.6 in Appendix 2.C.2 gives descriptive statistics by carrier
and confirms the similarity of the legacy carriers compared to Southwest). Southwest
tends to fly larger numbers of passengers on shorter routes than the legacy carriers; it
40We do not have detailed data on the precise extent of hedging by each carrier at each point in
time. Turner and Lim (2015) document and analyse the different hedging strategies of US airlines,
and the different effective fuel prices that result.
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charges lower prices and has lower fuel costs and emissions. Revenue and numbers of
competitors are broadly similar.
Figure 2.2 shows trends over the period for each carrier type. Figure 2.2(a) compares
Southwest’s average per-passenger fuel cost with the spot price of jet fuel. They track
each other reasonably closely, with a lag indicating the presence of hedging, which also
smooths out the peak and trough from the 2008 price spike. Note also the substantial
variation in fuel costs over the period. Figure 2.2(b) plots average ticket prices (left
axis) against per-passenger fuel costs (right axis) for Southwest. As expected, there
is a positive correlation. Figure 2.2(c) shows per-passenger fuel costs for the legacy
carriers and how they compare to the spot price of jet fuel. Fuel costs follow spot
prices more closely than for Southwest, consistent with a more limited use of hedging.
Figure 2.2(d) shows ticket prices and fuel costs for the legacy carriers; as for Southwest,
these appear to be closely related.
2.6.3 Baseline econometric specification
Following a standard approach in the pass-through literature (e.g., Fabra and Reguant,
2014; Atkin and Donaldson, 2015; Stolper, 2016; Miller et al., 2017), our baseline
specification is a regression of quarterly average prices pijt on quarterly average per-
passenger fuel costs kijt. Given the dimensions of our panel (N = 1, 334, T = 40) we
can estimate a standard fixed effects specification. We are interested pass-through
heterogeneity so interact costs with carrier identity – either Southwest or a legacy
carrier – and estimate the following equation:
pijt = ρSkijt · Si + ρLkijt · Li +X ′ijtβ + λt + ηij + ϵijt. (2.4)
The parameter of interest is ρ, the rate of cost pass-through. By interacting fuel
cost kijt with dummies Si and Li that are equal to 1 for Southwest and legacy
carriers, respectively, we obtain pass-through rates ρS and ρL for the two carrier types,
respectively. Controls (Xijt), time effects (λt), fixed effects (ηij), and residuals (ϵijt)
are further explained below.
Equation (2.4) cannot be estimated using OLS because the per-passenger fuel
cost kijt is potentially endogenous. It depends in its denominator on the number of
passengers flying in quarter t, which in turn will generally be an outcome of the price
pijt. Hence this regressor depends on an outcome variable, introducing the possibility
of simultaneity bias. To address this, we use the spot price of jet fuel as an instrument
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Figure 2.2 Aggregate trends in prices and costs.
(a) Southwest (b) Southwest
(c) Legacy (d) Legacy
Notes: Panels (a) and (c) show jet fuel spot prices and per-passenger fuel costs; panels (b) and (d)
show ticket prices and per-passenger fuel costs. Variables are quarterly averages (unweighted) over all
carrier-routes in our sample.
for fuel cost kijt.41 Since the price of jet fuel is determined by the global oil price,
it is exogenous to passenger numbers on a particular route, satisfying the exclusion
principle. In order to accommodate potential hedging, we include three lags of spot
prices. We also include a term interacting distance with fuel costs, in order to capture
the differential impact of spot fuel prices on the dollar fuel cost of flights of different
41We use jet fuel price data from Bloomberg (JETINYPR index, New York Harbor 54-Grade Jet
Fuel).
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lengths. The first stage regressions are given by:
kijt ·ai =
3∑
q=0
γqft−q ·ai+
3∑
q=0
δqft−q ·ai ·dij+X ′ijtβ+µt+θij+ωijt for each ai ∈ {Si, Li}
(2.5)
where ft is the spot fuel price, dij is the route distance, and the remaining controls are
the same as in Equation (2.4).
Equations (2.4) and (2.5) include a vector of controls Xijt which capture changes
in supply and demand that could otherwise bias the regression results. In addition
to a constant, Xijt is constructed as follows. (i) We include GDP growth to proxy for
demand because jet fuel prices closely track the oil price, which may be systematically
related to demand for air travel. We use the average GDP of the two states at either
end of the route. (ii) We construct an index of the main non-fuel costs, at the carrier
level, principally made up of labour and aircraft maintenance costs. (iii) We include
the number of competitor firms on route j. If this quantity remained stable over time,
there would be no need to include it when estimating Equation (2.4); however we do
see entry and exit in the data, which could potentially be systematically related to
fuel costs. (iv) We also include the number of low-cost competitors, as these may
have a different impact to other competitors. (v) We include carrier size, the total
number of passengers travelling on all of airline j’s routes in a given quarter, as a
measure of overall demand for airline j’s product. As robustness tests in Appendix
2.C.3, we explore several other controls to capture changes in supply and demand.
Time effects are controlled for using dummies for each year-quarter t, and fixed effects
are at the carrier-route level ij. Standard errors are clustered at the carrier-route level.
Finally, we weight observations by carrier-route emissions, so smaller routes do not
disproportionately affect the resulting carrier-level pass-through estimates (see Section
2.7.2 for further details).
It is worth noting an implicit assumption in our estimation of cost pass-through.
Our specification does not directly include competitors’ costs. A firm’s equilibrium
price, however, is usually a function of its own as well as its rivals’ costs. The literature
on pass-through estimation takes a variety of approaches to this. Miller et al. (2017)
include in their overall pass-through rate the coefficient on a measure of firm-specific
competitive pressure to capture the rival-cost component of pass-through. Stolper
(2016) argues for the theoretical importance of including rivals’ costs but then, for
reasons of identification, estimates an overall industry cost pass-through. Our approach
is to allow firm i on route j to have costs kijt that may be correlated in any arbitrary
way with any other rival’s costs. The substantive assumption is that the relationship
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between own and rivals’ costs is unchanging over the period we study. If this holds,
then our pass-through rates capture both own-cost and rival-cost effects. In this respect
our approach is similar to both Atkin and Donaldson (2015) and Stolper (2016).42
2.6.4 Estimation results
Table 2.3 shows the results of estimating Equation (2.4) using the 2SLS approach
described above, with the first stage given by Equation (2.5). Column (1) shows the
baseline result, using the full unbalanced panel. We see substantial heterogeneity:
Southwest’s pass-through rate is 1.41, whereas the legacy carriers’ pass-through is
0.62. They are significantly greater and smaller than 1, respectively. This means that
when Southwest’s costs rise, their rise in equilibrium price more than offsets this. The
opposite is true for the legacy carriers. To the best of our knowledge, our finding of
pass-through heteroegeneity in the airline industry is novel. We document, therefore, a
new dimension in which the “Southwest is special” result operates.
The coefficients on the controls generally have the signs we would expect. We see
that greater competition lowers prices, and that competition from low-cost carriers
has a large additional effect. Non-fuel costs raise prices as expected. Less expected is
that GDP growth and carrier size have a negative relationship with price. The first
stage results are also as we would expect: the spot price of jet fuel has a positive
relationship with per-passenger fuel costs, and the Sanderson-Windmeijer F-statistics
provide strong evidence that the instruments are relevant in all cases.
Column (1) gives our baseline results, which we will use in conjunction with GLC
to produce predicted profit impacts below. Column (2) shows the results of estimating
the same equations but on the subsample of the full dataset that gives a balanced
panel. We report these results because they are for the ‘stable’ routes only - those
that were operated continuously throughout the period. The near-identical results for
the balanced and unbalanced panel suggest that both newly opened routes and routes
shortly to be discontinued appear to have the same rate of pass-through as the stable
routes. This is encouraging for the external validity of our estimates.
In column (4), we show the results of estimating Equation (1) by OLS. The results
differ quantitatively from the baseline, suggesting the instruments are not redundant.
The qualitative result, however, that pass-through is significantly higher for Southwest
42Fabra and Reguant (2014) take another approach, given their focus on electricity: they analyze
pass-through for a homogeneous good (electricity) with a single market price, and their resulting
pass-through rate gives the dollar increase in the electricity price when the carbon costs of the marginal
supplier increase by $1.
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Table 2.3 Pass-through estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
Balanced
Panel
Common
routes OLS
Panel A: 2SLS Dependent variable: Price
Fuel cost · Southwest 1.41∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12)
Fuel cost · Legacy 0.62∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08)
Competitors -2.79∗∗∗ -2.86∗∗∗ -0.09 -2.94∗∗∗
(0.69) (0.76) (1.00) (0.68)
LCC competitors -5.06∗∗∗ -5.35∗∗∗ -6.78∗∗∗ -5.11∗∗∗
(0.90) (0.98) (1.73) (0.93)
Non-fuel cost index 6.49∗∗ 6.90∗∗ 7.86∗∗ 6.85∗∗
(2.60) (2.84) (3.41) (2.69)
GDP growth -1.30∗∗∗ -1.52∗∗∗ 0.40 -1.33∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.44) (0.33) (0.40)
Carrier size -15.24∗∗∗ -16.15∗∗∗ -1.40 -14.95∗∗∗
(5.15) (5.75) (4.56) (4.44)
R squared 0.212 0.216 0.436 0.213
Time- and fixed-effects X X X X
Unbalanced panel X X X
Observations 35,650 24,600 6,138 35,650
Carrier-routes 1,334 615 183 1,334
Panel B: First stage regressions
Dependent variable: Fuel cost · Southwest
Spot · Southwest 17.24∗∗∗ 17.31∗∗∗ 22.35∗∗∗
(1.06) (1.19) (2.79)
Spot · Distance · Southwest 10.20∗∗∗ 10.48∗∗∗ 9.95∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.21) (0.24)
F-statistic excluded instruments 734 681 197
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dependent variable: Fuel cost · Legacy
Spot · Legacy 26.71∗∗∗ 25.83∗∗∗ 8.54∗∗∗
(3.24) (3.49) (3.08)
Spot · Distance · Legacy 12.13∗∗∗ 12.24∗∗∗ 11.46∗∗∗
(0.88) (0.87) (1.36)
F-statistic excluded instruments 288 256 104
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: All regressions have a full set of carrier-route fixed effects, and year-and-quarter time dummies.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the carrier-route level. All regressions
except (3) are weighted by total emissions of the carrier-route over the period. Columns (1), (2), and
(3) are estimated by 2SLS. Column (2) is estimated on an balanced panel. Column (3) is estimated
on the subsample of common routes (see text). Column (4) is estimated by OLS on the full sample.
In Panel B, all first stage regressions include the full set of controls, fixed effects, and time effects as
in Panel A. Significance levels and p-values are denoted by: ∗ significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%,
and ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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than the legacy carriers, and these are on either side of 100%, continues to hold. This is
reassuring, because it shows that our key finding is not being driven by the instruments
in our baseline results.
What explains the heterogeneity in pass-through rates? To answer this we can
decompose the difference in baseline pass-through rates into three factors: route
portfolio, production costs, and product differentiation. Firstly, from the descriptive
statistics in Table 2.2 it is clear that Southwest operates different kinds of routes to
the legacy carriers since they are considerably shorter. Short haul flights are likely
to have systematically different characteristics: on the demand side, there are more
close substitutes (such as car, bus or rail travel); on the supply side, entry may be
more or less difficult so there may be differences in market power (e.g., Brander and
Zhang, 1990; Berry and Jia, 2010). To quantify the importance route portfolios, we
present in Column (3) of Table 2.3 the results of re-estimating our baseline using only
routes common to both Southwest and the legacy carriers. To achieve a fully like-for-
like comparison of pass-through rates we run an unweighted regression (rather than
weighting by emissions as in the baseline). We find that Southwest’s pass-through rate
falls significantly, to 1.08, while the legacy carriers’ pass-through remains statistically
unchanged, at 0.58. By comparing the difference in pass-through rates for the common
routes to that in the baseline results, we can attribute 32% of the original difference in
baseline pass-through to differences in route portfolio.
Secondly, we can quantify the importance of production cost heterogeneity. South-
west has lower average fuel costs on common routes: $30.37 per passenger compared
to $40.59 for the legacy carriers. This is principally due to the use of newer aircraft
and more efficient seating configurations. In the absence of any demand asymmetries
between firms there is a single market price; in such cases, any two firms’ (i and j)
pass-through rates are related only by their relative cost shocks, ρj/ρi = zi(τ)/zj(τ).
Using the fuel cost figures for the common routes, Southwest’s superior fuel efficiency
can explain 36% of the original difference in baseline pass-through rates.43
Thirdly, 32% of the pass-through differential remains. This residual difference now
shows hetergeneity in pass-through rates for a uniform cost shock on common routes
(that hits all carriers equally). We therefore attribute this residual to demand-side
asymmetries between carriers, based on their differentiated-product offering. Such
demand asymmetries now imply departures from a single market price on common
routes so also mean that differences in competitive conduct may be driving pass-
43All else equal, we would expect the legacy carriers to have a pass-through rate 25% lower than
Southwest using ρj/ρi = zi(τ)/zj(τ). Using Southwest as the baseline, this explains 36% of the
original difference in Table 2.3.
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through asymmetry.44 In sum, this decompostion suggests that around one third of the
pass-through difference is due to different route portfolios; around one third is driven
by Southwest’s superior fuel efficiency and the final third stems from differences in
demand patterns (and competitive conduct).45
2.6.5 Further results and robustness
We have explored a large number of robustness tests and alternative specifications,
and find that our central result of pass through greater than 100% for Southwest
and less than 100% for the legacy carriers is robust. We summarize the results here;
Appendix 2.C contains further details. First, we present the results of estimating
Equation (2.4) in a way closely related to the Mean Group estimator in Pesaran and
Smith (1995) and the estimation strategy used in Atkin and Donaldson (2015). The
principal advantage of this approach is that it allows for greater heterogeneity across
routes within an airline, at the cost of less comprehensive time controls.46 The results,
however, are similar to our baseline. Second, we re-estimate our baseline results but
allowing for heterogeneity at the individual airline level, rather than grouping the
legacy carriers together. Southwest remains the only carrier to have a pass-through
rate significantly greater than 1. Third, we explore a larger set of control variables that
address additional demand- and supply-side factors that could be relevant to airlines’
pricing choices. The pass-through rates are statistically unchanged in all cases. Further
robustness tests (such as varying the time period, adding interaction terms between
fuel cost and covariates of interest) are discussed in Appendix 2.C.
2.7 Estimating the profit impacts of carbon pricing
using GLC
In this section, we combine our pass-through estimates with our theoretical results for
GLC to estimate the predicted profit impact of a carbon price on US airlines.
44For example, Southwest has a higher market share on the common routes in our sample; this
is one factor than can lead to asymmetry in pass-through in the context of differentiated-products
competition.
45To add together the above elements of this back-of-the-envelope decomposition, we implicitly
require the ratio of fuel efficiencies zi(τ)/zj(τ) between Southwest and the lagacy carriers to be the
same for the whole sample as it was in the common routes.
46An earlier version of this paper, Grey and Ritz (2018), uses this estimation technique as the
empirical baseline.
78 Pass-through, profits and the political economy of regulation
2.7.1 From theory to empirics
GLC requires no assumptions to be made about demand functions, the number and
nature of competitors, competitors’ technologies and strategies, competitive conduct,
rationality or equilibrium. Many of these factors are unknown for airlines, and there
will be considerable intra-industry heterogeneity. For our profit impact estimates to be
valid, we need only the four assumptions of GLC to hold for the five airlines in our
data. We therefore discuss these assumptions in turn:
Input price-taking (A1) is an appropriate assumption in that an airline cannot
influence the global oil price, which is the primary determinant of its jet fuel price.
Likewise, the price-taking assumption is appropriate in the context of an emissions tax
and also approximately correct in the context of a cap-and-trade scheme in which firm
i is one among many as in the EU ETS and other current systems.
Cost-minimizing inputs (A2) also appears reasonable for airlines. Fuel costs are
often an airline’s largest cost, amounting to 20–50% of its total cost base Zhanga and
Zhang (2017) so it clearly has strong incentives to minimize fuel costs. Future carbon
costs are likely to be managed in conjunction with an airline’s overall commodity-market
exposure, so we expect these to be similarly optimized. Examples of fuel/emissions
reductions by airlines include adjusting flight time, cabin weight, and leasing newer
aircraft. These kinds of reversible, continuous and often operational changes are
consistent with our framework; anything that airlines did in the past in response to
fuel prices, they are likely to do again in response to a carbon price.47
Constant returns to scale (A3) is a more substantive assumption, though it is
standard in much of the airlines literature.48 The evidence on whether it holds
empirically is inconclusive: while some studies estimate modest scale economies others
find no such evidence (Zhanga and Zhang, 2017) so our analysis is consistent with
the notion that these are relatively weak in comparison with the marginal price-cost
shifts studied here.49 Note also that the presence of fixed costs is not an issue for the
application of GLC.
47Other abatement activities that fit less well with our approach are one-off, predominantly capital
changes, such as purchasing new aircraft or installing wing tips. If these kinds of abatement dominate
over the period we study, our historic average pass-through results may give less good predictions of
the impact of future carbon pricing.
48Brander and Zhang (1990) discuss how to conceptualise constant marginal costs in the case of
airlines; Berry and Jia (2010) estimate marginal costs which are constant for a given vector of route
characteristics.
49There is stronger evidence for economies of scope: a higher network density of its route portfolio
confers a competitive advantage on an airline—but this is not inconsistent with GLC theory. As
is common in the airlines literature, our empirical analysis considers each route separately, without
accounting for potentially complex network effects with other routes (see, e.g., Ciliberto and Tamer,
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Linear product market behaviour (A4) is the core assumption underlying GLC. We
allow the proportionality factor ψ to vary arbitrarily over routes and across carriers. So,
in contrast to standard oligopoly models, a higher market share does not necessarily
mean a higher profit margin. An empirical test of whether A4 holds in a given setting
would require full information on marginal costs. While we have fuel cost and some
other cost data, we do not have a good measure of full marginal costs at the carrier-route
level, and so cannot perform an adequate test of A4.50 It is, therefore, a maintained
assumption.
2.7.2 Profit impacts of an exogenous carbon price
If assumptions A1-A4 hold then we can apply GLC and use Proposition 1 to estimate
the profit impact of a carbon price. We begin by examining the impact of an exogenous
carbon price of $30/tCO2, which is roughly the Social Cost of Carbon reported by
Nordhaus (2017) and calculated by the US government.51 Importantly for the external
validity of our results, the wide variation of jet fuel prices over our period (the maximum
is 540% larger than the minimum) exceeds by a considerable margin the variation
in costs that a $30/tCO2 carbon price would induce.52 Hence our simulated carbon-
price shock lies within the range of fuel cost shocks that airlines responded to over
the sample period. Proposition 1 gives us the profit impact at the product level;
to obtain profit impact at the firm level we sum over all products for a given firm:
∆Πi ≃ τ ∑j 2eij(0)(1− ρij) = 2(1− ρi)τei(0), where ρi is firm i’s emissions-weighted
average pass-through rate.
Using our baseline pass-through estimates and Proposition 1, the impact of a
$30/tCO2 carbon price is summarised in Table 2.4 columns (1)-(3). The legacy carriers’
profits fall by 1.24 percentage points, whereas Southwest’s profits rise by 1.41 percentage
points. The intuition for this result is as follows. The legacy carriers’ pass-through
rate is less than 1, so as their costs rise their margin falls. By A4, their sales also fall.
Hence, their profits fall. For Southwest, however, with a pass-through rate greater than
2009). A strength of our estimation procedure is that it allows for arbitrarily complex networks, so
long as these are stable over the period we study.
50While we have information on fuel, labour and maintenance costs, we do not have data on
aeroplane purchase/lease costs, airport costs, sales and marketing costs, etc. Given this, we cannot be
confident we have a good measure of marginal cost. An advantage of the theory applied here is that
it only requires information on marginal cost shocks, which we do have via fuel cost shocks.
51The US Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases has compared and
averaged the results of the major models that are used to estimate the SCC. The results for the end
of our period of study are around $30/tCO2. See IAWG (2016) for the most recent estimates.
521 gallon of jet fuel produces 0.00957 tons of CO2 when burned.
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Table 2.4 Profit impacts, from by applying GLC to our pass-through estimates.
Exogenous τ = $30.00 Endogenous τ = $18.68
Southwest Legacy All Southwest Legacy All
Pass through, ρ 1.41 0.62 0.87 1.41 0.62 0.87
(0.12) (0.11) (0.16) (0.12) (0.11) (0.16)
Profit neutrality factor, γ -0.82 0.76 0.26 -0.82 0.76 0.26
(0.24) (0.22) (0.33) (0.24) (0.22) (0.33)
Profit impact, ∆Π 1.41 -1.24 -0.43 0.88 -0.77 -0.27
(0.41) (0.36) (0.54) (0.26) (0.22) (0.34)
Notes: The first three columns show the profit neutrality factor and profit impact (as a proportion of
revenue, given in percentage points) resulting from an exogenous carbon price of $30/tCO2, as implied
by the pass-through estimates and Proposition 1. The next three columns give the endogenous carbon
price and other outcomes using our pass-through estimates and Proposition 2, assuming a SCC of
$30/tCO2. The ‘All’ pass-through rates are an emissions-weighted average of Southwest and legacy
results.
1, when their costs rise their margins rise. This may be because their higher priced or
less efficient rivals have increased prices even more, allowing Southwest to raise prices
in this way, or because other substitutes such as travel by car have also risen steeply
in price. By A4 their output rises, and hence their profits rise. The overall effect on
the airline industry (as represented by these five firms) is a modest 0.43 percentage
point decline in profits.
While our finding of pass-through heteroegeneity in the airline industry is novel,
when applied via GLC to calculating profit impacts it consistent with several findings
in the literature. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), and
Berry and Jia (2010) variously point to Southwest being more efficient, better able
to cope with shocks, or especially threatening to its rivals (the “Southwest is special”
effect discussed above). Gaudenzi and Bucciol (2016) report jet fuel price rises are
associated with significantly more negative stock-market returns for legacy carriers
than for Southwest. While these authors stress differences in hedging strategies, our
findings offer a new explanation for their results.
2.7.3 Political economy and an endogenous carbon price
We can also use our pass-through results along with Proposition 2 to calculate an
endogenous carbon price and its impacts. Recall that this the equilibrium carbon price
implemented by a government that cares about carbon emissions, but also seeks to
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alleviate distortions from imperfect competition (Buchanan, 1969) and is lobbied by an
industry lobby group (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). We use the following parameter
values in the expression for the endogenous carbon price. For the marginal damage
from emissions we use an SCC of $30/tCO2 as above. For the lobbying parameter λ,
we turn to the literature. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) were the first to empirically
estimate this parameter, finding λ = 0.02 for the US. McCalman (2004) and Mitra et al.
(2002) obtain similar results for Australia and Turkey respectively while Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay (2000) find a much higher estimate of λ = 0.5. Based on these findings,
we take λ = 0.1 as our baseline. For the elasticity of industry emissions, we take the
midpoint of the range of estimates in Fukui & Miyoshi (2017), which is η = −0.256.
The resulting endogenous carbon price is $18.68, 37% lower than the exogenous
carbon price equal to the SCC. We can decompose this shortfall into two underlying
distortions. The Buchanan market-power effect is logically prior in that it can exist
without any political lobbying (i.e., where λ = 0) but the reverse is not true.53 Of the
two effects driving the result, the Buchanan effect is empirically much stronger than
the Grossman-Helpman effect: if we re-run the calculation with λ = 0 (i.e. with the
lobbying channel switched off), we find an endogenous carbon price of $19.93. Hence,
the Grossman-Helpman effect explains only around 10% of the disparity between the
endogenous and exogenous carbon prices. The profit impacts, shown in columns (4)-(6)
of Table 2.4, are smaller for the endogenous carbon price: a loss of only 0.77 percentage
points for the legacy carriers and a gain of only 0.88 percentage points for Southwest.
2.8 Conclusion
We have developed GLC – a new, simple, flexible reduced-form model of imperfect
competition that nests many existing oligopoly models as special cases. We showed
that, within GLC, firm-level cost pass-through alone is a sufficient statistic for the
profit impact of regulation on individual firms. Compared with the existing pass-
through literature, GLC relies heavily on supply linearity but allows near-arbitrary
firm heterogeneity and does not require additional information on conduct parameters
or mark-ups.
We have presented ex ante empirical estimates of the impacts of future carbon
pricing for US airlines. We found considerable intra-industry heterogeneity in pass-
through between legacy and low-cost carriers, driven by differences in product portfolios,
53In our setting, without any market power, there are no profits and hence nothing to lobby over
and so the Grossman-Helpman effect is zero.
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cost structures and consumer demand. Pass-through is heterogeneous even for a cost
shock that hits all firms equally. From a policy perspective, we therefore expect these
carrier types to have very different incentives to embrace climate regulation.
We hope that GLC will prove useful in other contexts in industrial organization,
public economics, international trade, and networks. In this paper, we have shown its
value in radically simplifying incidence analysis. More broadly, GLC lends itself to
large-scale estimation both in a single-industry context characterized by complex firm
heterogeneity demand, costs and conduct and for cross-industry analysis that seeks to
apply a consistent structure across many different markets. Relative to widely-used
structural empirical modeling, its comparative advantage lies in lower complexity and
greater transparency in addressing a narrower range of questions.
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Appendix 2.A Proofs of the propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof begins by deriving a general expression for the
profit impact, and then shows parts (a) and (b) of the result. In general, using A1, firm
i’s optimum profit as a function of regulation τ is Πi(τ) = pi(τ)xi(τ)−Ci(xi(τ), ei(τ))−
τei(τ). Using A2 and A3, [Ci(xi(τ), ei(τ)) + τei(τ)] = ki(τ)xi(τ) so this simplifies to
Πi(τ) = [pi(τ)− ki(τ)]xi(τ). Using A4, this becomes Πi(τ) = ψi[pi(τ)− ki(τ)]2.
For part (a), note that the profit-neutrality factor from (2.1) can be written as:
γi(τ , τ) =
1
ei(τ)
[
−Πi(τ)− Πi(τ)(τ − τ)
]
= 1
ei(τ)
[
−∆Πi(τ , τ)(τ − τ)
]
.
Therefore, for small values of (τ − τ):
γi(τ , τ)|τ→τ =
1
ei(τ)
−dΠi(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=τ
 .
Differentiation of the profit function Πi(τ) = ψi[pi(τ)− ki(τ)]2 yields:
dΠi(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=τ
= 2ψi[pi(τ)− ki(τ)]
 dpi(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=τ
− dki(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=τ
 .
By the definition of (2.2), marginal pass-through ρi(τ) = [dpi(τ)/dτ ]τ=τ /[dki(τ)/dτ ]τ=τ ,
and also by definition i’s quantity of the regulated factor equals its output times
its regulatory intensity, ei(τ) = zi(τ)xi(τ). By A1–A3 and the envelope theorem,
[dki(τ)/dτ ]τ=τ = zi(τ) and, by A4, xi(τ) = ψi[pi(τ) − ki(τ)]. So [dΠi/dτ ]τ=τ =
2ei(τ) [ρi(τ)− 1]. Combining results, it follows that, for small values of (τ − τ):
γi(τ , τ) ≃ γi(τ , τ)|τ→τ = 2 [1− ρi(τ)] , (2.6)
where, locally, marginal pass-through approximately equals average pass-through,
ρi(τ) ≃ ρi(τ , τ).
For part (b), the change in profits ∆Πi(τ , τ) = ψi
{
[pi(τ)− ki(τ)]2 − [pi(τ)− ki(τ)]2
}
.
Defining ∆pi(τ , τ ) ≡ [pi(τ)− pi(τ)] and ∆ki(τ , τ ) ≡ [ki(τ)− ki(τ)] and expanding and
simplifying yields:
∆Πi(τ , τ) = ψi
{
2 [pi(τ)− ki(τ)] [∆pi(τ , τ)−∆ki(τ , τ)] + [∆pi(τ , τ)−∆ki(τ , τ)]2
}
.
(2.7)
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Recalling that dki(τ)/dτ = zi(τ), it follows that ∆ki(τ , τ) =
∫ τ
s=τzi(s)ds. This in con-
junction with (2.2) gives ∆pi(τ , τ) =
∫ τ
s=τρi(s)zi(s)ds and so [∆pi(τ , τ)−∆ki(τ , τ)] =∫ τ
s=τzi(s)[ρi(s) − 1]ds. Using these expressions and ei(τ) = zi(τ)xi(τ) in the profit-
neutrality factor from (2.1) gives:
γi(τ , τ) =
ψi
{
2 [pi(τ)− ki(τ)]
[∫ τ
s=τ [1− ρi(s)]zi(s)ds
]
−
[∫ τ
s=τ [1− ρi(s)]zi(s)ds
]2}
(τ − τ)zi(τ)xi(τ) .
From A4, xi(τ) = ψi [pi(τ)− ki(τ)] and some rearranging gives a general expression
for the profit impact:
γi(τ , τ) = 2
[
1
(τ − τ)
∫ τ
s=τ
zi(s)
zi(τ)
[1− ρi(s)]ds
]
− (τ − τ)zi(τ)[pi(τ)− ki(τ)]
[
1
(τ − τ)
∫ τ
s=τ
zi(s)
zi(τ)
[1− ρi(s)]ds
]2
(2.8)
Observe that the profit-neutrality factor is bounded above according to:
γi(τ , τ) ≤ 2
[
1
(τ − τ)
∫ τ
s=τ
zi(s)
zi(τ)
[1− ρi(s)]ds
]
, (2.9)
where zi(s) ≤ zi(τ) for all s ∈ [τ , τ ] given A1–A3. There are two cases. If ρi(s) > 1, then
[zi(s)/zi(τ)] [1− ρi(s)] < 0. If ρi(s) ≤ 1, then 0 < [zi(s)/zi(τ)] [1− ρi(s)] ≤ [1− ρi(s)].
Therefore, whatever the value of ρi(s), [zi(τ)/zi(0)] [1− ρi(s)] ≤ max{0, [1− ρi(s)]}. It
follows that γi(τ , τ) ≤ max {0, 2[1− ρi(τ , τ)]}, where average pass-through ρi(τ , τ) ≡
1
(τ−τ)
∫ τ
s=τ [ρi(s)] ds, as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first derive the marginal impact of a tax on welfare,
and then use this to pin down the equilibrium tax rate. By consumer optimization,
marginal utility equals price, ∂V/∂xi = pi, and, by GLC’s A3, ∂Ci/∂xi = ki. Using
this, differentiation of the welfare function yields:
dW (τ)
dτ
=
∑n
i=1 [pi(τ)− ki(τ)]
dxi(τ)
dτ
+ (τ −D′(E(τ))dE(τ)
dτ
.
A4 xi(τ) = ψi[pi(τ)−ki(τ)] implies that dxi(τ)/dτ = ψi[ρi(τ)−1]zi(τ) since dki(τ)/dτ =
zi(τ). As ei(τ) = zi(τ)xi(τ), this leads to:
dW (τ)
dτ
=
∑n
i=1ei(τ)[ρi(τ)− 1] + (τ −D
′(E(τ))dE(τ)
dτ
.
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The profit impact follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1(a):
∑n
i=1
dΠi(τ)
dτ
= 2
∑n
i=1ei(τ)[ρi(τ)− 1],
Putting these parts together in the first-order condition from (2.3) shows that τ⋆(λ) > 0
is determined by:
dUgov(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=τ∗(λ)
=
[
(1 + 2λ)
∑n
i=1ei(τ)[ρi(τ)− 1] + (τ −D
′(E(τ))dE(τ)
dτ
]
τ=τ∗(λ)
= 0.
Using the definitions ρ˜i(τ) ≡ ∑ni=1 ei(τ)E(τ)ρi(τ), and η(τ) ≡ d lnE(τ)d ln τ < 0 gives the expression
for τ ∗(λ) in the proposition as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 3. Rewriting firm i’s profit function Πi(K) =
∑m
l=1σilKi(pl−ki),
given profit-maximization and regulation τ , yields:
Πi(τ) = [pi(τ)− ki(τ)]Ki(τ) (as
∑m
l=1σil = 1)
Differentiating and making use of the first-order condition pi(τ)−ki(τ) = (β
∑m
l=1σ
2
il)Ki(τ)
then gives:
dΠi(τ)
dτ
= 2Ki(τ)
(
dpi(τ)
dτ
− dki(τ)
dτ
)
= 2Ki(τ) (ρi − 1)
dki(τ)
dτ
(as ρi ≡ [dpi(τ)/dτ ]/[dki(τ)/dτ ])
= 2ei(τ) (ρi − 1) (as dki(τ)/dτ = zi(τ) by A1–A3 and zi ≡ ei/Ki).
Using the definition of the profit-neutrality factor it follows that:
γi(0) ≡ 1
ei(0)
(
− dΠi(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=0
)
= 2[1− ρi(0)],
as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 4. Using results from Hazledine (2006, eq 11 & 13) for
symmetric Nash equilibrium, it is easy to check that A4 is met for each price bucket
with [ph − k(τ)] = ϕhxih where ϕh = (nH + ...+ n+ 1)/nh is a constant for each h as
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required (for any given n ≥ 2 and H ≥ 2). So firm i’s profit impact satisfies:
∑H
h=1
dΠih(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=0
= 2
∑H
h=1
1
ϕh
[ph(0)− k(0)]
[
dph(τ)
dτ
− dk(τ)
dτ
]
τ=0
= 2z(0)xi(0)
∑H
h=1
xih(0)
xi(0)
(ρh − 1) ,
where [dk(τ)/dτ ]τ=0 = z(0) again follows from A1–A3, and ρh ≡ (dph/dτ)/(dk/dτ) is
the (symmetric) pass-through rate for price bucket h.
So the profit-neutrality factor γi(0;H) at τ → 0 can be written as:
γi(0;H) ≡ 1
z(0)xi(0)
(
−∑H
h=1
dΠih(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=0
)
= 2
∑H
h=1
xih(0)
xi(0)
(1− ρh) = 2[1−ρave(H)],
where ρave(H) ≡ ∑Hh=1 xih(0)xi(0) ρh is i’s average pass-through rate across the H price
buckets.
Hazledine (2006, Proposition 2) shows that price discrimination does not affect
the average price paid by consumers, that is, pave(H) ≡ ∑Hh=1XhX ph = pave(1) for all
H, where pave(1) is the uniform price. This implies that the change in price due to
cost-raising regulation satisfies d
dτ
pave(H) = ddτ
∑H
h=1
Xh
X
ph = ddτ pave(1) for all H ≥ 2.
Note also that firm symmetry implies that xih/xi = Xh/X (for all i).
The linear model structure implies that d
dτ
(
Xh(τ)
X(τ)
)
= 0, that is, higher cost due to
tighter regulation decreases in equal proportion the output of each price bucket, so
the ratio between output of bucket h and total output across all H buckets remains
unchanged.
Therefore the change in the average price and the average pass-through rate are
related according to:
d
dτ
pave(H) ≡ d
dτ
∑H
h=1
Xh(τ)
X(τ) ph(τ)
=
∑H
h=1
Xh
X
dph(τ)
dτ
(as d
dτ
(
Xh(τ)
X(τ)
)
= 0 by linearity)
= z(τ)
∑H
h=1
Xh
X
ρh (as ρh ≡ dph(τ)/dτ
dk(τ)/dτ and dk(τ)/dτ = z(τ))
= z(τ)
∑H
h=1
xih
xi
ρh (as xih/xi = Xh/X by firm symmetry)
= z(τ)ρave(H) (by the definition of ρave(H)).
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As d
dτ
pave(H) = ddτ pave(1) for all H ≥ 2 it thus follows that also ρave(H) = ρave(1) for
all H ≥ 2. Finally, therefore:
γi(0;H) = 2[1− ρave(H)] = 2[1− ρave(1)] = γi(0; 1) for all H ≥ 2,
as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 5. As firm i sells both product qualities, using the linear
demand curves p1(Y1) = (1 − Y1)q1 and p2(Y2) = (1 − Y2)qU from the main text, its
two first-order conditions for Zi1 and Zi2 (taking as given rivals’ outputs) are given by:
∂Πi
∂Y i1
= ∂Π
i
1
∂Y i1
= p1 − ki1(τ)− Y i1 q1 = 0;
∂Πi
∂Y i2
= ∂Π
i
2
∂Y i2
= p2 − kiU(τ)− Y i2 qU = 0.
It is easy to see that each first-order condition yields the linear structure of GLC’s
A4. We begin by deriving the profit-neutrality factor for the baseline product, and
then characterize the overall profit impact. First, recalling firm i’s baseline profit
Πi1(τ) = [p1(τ)− ki1(τ)]Y i1 (τ) and using its first-order condition for Y i1 yields:
dΠi1(τ)
dτ
= 2Y i1 (τ)
(
dp1(τ)
dτ
− dk
i
1(τ)
dτ
)
= 2Y i1 (τ)
(
ρi1 − 1
) dki1(τ)
dτ
(as ρi1 ≡ [dp1(τ)/dτ ]/[dki1(τ)/dτ ])
= 2ei1(τ)
(
ρi1 − 1
)
(as dki1(τ)/dτ = zi1(τ) by A1–A3 and zi1 ≡ ei1/Y i1 ).
Using the definition of the profit-neutrality factor γi1(0) from the main text it follows
that:
γi1(0) =
1
ei1(0)
(
− dΠ
i
1(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=0
)
= 2[1− ρi1(0)],
as claimed. In exactly the same way, γi2(0) = 2[1− ρi2(0)] for the upgrade. Second, for
the overall profit impact, note that the profit-neutrality factor γi(0) from the main
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text can be written as:
γi(0) =
−
(
dΠi1(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=0
+ dΠ
i
2(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=0
)
[ei1(0) + ei2(0)]
= e
i
1(0)γi1(0) + ei2(0)γi2(0)
[ei1(0) + ei2(0)]
(using the results for γi1(0) and γi2(0))
= ωi1(0)γi1(0) + ωi2(0)γi2(0) (as ωik ≡ eik/(ei1 + ei2) for k = 1, 2),
as claimed.
Appendix 2.B Construction of airline data
Ticket price pijt we obtain from the cleaned DB1A data provided by Severin Boren-
stein (the raw DB1A data, along with all the data below, are from the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics). We drop any non-direct tickets for ijt, and then convert
the nominal prices to real 2013Q4 USD using St. Louis Fed CPI data (as we do with
all monetary variables).
Per-passenger fuel cost kijt is constructed as follows, with the raw variable names
given parentheses. First we use the Form 41 (Schedule P-5.2) dataset, which contains
carrier-aircraft-time specific fuel costs (fuel_fly_ops), which we denote kilt. Following
O’Kelly (2012), we assume the fuel used to fly route j is a linear function of distance
dj with a non-zero intercept: kilj = b0ilt + b1iltdilj. The fixed cost comes from the fuel
used in take-off and landing, and any airport related activities; the variable cost is
the ‘miles per gallon’ fuel consumption at cruising altitude. The fuel use data we have
do not allow us to identify both the slope and the intercept, so we use an average
value for their ratio taken from EEA (2016): we set the ratio b
0
ilt
b1
ilt
= 131 for all ilt,
meaning take off and landing uses the same fuel as cruising 131 miles. Next we use
the T-100 Domestic Segment to assign aircraft to routes. We construct the share
αijt(l) of carrier i’s passengers on route j at time t that travelled on aircraft type l
(aircraft_type). We use total ‘effective distance’ flown by each aircraft type l on each
route j, d˜iljt = ( b
0
b1 + distancej) × dep_performedijlt, so that αijt(l) = d˜ijlt∑
l
d˜ijlt
. Using
these shares we construct the weighted average fuel cost kijt =
∑
l αijt(l)kilt.
Non-fuel cost index is constructed from Form 41 (Schedule P-5.2). We take, for
each ilt, total flying operating costs (tot_fly_ops) plus total maintenance costs
(tot_dir_maint) minus fuel costs (fuel_fly_ops). We then construct a weighted
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average value for each ijt using the weights αijt(l) described above. Finally, we trans-
form the carrier-route-time specific costs (which could be subject to endogeneity via
their denominator), into a carrier-time index of costs. This is done by dividing total
costs by total passengers, for each carrier-time. We normalise to the 2004Q1 value for
American Airlines.
GDP growth is constructed with data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Using state-level GDP data, for each route j we take the average of the states in which
each of the origin and destination airports are located. For 2004 we interpolated the
annual data as quarterly data are not availble.
Competitors and LCC competitors we construct from the full DB1A data (i.e. not
just the routes in our panel). We define competitors to include all routes that serve
the same city-city market as route j. For example LAX-SLC is a competitor product
to SNA-SLC because LAX and SNA both serve the city of Los Angeles. Using the
Bureau of Transportation Statistics’ definition of a market (origin_city_market_id
and dest_city_market_id), we count all carriers serving that market with at least
1,000 passengers in a quarter. LLC competitors is the number of competitors from the
set of low-cost carriers, as defined by ICAO.
Carrier size is constructed from the full DB1A (i.e. not just the routes in our panel).
It is the sum of all passengers on all routes in a given quarter for a give airline.
Appendix 2.C Further empirical results and robust-
ness
2.C.1 Mean Group regressions
As explained in Grey and Ritz (2018), if we allow for full heterogeneity across routes
within a given carrier’s portfolio, then our relationship of interest is a variant of
Equation (2.4) given by:
pijt = ρijkijt +X ′ijtβij + λijt + ηij + ϵijt. (2.10)
Carrier-specific pass-through rates ρi are obtained from Equation (2.10) by running a
separate regression for each carrier-route, and then taking a weighted average of the
carrier-route specific ρij to obtain a pass-through rate at the carrier level, ρi. The
weights are emissions on the carrier-route. This approach imposes no homogeneity
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restrictions on the parameters across carrier-routes within an airline, which could be
important given heterogeneities across routes in the airline industry (see Grey and
Ritz, 2018, for further discussion). In running a separate regression for each product,
we take a similar approach to Atkin and Donaldson (2015). The procedure could also
be considered a special (non-dynamic) case of the “Mean Group” estimator in Pesaran
and Smith (1995).54 Note that allowing pass-through rates and other parameters to
vary across carrier-routes does not mean the routes are independent in an economic
sense, rather that their interdependencies are one of the many characteristics captured
by the pass-through rate that we seek to estimate.
A draw back of using this approach is that, unlike in the standard fixed-effects
baseline, year-and-quarter time effects are not identified. Equation (2.10) is therefore
estimated only with quarterly time effects. We use the analogue of Equation (2.5) to
estimate Equation (2.10) by 2SLS. The results are given in Table 2.5. Southwest’s
pass-through rate is 1.24, significantly above 1, and the legacy carriers’ pass-through
rate is 0.75, significantly below 1. The results are, therefore, qualitatively the same as
the baseline, and quantitatively similar too.55
2.C.2 Results for individual legacy carriers
Table 2.6 gives descriptive statistics for the individual carriers in our sample. These
confirm that the legacy carriers form a group distinct from Southwest, for example on
the basis of price, fuel cost or distance.
Table 2.7 contains the results of estimating a variant of Equation (2.4) with an
interaction term for each individual legacy carrier, rather than a single dummy for all
legacy carriers. It therefore gives a pass-through rate for each airline. Column (1) is
the baseline result in the main text, and column (2) gives the pass-through results by
airline. Southwest’s pass-through remains unchanged. The average of the individual
legacy carriers’ pass-through rates is in line with the overall legacy carrier result in
the baseline. There is, however, considerable heterogeneity among the legacy carriers.
Delta has a particularly large pass-through rate. Despite this range, the results do
support our prior (following the airlines literature) to consider Southwest as distinct
54Estimating our relationship of interest as a system of N seemingly unrelated regression equations
would not change the point estimates but would give efficiency gains. SURE estimation is, however,
not feasible here because the number of equations in our system is so much larger than the degrees of
freedom of each individual regression.
55The small differences between these results and those in Grey and Ritz (2018) reflect a slightly
different time period and slightly different set of airlines in the legacy group (the small, non-mainland
US carriers Hawaiian and Alaska were included in that paper).
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Table 2.5 Pass-through estimates from a route-by-route estimation procedure.
Dependent variable: Price
(1) (2)
Southwest Legacy
Fuel cost 1.24∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Competitors -1.04∗∗∗ -4.43∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.64)
LCC competitors -1.12∗∗∗ -3.86∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.64)
Non-fuel cost index 41.08∗∗∗ 15.01∗∗∗
(2.53) (2.25)
GDP growth 1.40∗∗∗ 2.16∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.29)
Carrier size 0.70 -35.67∗∗∗
(1.02) (3.62)
R squared 0.87 0.46
Observations 9,920 14,680
Carrier-routes 248 367
Notes: All regressions include quarterly time dummies. Newey-West standard errors are shown in
parentheses and are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent. The estimates shown are an
emissions-weighted average of the estimates from each separate regression. Significance levels and
p-values are calculated on the assumption that errors are independent across carrier-routes, and are
denoted by: ∗ significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, and ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 2.6 Descriptive statistics for individual carriers.
Southwest American Delta United US
Quarterly av. statistics
Price ($) 154.73 212.54 236.54 231.41 230.85
Fuel cost ($) 32.95 57.12 50.73 56.31 45.14
Distance (miles) 717 1,102 992 1,128 915
Emissions (tCO2) 0.13 0.23 0.18 0.21 0.18
Emissions cost ($/tCO2) 4.00 6.91 5.44 6.23 5.30
Passengers (000s) 42 36 30 28 25
Competitors (#) 2.24 2.84 2.40 3.70 2.20
LCC competitors (#) 0.40 0.40 0.73 0.94 0.60
Revenue ($ million) 5.46 6.76 5.76 5.76 4.66
Whole sample statistics
Revenue in sample (%) 0.56 0.47 0.40 0.52 0.35
Observations (#) 13,199 6,110 6,879 5,759 3,703
Carrier-routes (#) 416 198 323 239 158
Notes: Data are quarterly, over the period 2004Q1-2013Q4. Price, fuel cost, emissions and emissions
cost are per passenger. Emissions cost are calculated at a carbon price of $30/tCO2. Whole sample
statistics are aggregated over all N and T . Revenue in sample is the proportion of all US aviation
revenue (ie all flights on all airlines) in the sample over this period. All averages are unweighted.
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Table 2.7 Pass-through estimates for individual carriers.
Dependent variable: Price
(1) (2)
Baseline
Individual
airlines
Fuel cost · Southwest 1.41∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.14)
Fuel cost · Legacy 0.62∗∗∗
(0.11)
Fuel cost · American 0.67∗∗∗
(0.13)
Fuel cost · Delta 1.13∗∗∗
(0.15)
Fuel cost · United 0.30∗∗∗
(0.08)
Fuel cost · US 0.72∗∗∗
(0.10)
Competitors -2.79∗∗∗ -2.37∗∗∗
(0.69) (0.67)
LCC competitors -5.06∗∗∗ -4.50∗∗∗
(0.90) (0.89)
Non-fuel cost index 6.49∗∗ 12.38∗∗∗
(2.60) (2.67)
GDP growth -1.30∗∗∗ -1.21∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.40)
Carrier size -15.24∗∗∗ -18.60∗∗∗
(5.15) (5.22)
R squared 0.212 0.208
Observations 35,650 39,753
Carrier-routes 1,334 1,396
Notes: All regressions have a full set of carrier-route fixed effects, and year-and-quarter time dummies.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the carrier-route level. Regressions are
weighted by total emissions of the carrier-route over the period. Significance levels and p-values are
denoted by: ∗ significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, and ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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from the legacy carriers: it is the only airline with a pass-through rate statistically
significantly greater than 1.
2.C.3 Robustness of empirical results
Table 2.8 contains the results of adding additional control variables that plausibly could
impact airlines’ pricing decisions. Columns (1)-(5) show the impact of using alternative
measures of demand. All but two of the demand controls are self-explanatory. Gravity
demand (analogous to the concept as used in the trade literature) is a measure of
demand on a route constructed as the product of (per capita GDP times population)
in origin and destination cities, divided by distance. Network density is the number
of actual connections (ie routes) between airports in a carrier’s network, divided by
the total number of possible connections (the standard definition in the networks
literature). Column (1) is the same baseline as in the main text, and contains the only
measure of demand that is statistically significant (this motivated its inclusion in the
baseline specification). In which ever measure is used, the pass-through rates are very
stable around the baseline result.
Column (6) includes a dummy for potential entry by Southwest, using the definition
in Goolsbee and Syverson (2008). We don’t find a significant effect, and the pass-
through rates are unchanged from the baseline. Column (7) reports the effect of
bankruptcy (all carriers except for Southwest were bankrupt at some point in this
period). This is significant, but does not statistically effect pass-through.
In addition to investigating the effect of controls on prices, we also interacted these
variables with fuel costs, to see if they had an effect directly on pass-through rates.
We found almost no results of statistical significance. We also experimented with
varying the start and end dates of our time period, which again had little impact on
our estimates. These results are omitted in the interests of space, but available on
request.
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Table 2.8 Robustness checks.
Dependent variable: Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fuel cost · Southwest 1.42∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Fuel cost · Legacy 0.66∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Competitors -2.17∗∗∗ -2.20∗∗∗ -2.17∗∗∗ -2.27∗∗∗ -2.10∗∗∗ -2.17∗∗∗ -2.31∗∗∗
(0.72) (0.70) (0.72) (0.68) (0.72) (0.72) (0.70)
LCC competitors -7.81∗∗∗ -7.82∗∗∗ -7.80∗∗∗ -7.72∗∗∗ -7.77∗∗∗ -7.69∗∗∗ -7.56∗∗∗
(1.36) (1.36) (1.38) (1.35) (1.35) (1.38) (1.34)
Non-fuel cost index 6.89∗∗∗ 6.77∗∗∗ 6.81∗∗∗ 6.86∗∗∗ 7.30∗∗∗ 6.99∗∗∗ 8.08∗∗∗
(2.58) (2.58) (2.59) (2.56) (2.67) (2.58) (2.45)
Carrier size -15.12∗∗∗ -14.88∗∗∗ -14.98∗∗∗ -14.86∗∗∗ -9.27∗ -15.12∗∗∗ -12.70∗∗
(5.22) (5.24) (5.19) (5.22) (4.98) (5.21) (5.43)
GDP growth -1.34∗∗∗ -1.34∗∗∗ -1.31∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39)
GDP per capita 1.81
(2.48)
Population (million) -0.12
(4.48)
Gravity demand 12.44
(9.97)
Network density -8.40∗
(5.06)
Southwest potential entry 1.86
(1.52)
Bankrupt 6.41∗∗∗
(1.91)
R squared 0.219 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.220 0.219 0.223
Observations 35,650 35,650 35,584 35,584 35,650 35,650 35,650
Carrier-routes 1,334 1,334 1,326 1,326 1,334 1,334 1,334
Notes: All regressions have a full set of carrier-route fixed effects, and year-and-quarter
time dummies. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the carrier-
route level. Regressions are weighted by total emissions of the carrier-route over
the period. Significance levels and p-values are denoted by: ∗ significant at 10%, ∗∗
significant at 5%, and ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.

Chapter 3
Sanitation and mortality in urban
England, 1875-1911

Abstract
What is the impact of investing in the urban environment? Both economic historians and
public economists continue to disagree, especially on the role of sanitation infrastructure
in reducing mortality. We present new evidence using a detailed panel of the 16 largest
towns in England over the period 1875-1911. We construct a novel dataset by digitising
public accounts and public health records at the same geographical unit. We find
sanitation infrastructure is not associated with a reduction in any of our mortality
outcomes. We explain our null result compared to other results in the literature by
quantifying the importance of consistency in geographical units, which previous studies
reporting large effects have lacked.
Keywords: infrastructure, health, sanitation, water, local government, urban history.
JEL codes: N93, R53, I18, H51, H54.
3.1 Introduction
One of the most protracted debates in British economic and demographic history
concerns the relative contributions of economic growth and public health interventions
to the early stages of the British mortality decline. McKeown and Record (1962)
famously argued that improvements in living standards, particularly diet, substantially
outweighed medical, public health and other contributions, before the twentieth century.
While critics of McKeown and Record have often argued that he under-estimated the
benefits of public health interventions, there remains no consensus on whether public
investments in improving water quality and sewage disposal in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries had a major impact on mortality trends. Three recent papers
have used broadly the same evidence for public investments and mortality rates to
arrive at very different conclusions. Chapman (2019) argued that that investments
by urban sanitary authorities in public health initiatives, as measured by the value of
loans, accounted for as much as 60% of the total improvement in urban mortality rates
between 1861 and 1900. Conversely, Harris and Hinde (2019) and Hinde and Harris
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(2019) used evidence of loans and mortality for both ‘high-performing’ towns and for
all Registration Districts over the longer period 1851–1910 to argue that mortality fell
almost everywhere and with similar patterns in rural and urban populations, regardless
of wide variations in public investment in water supplies and sewerage.
The historical study of public health and urban mortality patterns in England
and Wales has been seriously hampered by the types of data available. The two
largest problems are difficulties in quantifying public health investment, and the lack of
mortality data for specifically urban populations. In this paper we use two novel sources
of evidence that partially overcome these problems. These are annual expenditures
by urban authorities, and weekly counts of deaths in the largest English towns. We
use these to improve upon the existing evidence base in three ways: (1) by creating
measures of municipal investment, by type of investment, based on expenditure, rather
than loans; (2) by using annual rather than decadal mortality data, (3) by using
mortality and expenditure data that relate to the same administrative units (Urban
Districts). These sources avoid some of the shortcomings of previous studies, however
they come at the price of sample size. Our final sample comprises only the sixteen
largest cities (excluding London) for the period 1875-1911. Although this is a relatively
small number of cities, it is roughly one quarter of the total urban population over
the period. Using these data we find no negative relationship between expenditure on
sanitation (water and sewerage) and infant, diarrhoeal or all-cause mortality. In order
to test whether our results were a consequence of our sample size or composition, we
replicated Chapman’s (2019) method with our sample, and were able to reproduce
approximately his results. We think therefore that the discrepancy between our main
results and previous work reflects the enhanced precision of our measures, rather than
shortcomings of our sample. We suggest that investment may provide a poor measure
of water quality or sanitary conditions in British cities in this period.
Section 3.2 reviews previous work on public health investments and mortality
improvements in urban populations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
We describe the construction of our measures of public expenditure in Section 3.3, and
mortality outcomes in Section refsec:ch3:mortality. Regression analyses are presented
in Section 3.5, and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
One of the most striking apparent demonstrations of the impact of improvements in
water quality is Cutler and Miller’s (2005) study of the introduction of filtration and
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chlorination of public water supplies in American cities in the early twentieth century.
In a panel study of thirteen major cities between 1900 and 1936, they found that water
filtration and chlorination was associated with a near halving of infant mortality, a
halving of child mortality, and a 13% reduction in total mortality. These very large
effects of water treatment were similar to results reported by Ferrie and Troesken (2008)
for Chicago, where progressive steps to improve water quality were associated with
large falls in both typhoid and all-cause mortality rates (see also Beach et al., 2016).
However, these large and apparently ubiquitous effects contrasted with some earlier
studies which found effects of water treatment on typhoid mortality but not on other
causes of death. For example, in Philadelphia, one of the cities in Cutler and Miller’s
panel, Condran (1987) studied the effects of the staggered introduction of filtration
on a ward by ward basis within the city. She also found marked declines in typhoid
mortality upon the introduction of filtration. However, in contrast to Cutler and
Miller’s findings, all-cause, infant and diarrhoeal mortality were relatively unaffected.
More recently, a reanalysis of Cutler and Miller’s results has revealed that their
data included transcription errors that invalidated some of their results. Using an
expanded panel of 25 cities over the period 1900-1940, and examining the effects of
measures to improve water supply, sewage disposal, and milk quality, Anderson et al.
(2019) demonstrated that water filtration was associated with significant reductions in
typhoid death rates, and small but significant reductions in infant mortality. However,
none of the interventions studied showed a statistical association with improvements
in infant diarrhoeal mortality, nor all-cause mortality.1
Other authors have argued that interventions to prevent the faecal contamination
of water (such as cleaner sources, filtration and chlorination) are much more effective
when combined with modern sewerage to remove faecal waste. Alsan and Goldin (2019)
exploited temporal delays in the roll-out of a combined water and sewerage scheme
to municipalities in the Boston area of Massachusetts (1880–1920) to compare the
effects of introduction of either clean water or sewerage alone with water and sewerage
combined. They found that clean water and more especially sewerage contributed to
reductions in child (under five) mortality, but the effect was much larger when both
interventions were present (accounting for a third of the decline in under 5 mortality,
and nearly half of the decline in infant mortality, over the period). The importance
of faecal disposal, as well as uncontaminated water, hints at the multiple pathways
1An analysis of estimated typhoid transmission rates in relation to per capita expenditures on
water and sewerage in 16 major U.S. cities also suggested significant but also very variable effects of
expenditures on typhoid rates in the period 1889-1931 (Phillips et al., 2019; Vanderslott et al., 2019).
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by which faecal-oral diseases may be transmitted, that include fly-borne transmission
from exposed faeces to food and surfaces as well as faecal contamination of water.
In contrast to the findings for U.S. cities, studies of water and sanitary improvements
in nineteenth century cities elsewhere have generally reported relatively modest effects
of water and sanitary interventions on mortality. For example, fairly small or negligible
beneficial effects of piped water supply and sewerage on infant mortality were reported
for Munich and other urban districts in Bavaria, 1825-1909, for larger Finnish cities
before c.1900, Swedish urban centres 1875-1930, and Swiss towns 1876-1901, and
in Dutch cities (Brown and Guinnane, 2018; Floris and Staub, 2019; Helgertz and
Önnerfors, 2019; Peltola and Saaritsa, 2019; van Poppel and van der Heijden, 1997).
However, larger reductions in infant mortality were observed in response to water
and sewerage improvements in Sydney and in smaller Finnish towns in the early
twentieth century, and the extension of modern sewerage was associated with large
improvements in life expectancy in Parisian neighbourhoods 1880-1914 (de Looper
et al., 2019; Kesztenbaum and Rosenthal, 2017; Peltola and Saaritsa, 2019). However,
as in the case of U.S. cities, studies that considered typhoid generally observed much
larger reductions in typhoid mortality compared with other causes of death in response
to sanitary interventions, especially those that improved water quality (de Looper
et al., 2019; Floris and Staub, 2019).
In the British case there is also substantial disagreement in the historical literature
about the efficacy of public health interventions to improve water supplies. English
cities were some of the first in the world to introduce modern sewerage and clean piped
water supplies. Early accounts of the public health movement in Britain attributed
considerable success to the efforts of Edwin Chadwick and the Health of Towns
movement in the 1840s; however, revisionist accounts now identify the 1870s as decisive
(Hassan, 1985; Szreter, 1997; Szreter and Woolcock, 2004; Wohl, 1984). The first half of
the nineteenth century was characterised by a major expansion in the provision of piped
water in towns, and most of this was supplied by private water companies (Hassan,
1985). After c.1850 there was a very substantial increase in municipal waterworks,
as a result both of new waterworks, and of the acquisition of private works by local
governments. Hassan (1985) has argued that the short-sighted nature of private
investment proved detrimental to both industrial and public interests, and many towns
therefore turned to public provision of water after mid-century. Some of the largest
towns, including Liverpool and Manchester, undertook very ambitious long-distance
supply schemes in the 1850s and 1860s. However, according to Hassan (1983, 1985) the
main beneficiaries of early municipalisation of waterworks were urban industries that
3.2 Literature review 103
required clean (and soft) water, and public health benefits were minimal. Only in the
1870s did expenditures by local governments demonstrate a sustained and substantial
rise. As Szreter and Woolcock (2004, pp. 659-660) put it, ‘[engineers and health
professionals] technically knew how to construct a sanitary environment. . . since at
least as early as the 1840s, but it took a religiously infused moral movement to motivate
the mobilisation of collective will’. Other authors have pointed out that the early stages
of sanitary reform were bedevilled not only by the parsimony of municipal councils
and ratepayers, but also by ideological conflicts over the causes of high urban death
rates, and by uncertainty regarding the efficacy of new technologies (including water
filtration, efficient drainage pipes, sewage treatment and water quality testing) and
their suitability to local conditions (Wohl, 1984; Hamlin, 1988, 1990; Sheail, 1996;
Hamlin, 1998; Thornton and Pearson, 2013). Local councils were reluctant to incur
large debts for experimental systems, and there was no legal compulsion to do so before
the Public Health Acts of 1866 and 1875, which required towns to provide clean water
and sewage disposal for their populations, and provided cheap finance to do so.2
The strongest evidence for substantial effects of sanitary investments on public
health in Britain has been provided by Chapman (2019). He analysed the relationships
between total investments made by towns, as measured by the outstanding value of
loans contracted by urban municipalities, and decadal mortality in English and Welsh
towns. He restricted his analysis to the period 1867-1900, because data on loans were
not reported in the Local Taxation Returns before 1867, and because he considered
that ‘this period marked the very beginning of the public health movement’.3 He
reported a strong negative relationship between total investment and mortality from
both ‘airborne’ and all-cause mortality between 1861 and 1900, and for ‘waterborne‘
mortality (cholera, typhoid and diarrhoea) from 1871-1900.
Harris and Hinde (2019) used the same source of mortality data as Chapman
(2019), i.e., the Registrar-General’s decennial averages of deaths by age and cause for
Registration Districts. However, they used the full available data (1851-1910), for rural
as well as urban Registration Districts, and they used the information on age and
cause of death to estimate the contribution of particular causes to improvements in
2See Webster (2015) regarding the importance of the reduction in the interest rate for Public
Works Loans Board loans specifically for sanitary purposes from 1872 onwards. See Harris and Hinde
(2019), and references therein, regarding other motives for increased borrowing, including greater
resolution to tackle sanitary problems, and increased income from rates and municipal gas works.
3The discrepancy between the start of the analysis in 1861 and the start of loans expenditure data
in 1867 is because the mortality data used were decennial averages and included 1861-70. The choice
of end date of 1900 is somewhat unclear.
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life expectancy.4 Using a much longer and more comprehensive time series of loans
which urban authorities sought approval for or contracted, and a more impressionistic
analytical approach, Hinde and Harris (2019) found no obvious associations between
loans related to water supplies or sanitary projects and improvements in mortality
from ‘waterborne’ (a category that included typhus, in contrast to Chapman’s) or other
causes over the period 1851-1910. They noted that mortality fell in rural and urban
districts, regardless of expenditure or sanitary interventions, and that typhus/typhoid
and tuberculosis declined at similar rates in urban and rural areas.
In a very insightful article, van Poppel and van der Heijden (1997) set out the
conceptual and methodological difficulties involved in identifying relationships between
water and sanitary interventions on the one hand, and mortality improvements on
the other (see also Bell and Millward, 1998). They identified two key conceptual
difficulties. First, while gut pathogens are often described as ‘water-borne’, they can
in fact infect humans via multiple routes. These diseases are described as ‘faecal-oral’
because they result from ingestion of infected faeces, and sources of infection include
contaminated drinking water, but also poor personal hygiene, faecal contamination
of crops and seafood, unsafe food preparation, transfer of faeces to food and skin
by insects (especially flies), and even bathing in unclean water. Ewald (1991, 2004)
demonstrated this variability in dependence on water-borne transmission using evidence
from historical outbreaks of faecal-oral diseases where the pathogen was identified and
also the likely source of the infection. He found that the most lethal faecal-oral diseases,
including Asiatic cholera, typhoid and dysentery, are the most dependent on water
transmission, while those diarrhoeal pathogens that kill mainly very young children
and the elderly are less commonly waterborne and depend largely on human-to-human
transmission (Table 3.1).5 If this thesis is correct, then improvements in water quality
could have had significant effects on those diseases that depended most on water-borne
transmission (cholera, typhoid and dysentery). However, such improvements may have
4Chapman (2019) used only crude all-cause or cause-specific death rates, that is, deaths divided
by the total population, without any adjustment for age structure. It is not clear why he used the
decennial mortality reports in this way. The key advantage of the decennial data is that the deaths
are cross-tabulated for each Registration District by cause and age, making it possible to estimate
life expectancies or to age-standardise mortality rates. If crude death rates sufficed then it would
have been preferable to use the Registrar-General’s annual reports, because these provided annual
deaths by cause, although without any age information. The use of decadal averages meant that the
effects of any intervention could only be measured by inter-decadal changes in mortality rates. It also
severely restricted the number of data points for each Registration District, to three in the case of
typhoid (1871-1900) in Chapman’s study.
5Pathogens associated with contemporary infant diarrhoea in low-income countries include E. coli
and Shigella species, however the causal agents of infant diarrhoea in our period remain unknown
(Hardy, 2014).
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had little effect on diarrhoeal mortality. Conversely, diarrhoeal mortality may have
been more sensitive to the removal of faecal waste from domestic or neighbourhood
environments by sewerage systems. In the case of typhoid, by the late nineteenth
century typhoid rates had converged in urban and rural populations in Britain, and
there appears to have been a shift from predominantly water-borne to food-related
epidemics associated especially with milk, ice-cream and shellfish, and possibly with
fly-borne contamination (Hardy, 1993, 2014; Luckin, 1986). Variations in infant feeding
practices could also lead to very large differences in the efficacy of interventions.
Where most infants were breastfed, and rarely fed untreated (unboiled) water, the
improvements in water quality might have had negligible effects on infant mortality,
but profound effects on typhoid or cholera mortality at older ages, where exposure to
untreated water was greater. Conversely, where infants were regularly fed untreated
water, the improvements in water supplies could lead to large improvements in infant
mortality.
Table 3.1 Pathogens with faecal-oral transmission routes.
Pathogen Mortality(% of cases)
Waterborne outbreaks
(% of all outbreaks)
Vibrio cholerae, classical biotype [Asiatic cholera] 15.7 83.3
Shigella dysenteriae type 1 [dysentery] 7.5 80
Salmonella typhi [typhoid] 5.8 74
Vibrio cholera, el tor biotype 1.44 50
Shigella flexneri 1.32 48.3
Shigella sonnei 0.65 27.8
Enterotoxic E. coli <0.1 20
Campylobacter jejuni <0.1 10.7
Non-typhoid salmonella <0.1 1.6
Source: Ewald (1991).
In addition, van Poppel and van der Heijden (1997) argued that starting conditions
and local geography mattered. Jaadla and Puur (2016) provided an elegant demonstra-
tion of this in late nineteenth-century Tartu, Estonia. Using household-level data on
water supply and infant mortality, they demonstrated that before any introduction of
piped water, water from the river was associated with a two-fold higher infant mortality
than water from household wells, and four-fold higher mortality compared with public
artesian wells (after adjusting for paternal education and occupation, mother’s age,
household size, and waste disposal method). The quality of locally available water
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supplies also varied widely in British towns. Birmingham, for example, enjoyed access
to unpolluted aquifers, and was the only major British town to escape a significant
cholera outbreak in all of the four nineteenth century epidemics. Other towns were
forced to seek remote sources of clean water or to purify river water. We develop
these points further in the following two Sections, which describe our explanatory and
outcome variables.
3.3 Measures of Sanitation Capital
Previous studies of investment by urban authorities in public health services have
used evidence from loans to approximate investment expenditure. Chapman (2019)
used the value of total loans outstanding between 1867 and 1900. These debts are
not disaggregated by purpose, and therefore contain investment in a very wide variety
of a town’s activities, including roads, hospitals, markets, gasworks, public lighting,
and trams. Harris and Hinde (2019) used evidence from a range of archival and
parliamentary sources to reconstruct total loans sanctioned by central government, and
divided these loans by purpose, separating loans relating to water supplies from loans
for other health-related purposes (including bath-houses, hospitals, street improve-
ments, sewerage and drainage) and other functions. Harris and Hinde’s painstaking
reconstruction supports the longstanding view that public investment in water and
sanitation was very limited before the 1870s.
In this paper, we analyse a sample consisting of the 16 largest cities in England
(excluding London) over the period we study.6,7 We obtained annual public accounts
data from the Local Taxation Returns reported to Parliament, which provide expen-
diture data by city, over the period 1867-1913.8 The accounts data is available for a
large number of towns and cities (approximately 1,000); our constraint to look at only
the largest 16 cities is dictated by mortality data availability (see Section 3.4). In the
Local Taxation Returns, data are reported at the geographical and administrative unit
6The 16 cities are: Birmingham, Bradford, Bristol, Hull, Leeds, Leicester, Liverpool, Manchester,
Newcastle, Norwich, Nottingham, Portsmouth, Salford, Sheffield, Sunderland, and Wolverhampton.
7London had a different structure of local government to the rest of England in this period, and so
expenditure was not reported in the Local Taxation Returns. In any case, its sanitary investments were
also structured differently, divided between a number of private waterworks which served different
Boroughs, and so it would not fit easily into our analysis.
8Local Government Board, Local Taxation Returns (Parliamentary Papers 1867-1913). Throughout
this paper we use the year in which a town’s fiscal year ends to refer to the entire fiscal year. For
example the year 1874-75 in the Local Taxation Returns is referred to as 1875 in this paper.
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of the Urban District.9 These were the local authorities tasked with managing and
improving many aspects of urban life, and they had a very high degree of autonomy
from central government.10 They had the power to raise funds using local property
taxes, by running local natural monopolies (e.g., waterworks, gasworks, markets), or
taking out loans. The Urban Districts, and not central government, were responsible
for spending on water and sewerage provision (as well as roads, hospitals, markets,
gasworks, public lighting, and trams). Importantly, Urban Districts had a great deal
of freedom in the quantity and quality of public services they provided: they could
provide very little, and so minimise the local tax burden, or undertake hugely expensive
infrastructure projects if they perceived a benefit in doing so. There was wide variation
in expenditure both between Urban Districts and over time for a given Urban District
(see Figures 3.1 and 3.2).
The goal of this paper is to investigate the impact of sanitary investments in the 16
Urban Districts in our sample. In order to do this, we construct an annual measure
of each Urban District’s stock of sanitation capital. This is the stock of sanitation
assets in place, which produce sanitation services, which potentially impact health. We
construct this variable as follows. From 1872, expenditure on sewerage is disaggregated
from general public works expenditure in the Local Taxation Returns, and in 1875
expenditure on water is likewise reported separately. These data allow us to construct
three measures of interest: water capital, sewerage capital and the total of water and
sewerage capital, which we henceforth refer to as sanitation capital. We construct a
capital stock for each of these variables according to the standard capital accumulation
equation:
Sit = Sit−1 + Iit − δSit−1, (3.1)
where Sit is the per capita stock of (sanitation, water or sewerage) capital in town i in
year t, Iit is per capita investment, and δ is the depreciation rate. Investment Iit is
directly available in the accounts from 1883 onwards, as expenditure was disaggregated
into current spending and capital spending (i.e., funded by loans). For the period
1875-1882, when only combined (current and capital) spending is reported in the
accounts, we construct a measure of capital spending in the following way (Appendix
3.A describes the procedure in further detail). We estimate the Urban District-specific
relationship between capital spending (Iit) and combined spending (Cit) for a period
9These were Local Boards or Improvement Commissioners up until 1872, Urban Sanitary Districts
in the period 1873-1895, and Urban Districts from 1896. We use the term Urban District (UD) to
describe these urban units throughout our study.
10See Millward and Sheard (1995) and Daunton (2001) for institutional background on local and
urban government in this period.
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of years in which we have disaggregated data:11
Iit = Fi(Cit) + ωit. (3.2)
We tested a large number of possible functions Fi, evaluating the performance of the
model based on out-of-sample fit over the 10 year period following the estimation
period. The function giving the best out-of-sample fit was cubic in Cit and included two
leads in Cit. As described further in Appendix 3.A, our final results are not sensitive
to the choice of Fi. On the assumption that the estimated relationship holds also over
the period 1875-1882, we then estimate capital spending for these years according to:
Îit = max{F̂i(Cit), 0}. (3.3)
This gives us a panel of investment spending for 1875-1913. In order to pin down
the initial capital stock, we use the value of loans outstanding in 1884, the first year
in which it is disaggregated into spending type (water and sewerage). To address
the issue of possible municipalisation of waterworks during this period, if an Urban
District’s waterworks were initially privately owned but municipalised after 1884, we
take the value of water loans outstanding in the first year after municipalisation. For
the depreciation rate δ, we assume a value of 0, with the rationale that current spending
over this period included maintenance of the capital stock.
Sanitation, water and sewerage capital are shown for our sample as a whole in
Figure 3.1, and for each Urban District in Figure 3.2 (together with all-cause mortality
rates, discussed in the next Section). There were very wide variations in expenditure
over time and between Urban Districts, especially in the provision of water. Some of
this variation was caused by reliance on private waterworks. Of the 16 Urban Districts
in our sample, nine had private waterworks in 1870, and five water supplies remained in
private ownership in 1911 (Bristol, Newcastle, Norwich, Portsmouth and Sunderland).12
These five Urban Districts were characterised by very low public expenditures on water.
Four Urban Districts in our sample municipalised existing private waterworks in the
period under study. Municipalisation was associated with a sudden rise in public water
investment, in Birmingham (municipalised in 1876), Leicester (1878), Nottingham
11As explained in Appendix 3.A, we test two different estimation periods: the 10 years following
1883 (a short window as close to the period 1875-1882 as possible), and the entire sample other than
the final 10 years (as large an estimation period as possible while leaving 10 years of observations for
out-of-sample evaluation). The results were not sensitive to this choice.
12The towns in our sample were in fact characterised by a later move to municipalisation compared
with the larger sample of 81 provincial towns in Hassan (1985) (where 55% of waterworks were in
municipal ownership by 1871).
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(1880), and Sheffield (1887). Importantly, these very substantial public investments
may have had no immediate effect on the nature or extent of the water supply, because
the money was used in the first instance to acquire existing waterworks. Moreover,
municipalisation was often triggered by the need to expand existing provision, and so
further investment was often required simply to maintain per capita supply in the face
of urban growth (Hassan and Taylor, 1998; Silverthorne, 1881). Indeed as Hassan (1985)
argued, the best performing towns in terms of supply per capita and revenue to capital
ratio were those where municipalisation was of relatively long duration, presumably as
a result of cumulative investment after the initial acquisition of the waterworks. We
cannot estimate investment by private water companies in our sample, however we
do compare mortality outcomes by public or private status of water supplies. Other
studies have focussed only on public investments, and sometimes ignored the issue of
private ownership entirely.
Figure 3.1 Aggregate sanitation capital, water capital, and sewerage capital, and loans
outstanding.
Notes: Data are annual averages, weighted by town population. All quantities are in £ per capita.
Source: Local Taxation Returns.
There were also substantial variations in expenditure amongst Urban Districts
with municipal waterworks. Some of this variation reflected the fact that many
Urban Districts sold water to neighbouring rural and urban districts.13 Manchester,
13The arguments and in this and the next paragraph are based onWater Undertakings (Parliamentary
Papers, 1888).
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Figure 3.2 All-cause mortality, water capital and sewerage capital, by town.
Sources: Weekly Returns of the Registrar-General and Local Taxation Returns.
for example, invested in very expensive long-distance water supplies, constructing
reservoirs and transporting clean upland water from Longendale in the Pennines in the
1850s and from Thirlmere, over 90 miles away in the Lake District, in the 1890s. The
water was then supplied both to Manchester residents and to surrounding districts,
including Salford. Therefore, in our data Salford expended relatively little on water,
yet benefitted from the investments made by Manchester. Conversely, the investments
made by Manchester overstate the benefit to local residents. In the case of the Urban
Districts of Leicester, Sheffield, Nottingham, and Derby, competition for water led to
the creation of the Derwent Valley Water Board in 1899. The cost of construction of
the new reservoirs and waterworks was apportioned between the four Urban Districts,
and expenditures on water by these Urban Districts declined over the next decade
despite a very significant augmentation in water supplies.
A third factor that caused major variations in especially water expenditures was
the importance of variations in natural endowments. Urban Districts varied in their
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access to river water and to deep uncontaminated sources of groundwater. Hull, for
example, spent relatively little on its public water supply (Figure 3.2). It obtained
its water wholly from deep local wells, and did not employ filtration, an arrangement
that must have been relatively cheap compared with long-distance sourcing of uplands
water, or with the very substantial storage facilities required for sand filtration. Other
Urban Districts that partly sourced their water from local bores and wells also spent
relatively modestly on water supplies (Nottingham, Leicester, Wolverhampton, and
Birmingham before 1903). Birmingham, however, demonstrated an extraordinary rise
in investment in the first decade of the twentieth century, when the Urban District
finally resorted to a long-distance water supply from Wales. This did not necessarily
result in any improvement in water quality (which was already high), but pre-empted
a deterioration in supply in the face of continued urban expansion. With respect to
filtration, usage varied. Sand filtration was first introduced in the early nineteenth
century, however it was generally reserved for river water, which was widely deemed
polluted. The adoption of filtration was thus not necessarily an indicator of superior
water quality. In 1870 only four of the 16 Urban Districts in our sample used sand
filtration to treat part or all of their water. By 1910 all river water was filtered, and
most upland sources. However, Manchester (and Salford) and Sheffield still depended
on unfiltered upland water, and Urban Districts generally did not filter piped water
from wells and boreholes.
Investments in sewerage were more modest, and generally demonstrated smoother
rises across our sample period (Figure 3.2). Early attempts to privatise sewerage and
faecal collection failed, and all town councils had to deal with their own local wastes and
the methods employed varied (Sheail, 1996). Although Chadwick called for combined
water carriage (flush toilets and water-flushed sewers) in the 1840s, flush toilets were
still not universal even in the largest Urban Districts by 1911. Many Urban Districts
focussed in the early part of our period on replacing the most egregious hazards, such
as midden privies (where faecal waste was stored in heaps in yards or on the street
awaiting collection), with other dry conservancy methods (involving domestic storage
of faecal waste and regular house-to-house collection). This type of public health
expenditure is not captured by our sewerage variable. Installation of flush toilets was
accompanied by the provision of sewers for faecal waste (as distinguished from drainage,
the older function of sewers). However most sewers emptied into waterways, and sewage
treatment, the chemical and mechanical breakdown of faecal waste to destroy pathogens,
was introduced only very slowly. The recognition that faecal contamination of drinking
water was dangerous initially resulted only in the separation of contaminated and
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uncontaminated water, as sewage outfalls were removed further downstream, and water
supplies either filtered or sourced from more remote areas. The purification of sewage
was costly, and was not necessarily of direct benefit to Urban Districts, because the
main advantages often accrued to downstream users. Thus the rapid removal of faecal
waste from houses using water-borne disposal was associated, in its early stages, with
the progressive pollution of waterways and coastal areas. These practices appear to
have led to food-borne typhoid outbreaks associated with contaminated shellfish by
the late nineteenth century, but clear guidelines for chemical and mechanical treatment
of sewage were only developed in the course of a Royal Commission (1898-1915) on
the treatment and disposal of sewage (Hardy, 2014). Unfortunately, our sources (the
Local Taxation Returns) do not allow us to unpick the components of expenditure on
sewage disposal versus treatment.
Ideally, investments in water supply or sanitation should capture changes in both the
quantity and quality of provision. However, as detailed above, there are many reasons
why this relationship may be complicated. As discussed in Section 3.2, early efforts to
provide public water supplies may have been motivated more by industrial demand
than by considerations of public health, and much of the water supplied may have
been used for non-domestic use. Ideally, we would have annual data on the proportion
of the population served by piped water and by in-house supply versus standing pipes
in the street. We would also have measures of per capita domestic consumption, and
whether water was provided on a constant system, or was available only on certain
days or between certain hours (the ‘intermittent’ system). Intermittent water supplies
necessitated storage of water in cisterns or other containers, and increased the chances of
domestic contamination. Unfortunately, these kinds of data are scanty in chronological
and geographical range. All the Urban Districts in our sample provided a constant
supply (either in-house or via standpipes in the street) to all or almost all residents of
the Urban District by 1911, but we lack consistent evidence for our panel before this
date. With respect to pathogenic contamination of the water, despite the development
of increasingly sophisticated tests of water content, controversy persisted over the
best means of detecting faecal contamination into the twentieth century (Hamlin,
1990). The extension of constant piped water to all inhabitants, the introduction
of flush toilets and sewerage occurred progressively in most British towns, and it is
not generally possible to pinpoint decisive turning points. In conclusion, while our
measures of sanitation, water and sewerage capital provide some measure of the quality
of sanitation services experienced by the residents of the Urban Districts in our sample,
we also wish to draw attention to reasons why they may be a poor proxy in specific
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cases. These critiques apply to any analysis using variables derived from the Local
Taxation Returns, or in many cases from the use of public accounts data in general.
3.4 Measures of Mortality
In this Section, we describe our outcome variables, mortality rates. The study of urban
mortality patterns in Victorian England and Wales has been severely hampered by the
reporting practices of the Registrar-General’s office. The two most serious problems
are the geographical units for which most mortality data were reported before 1912,
and the ways that deaths by individual causes were aggregated and reported. Our
study largely overcame the first problem, but could only partially address the second
problem.
The main administrative unit used by the Registrar-General to report deaths
before 1912 was the Registration District (RD). Registration Districts were based on
poor law unions created from the aggregation of groups of parishes under the Poor
Law Amendment Act of 1834. In the case of towns and cities, poor law unions, and
therefore Registration Districts, were deliberately designed, where possible, to combine
rural with urban populations, in order to spread the costs of supporting the urban
poor. Thus except in the case of some districts in the very largest towns, Registration
Districts were generally larger than their constituent towns in area and population,
and included a mix of rural and urban communities. Figure 3.3 illustrates the point
for Wolverhampton. Wolverhampton was one of the 16 largest non-metropolitan towns
in England and Wales in the period 1870-1911, but the borough (the Urban District),
was nonetheless included within a much larger Registration District and comprised
only half of the Registration District population in 1871 (Table 3.2, columns 2-4).
Critically for the study of public health, urban political and administrative functions
were not organised on the basis of Registration Districts. As described in Section
3.3, investments in urban public health were undertaken by Urban Districts. These
units were often co-terminus with pre-existing municipal boroughs (as in the case of
Wolverhampton), and were either contained within a single Registration District, or
overlapped several. The reporting of deaths by Registration District, therefore, poses a
serious problem for studies of the health effects of urban improvements in water supply
and sanitation, because investments made by Urban Districts would be expected to
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Figure 3.3 Wolverhampton Urban District and Registration District, 1911.
Source: Max Satchell’s Urban District boundary data (described in text).
affect only that fraction of the Registration District populations that lived within the
Urban District.14
Previous studies have generally confronted this problem of mismatch between urban
areas and their related Registration Districts by aggregating mortality data for all the
Registration Districts that overlapped Urban Districts.15 The extent of the mismatch
between Urban Districts and their associated Registration Districts produced by this
method is documented for our sample of the 16 largest non-metropolitan towns in
England and Wales in Table 3.2. The table compares the population of each Urban
District and the Registration Districts that overlapped it, in 1871 (columns 2-4). It
also documents the extent to which the Registration District populations exceeded
14The Registrar-General also reported a more limited set of mortality statistics for registration
sub-districts (Table 3.3). These were sub-divisions of Registration Districts (comprising over. 2,000 in
total, compared with c. 630 Registration Districts), but were never designed to distinguish urban
from rural districts.
15Chapman (2019); Harris and Hinde (2019); Hinde and Harris (2019); but see Woods (1978) for an
outstanding, though unfortunately only cross-sectional, small area study of Birmingham c.1885.
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the populations of the Urban Districts which they overlapped in successive censuses
(columns 5-7). In some cases (Portsmouth, Leicester and Norwich) the fit was perfect,
and the Registration District and Urban District were co-terminus. In other cases
the Registration District populations substantially exceeded the Urban District, by
almost 100% in the case of Wolverhampton. Table 3.2 also indicates the effects of the
redrawing of boundaries of both Urban Districts and Registration Districts across the
period and particularly in the 1890s. In some cases, as in Bristol and Nottingham,
there was a reconciliation of the Registration and Urban District boundaries during
our period.
Our study uses a previously unexploited source of mortality data that pertains
to Urban Districts, not Registration Districts. This is the Weekly Returns of the
Registrar-General, which reported deaths from a limited set of causes for the largest
Urban Districts, from 1870 to 1911. The Weekly Returns reported weekly counts of
total births and deaths, deaths aged under one year and 60 years and over, and deaths
attributed to a limited number of causes, including diarrhoea, fever (which included
deaths from typhus, typhoid and ‘simple continued fever’), and several other infectious
diseases, and accidental and violent deaths. The series started in 1870 with the 17
towns with populations that approached or surpassed 100,000 in 1861. London was
included, but was excluded from our study because data for London were not reported
in the Local Taxation Returns. While the 16 Urban Districts in our sample constitute
a small panel compared with the roughly 1,000 Urban Districts in England and Wales
in this period, these were the largest Urban Districts. They accounted for around a
quarter of the total population of non-metropolitan Urban Districts, and most or all of
the population living in large towns (with populations of 100,000 or more, excluding
London) (Table 3.2).
A central issue is which mortality rates provide the best measure of the success of
sanitary interventions to reduce faecal exposure. In the English case previous studies
have used as outcome measures all-cause, typhoid, infant, or diarrhoeal mortality rates,
or an aggregated category of ‘water-borne’ causes of death (Table 3.3). Chapman’s
(2019) ‘water-borne’ category included typhoid, cholera, diarrhoea and dysentery. Since
typhoid was not reported separately from typhus until 1869, he included only the three
decades 1870-1900 in his analysis of these causes. Hinde and Harris (2019) instead
constructed a ‘water-borne’ category for the whole period 1851-1910, and so were
forced to include typhus together with typhoid, although typhus is transmitted by
lice, not faeces. In our study, the main outcome measures were all-cause, infant and
diarrhoeal mortality. We could not construct a ‘water-borne’ disease category that
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was comparable to previous studies, because the Weekly Returns distinguished only
diarrhoea and cholera deaths, and cholera had virtually disappeared as a cause of
death in Britain after 1866. Typhoid deaths were included in the ill-defined category
of ‘fevers’, and dysentery was not reported (but was anyway a very minor cause of
death by 1870).
Our incapacity to construct a ‘water-borne’ category of deaths was not in itself a
shortcoming, because while such categories are usually intended to include all major
faecal-oral diseases, it is widely recognised that these diseases vary in the extent to
which they depend on faecal contamination of water. Therefore, it is preferable to
study these diseases separately where possible. In the English case diarrhoeal deaths
accounted for around 80% of all deaths attributed to faecal-oral diseases by 1870,
and diarrhoeal mortality was a major component of the ‘urban penalty’ (Davenport,
2007). Our source allowed us to track diarrhoeal mortality in great detail. However, as
suggested in Section 3.2 (Table 3.1), there is reason to expect that diarrhoeal mortality
was not closely related to water quality, although it may have been sensitive to other
aspects of faecal disposal. Typhoid appears to have provided a much more sensitive
indicator of water quality in previous studies, and it was unfortunate that it was not
reported separately in our source. To provide a partial remedy, we constructed annual
rates of typhoid mortality for the Registration Districts corresponding to our 16 Urban
Districts (Table 3.3).
To construct our main mortality variables, we aggregated weekly deaths into annual
series, because our expenditure and constructed sanitation capital data were available
on an annual basis, and converted these to mortality rates using annual population
estimates. To do this, we extracted census populations for our 16 Urban Districts from
census reports, together with dates on which boundary changes, and therefore changes
in population, came into effect, and interpolated between census dates.16 The resulting
death rates were crude rates, that is, they were calculated using the whole population
as the denominator. For infant and diarrhoeal deaths, we constructed rates as deaths
per 1,000 births, because most or all of the deaths in these categories occurred to
infants.
16We used geometric interpolation between census dates in cases where there was no intercensal
boundary change. In cases where a boundary change occurred, we used the ratio of the number of
(weekly) births in the 52 weeks before the boundary change, to the number in the 52 weeks following
the change to estimate the change in population. We then used the intercensal growth rate in the
decade closest to the change to either forward-project or back-project the nearest census population to
the date of the boundary change to estimate the population at the date of change, and then estimated
the population before or after that date from the ratio of births before and after the boundary change.
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For comparison with other studies, we also constructed decennial death rates
for the Registration Districts associated with the 16 Urban Districts in our sample.
We constructed crude decennial death rates (Chapman’s (2019) measure) using the
decennial deaths and average intercensal population totals for the Registration Districts
reported by the Registrar-General in his decennial Supplements. We also created
age-standardised decadal rates by first creating age-specific death rates (using the
Registrar-General’s average population totals for each Registration District by age) and
then using these to calculate the number of deaths, and crude death rates, that would
have occurred at these rates if the Registration District populations had had the same
age structure as the population of England and Wales as whole in 1901. Annual crude
death rates for Registration Districts were also constructed for typhoid and typhus.
Trends in our main mortality measures are displayed in Figure 3.4. In the 16 Urban
Districts in aggregate, crude all-cause death rates declined fairly continuously between
1870 and 1911 (Figure 3.4a). This was also the case in individual Urban Districts
(Figure 3.2). However, as Figure 3.2 demonstrates, mortality levels varied markedly
between Urban Districts. In the early 1870s, crude death rates hovered around 30
per 1,000 in Liverpool, Manchester, Salford and Newcastle, but were only around 20
per 1,000 in Portsmouth. In order to compare performance over time, regardless of
initial levels, Figures 3.4b-d display annual mortality by cause for each Urban District,
standardised to the rate in 1870 (1870 = 100). With the exception of two very poorly
performing Urban Districts (Nottingham and Sunderland), crude all-cause mortality
trended downwards fairly consistently across Urban Districts, and had halved by 1911
in some cases (Figure 3.4b).
In contrast to all-cause mortality, our two more specific measures of sanitary
conditions, diarrhoeal and infant mortality, showed little improvement before c.1901,
and actually rose in the 1890s (Figures 3.4a, c-d). This pattern reflected national trends,
and was attributed to a string of hot dry summers in the second half of the 1890s that
caused major summer diarrhoeal epidemics (Woods et al., 1988, 1989). Diarrhoea was
largely a phenomenon of late summer, and the size of epidemics was influenced by
summer temperatures. Indeed Figure 3.4d draws attention to the marked synchrony of
inter-annual variations in diarrhoeal mortality across all Urban Districts, regardless of
the differences in levels of mortality. We could not measure typhoid mortality in our
16 Urban Districts , however death rates from this disease fell markedly in the period
1869-1880 in the Registration Districts associated with our Urban Districts (Figure
3.5a). There was, however, no further improvement in typhoid mortality until c.1900,
despite large increases in expenditures on water and sanitation in this period, and there
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Figure 3.4 All-cause, infant and diarrhoeal mortality rates, by town.
Notes: Panel a represents aggregated rates for all 16 towns (weighted by population). Panels b-d
represent rates standardised to the rate in 1870. Source: Weekly returns of the Registrar-General.
was no obvious difference in levels or trends in mortality from these diseases in towns
with municipalised water supplies compared to those with private supplies. Trends in
typhoid mortality clearly differed from those of diarrhoeal mortality, a fact suggestive of
different aetiological pathways, as noted in Section 3.2. Louse-borne typhus displayed
different geographical and chronological patterns compared with typhoid, and had
virtually disappeared as a cause of death by 1890 in our 16 Urban Districts (Figure
3.5b).
In order to construct demographic and economic control variables for our 16 Urban
Districts, we created a Geographical Information Systems (GIS) dataset of boundaries
for the 16 Urban Districts in 1911.17 This was augmented to reflect historical boundary
changes to the 16 Urban Districts between 1870 and 1911. These boundaries were then
used to identify sets of quasi-parish units that corresponded most closely to each of
the Urban Districts for each census year. Individual-level census data were extracted
17This dataset was created by Max Satchell, Cambridge Group for the History of Population and
Social Structure.
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Figure 3.5 Typhoid mortality rates in Registration Districts associated with our 16
panel towns, by type of water supply.
Source: Weekly returns of the Registrar-General.
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from the Integrated MicroCensus (I-CeM) database for each of these quasi-parish units
(into which the I-CeM data are already organised), and combining these with the GIS
data, we constructed variables for each Urban District, for each decade following the
census. These variables were: measures of the age structure, sex ratio, and workers per
capita employed in textiles, manufacturing and waterworks. The tax base per capita
was extracted from the Local Taxation Returns, by dividing the ‘assessable value’ of
all property an Urban District by its population. A dummy equal to one if an Urban
District had a municipal waterworks was constructed from parliamentary sources.18
3.5 Empirical Results
Table 3.4 provides descriptive statistics for our data. The primary dataset is a balanced
panel of dimension N=16, T=37, spanning the years 1875-1911. The length of the panel
is constrained by either mortality data availability at the end of the period (1870-1911)
or the availability of data on water-related expenditure at the start (1875-1913). Since
five Urban Districts had private waterworks throughout the period, and a further four
Urban Districts had for some of the period, and we therefore have no data on their
expenditures, we also use an unbalanced N=11 panel for robustness checks, containing
only Urban District-year observations with municipal supply of water.
In order to quantify the relationship between sanitation infrastructure and mortality,
we estimate the following equation:
Mit = α + βSit + γXit + ηi + λt + ϵit (3.4)
where Mit is a mortality rate for UD i in year t, Sit is a measure of sanitation
infrastructure, Xit is a vector of controls, ηi is a UD-level fixed effect, λt is a time
effect, and ϵit is the residual. Table 3.5 reports the results of estimating Equation (3.4)
using our panel data, with all-cause mortality as the outcome variable and sanitation
capital (the sum of water capital and sewerage capital) as the measure of sanitation
infrastructure. All coefficients are standardised and standard errors are clustered
at the Urban District level. Regressions are weighted by average population over
the period, so that larger Urban Districts have a proportionately larger influence
on the coefficients. Column (1) shows there is a negative raw correlation between
sanitation capital and all-cause mortality. The R2 is very low, however, suggesting
sanitation capital alone has little explanatory power. Column (2) reports the results
18Means by which drinkable water is supplied to every urban district in England and Wales (Parlia-
mentary Papers, 1879), Water undertakings (Parliamentary Papers, 1888).
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Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics.
Mean S.D. Min Max N
Weekly Returns of the R.G.
All-cause mortality rate 21.07 4.07 12.48 36.63 672
Diarrhoea mortality rate 36.20 15.17 5.69 85.18 672
Infant death rate 168.81 26.16 90.66 269.99 672
Accidental mortality rate 0.78 0.23 0.39 3.30 672
Birth rate 33.63 5.06 18.98 46.74 672
Annual Returns of the R.G.
Typhus mortality rate 0.04 0.11 0.00 1.44 672
Typhoid mortality rate 0.26 0.16 0.00 0.97 672
Local Taxation Returns
Sanitation capital 4.60 4.19 0.00 17.45 624
Water capital 3.50 3.89 0.00 15.98 624
Sewerage capital 1.07 0.84 0.00 3.65 664
Loans outstanding 10.91 8.93 0.11 34.79 716
Tax base 4.47 1.39 0.10 8.37 690
Census
Population growth (%) 1.55 0.98 -0.64 4.03 706
Population 255,220 154,395 65,521 759,540 752
Female (%) 51.74 1.33 47.12 55.04 752
Aged 0 to 14 (%) 34.76 2.85 24.81 40.94 752
Aged 15 to 40 (%) 47.47 1.90 42.81 51.55 752
Water works employment (%) 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.08 752
Manufacturing employment (%) 10.02 6.67 3.61 28.81 752
Textiles employment (%) 6.74 9.43 0.15 35.51 752
Other
Municipalised water (%) 61.30 48.74 0.00 100.00 752
Notes: Data cover the period 1867-1913, though not all variables are available for the full period:
Column N gives the number of observations for each variable. Mortality rates are per 1,000 population,
other than diarrhoeal and infant mortality which are per 1,000 births. All variables derived from the
Local Taxation Returns are in £ per person. Census data are exponential interpolations of decadal
data. Sex and age variables are normalised by the total population. Employment variables are
normalised by the working age population (15-64).
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when we include Urban District fixed effects (that capture average differences in levels
of mortality between Urban Districts), and we find a much larger and significantly
negative effect of sanitation capital. Column (3), however, also includes year effects,
and the coefficient on sanitation capital becomes positive but not significantly different
from zero. The large increase in R2 suggests that the majority of the explanatory
power in this and subsequent regressions is coming from common time effects. If the
common time effect and sanitation are positively related while the common time effect
and mortality are negatively related, then the OLS estimate with no common time
effects is subject to a negative bias, which could explain the coefficient being negative
in columns (1) and (2) and positive in column (3). Column (4) reports the results
when including a full set of controls in Equation (3.4): Tax base, Population growth,
Female, Age 0-14, Age 15-44, Birth rate, Manufacturing employment, and Textiles
employment. Sanitation capital is not associated with a statistically significant change
in all-cause mortality. This is the central result of our paper, and, as we go on to show,
it is highly robust. The R2 does not change much by the addition of controls. Taking
columns (1)-(4) together, it appears that mortality is primarily driven by unobserved
factors changing over time which are common to all Urban Districts. These include
year-to-year variations in weather conditions, but also reflect the ubiquity of mortality
declines in this period as shown in Figure 3.4b (and see Hinde and Harris, 2019).
In column (5) of Table 3.5, we disaggregate sanitation capital into its components:
water capital and sewerage capital. Water capital has a positive but insignificant
effect, whereas sewerage capital has a negative but insignificant effect. To explore
whether water and sewerage might have a complementary impact on mortality, column
(6) includes an interaction term. The coefficient is negative and significant at the
5% level, providing some evidence that there may be complimentarities between the
two forms of investment: water infrastructure lowers mortality only when there is
sewerage infrastructure in place, and vice versa. Finally, in column (7) we include
only Urban District-year observations for which an Urban District’s water supply
was publicly owned, and its spending therefore appeared in our public accounts data.
This addresses the serious concern that many Urban Districts that appear to have no
water infrastructure according to the public accounts in fact have substantial water
infrastructure run by private water companies. The result, however, is similar to our
baseline result in column (4).
We explore the robustness of our result in three ways: interacting our capital
measures with other variables of interest, dividing the sample into different time
periods, and exploring alternative measures of sanitation infrastructure. Regression
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Table 3.5 Baseline regression results.
Dependent variable: All-cause mortality rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sanitation capital -0.100∗∗ -0.801∗∗∗ 0.134 -0.012 0.030
(0.041) (0.256) (0.107) (0.079) (0.112)
Water capital 0.015 0.052
(0.053) (0.044)
Sewerage capital -0.113 -0.026
(0.092) (0.058)
Water-sewerage int. -0.143∗∗
(0.066)
Fixed effects X X X X X X
Time effects X X X X X
Controls X X X X
R2 0.010 0.308 0.832 0.887 0.888 0.895 0.911
No. observations 592 592 592 592 592 592 385
No. towns 16 16 16 16 16 16 11
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is all-cause mortality rate per 1000 population. Time period is 1875-1911.
All coefficients are standardised. Standard errors are clustered at the town level. R2 calculated
for within variation when specification includes fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by average
population over the period. All variables are measured at the Urban District (UD) level. Control
variables are: Tax base, Population growth, Female, Age 0-14, Age 15-44, Birth rate, Manufacturing
employment, and Textiles employment. Columns (1)-(6) are for the full balanced panel of all towns,
whereas column (7) only includes town-year observations where a town’s water supply is municipally
owned (and its expenditure therefore appears in its public accounts).
results are reported in Appendix 3.B. First, we investigate whether more industrial
Urban Districts have a different relationship between infrastructure and mortality to
less industrial Urban Districts. We interact our capital measures with the proportion
of an Urban District’s workforce employed in industry (the sum of employment in
manufacturing and textiles divided by the working age population). The results are
given in Table 3.8, columns (1) and (2). For both sanitation capital and water capital,
we find a negative and statistically significant (at 10% and 5%, respectively) effect
for the level of the respective capital stock, and a positive and statistically significant
effect (at 1% for each) on the interaction term. These results suggest that in less
industrial Urban Districts, investing in sanitation and water capital may have affected
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mortality negatively, but that the more industrial an Urban District is, the less negative
is this effect. This is consistent with the arguments of Hassan and Silverthorne, that
the public benefits of municipal investments in water were offset to some extent in
industrial Urban Districts by the high proportion of that water that was supplied to
industries, including compensation to mill-owners with riparian rights to the water
sources (Hassan, 1985; Silverthorne, 1884).
Second, we investigate different measures of water infrastructure other than those
derived from the accounts in the Local Taxation Returns. From the census we know the
proportion of an Urban District’s population employed in its waterworks, which we take
to be a proxy for the quantity of water infrastructure operated by an Urban District.
This has the advantage that it captures the presence of private waterworks, unlike any
public accounts derived variables. Another independent measure is a dummy variable
equal to one if an Urban District had municipalised its water supply in a given year.
This correlates with public water infrastructure for obvious reasons, and it has been
argued that it correlates with the quality of an Urban District’s water supply more
generally in this period. Table 3.8 columns (3) and (4) suggest, however, that neither
of these independent measures of water infrastructure are associated significantly with
all-cause mortality.
Third, we investigate whether the effect of water capital on mortality might be
different in the earlier part of our sample period relative to the later part. Plausibly,
infrastructure investments might be subject to diminishing marginal returns, and
this could be driving our overall result (Hassan, 1985). Table 3.8 columns (5)-(8)
report the results of estimating Equation (3.4) separately for the early and late halves
of our sample period. No results are significant, but for all three capital measures
the coefficients are more positive in the later period, consistent with the presence of
diminishing marginal returns.
Table 3.6 reports the results of estimating Equation (3.4) with other mortality
rates: diarrhoeal, infant, accidental, typhus and typhoid. As discussed in Section 3.4,
typhus and typhoid data are not available at spatial units consistent with the accounts
data, so these two results should be treated with a large degree of caution. We do not
find significantly negative effects for any mortality outcome. Sanitation capital is in
fact associated positively with diarrhoeal (at 10%) and infant (at 1%) mortality. In
the Appendix, we report the results of many of the robustness tests described above
applied to diarrhoeal and infant mortality respectively. For diarrhoea, Table 3.9 reports
that when disaggregating into water and sewerage capital, it is the water capital that
is associated positively (at 10%) with mortality. When adding interaction terms, using
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alternative measures of water capital, or restricting the sample to Urban District-year
observations with municipal waterworks, we find no significant results. Taken together,
these findings suggest that sanitation, water and sewerage capital probably had no
effect on diarrhoeal mortality in our sample.
For infant mortality, Table 3.10 reports that the significantly positive baseline result
is somewhat more robust. When disaggregating into water and sewerage capital, it
appears that water is driving the positive association. There is no significant interaction
between water and sewerage, though the industry-sanitation capital interaction is
significantly positive. Unlike for all-cause mortality, this appears to be driven by the
industry-sewerage interaction. Both alternative measures of sanitation infrastructure
are positive at 10%. When restricting the sample to Urban District-year observations
with municipal water supply, the results are not significant. (The time decompositions,
not shown in the interests of space, do not give significant results but are consistent
with a more positive effect in the first half of the period.) Taken together, these findings
suggest that sanitation infrastructure correlates either positively or not at all with
infant mortality.
In conclusion, the one robust finding to emerge from our analysis of the 16 Urban
Districts is that water and sewerage infrastructure does not appear to reduce diarrhoeal
or infant mortality. This is, perhaps, not so surprising, given the relative stability of
these mortality rates in the face of large increases in sanitary expenditures (Figure 3.1
and Figure 3.4).
We have also explored possible dynamic relationships between our variables of
interest. In regresions with up to 10 lags of the capital stock measures, no clear patterns
emerge. The long run effect (the sum of coefficients on the lags) is at best significantly
different from zero only at the 10% level. We have also explored a dynamic panel
specification, as well as a Pooled Mean Group (Pesaran and Smith, 1995) specification
to allow for heterogeneity between different Urban Districts in the sample. In no cases
did we find a significantly negative effect.19
The results above differ markedly to those of Chapman (2019), who reported signif-
icantly negative relationships between various measures of mortality and infrastructure,
as measured by loans outstanding recorded in the Local Taxation Returns. Our econo-
metric methods are very similar. Other than the control variables used, the only
difference is that we use weighted regressions whereas he uses non-weighted regressions,
so that in his results the smallest town has the same impact on estimated coefficients
19These results are omitted in the interests of space, but available upon request.
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Table 3.6 Regression results for different mortality measures.
Dependent variable: Mortality rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-cause Diarrhoeal Infant Accidental Typhus Typhoid
Sanitation capital -0.012 0.103∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.041 0.107
(0.079) (0.047) (0.055) (0.089) (0.161) (0.073)
Fixed effects X X X X X X
Time effects X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
R2 0.887 0.784 0.770 0.467 0.555 0.524
Geographical unit UD UD UD UD RD RD
Time period 1875-1911 1875-1911 1875-1911 1875-1911 1875-1910 1875-1910
No. observations 592 592 592 592 576 576
No. towns 16 16 16 16 16 16
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: For All-cause, Accidental, Typhus and Typhoid mortality the rate is per 1,000 population.
For Diarrhoeal and Infant mortality the rate is per 1,000 births. Control variables are: Tax base,
Population growth, Female, Age 0-14, Age 15-44, Birth rate, Manufacturing employment, and Textiles
employment. All coefficients are standardised. Standard errors are clustered at the town level. R2
calculated for within variation. Regressions are weighted by average population over the period. All
variables are measured at the Urban District (UD) level, except the mortality rates for Typhus and
Typhoid at the Registration District (RD) level.
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as the largest town.20 There are, however, some important differences between the data
used in each case. As discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, the two principal differences
are that Chapman used data at a decennial frequency, and he used mortality rates
measured on a different geographical unit (the Registration District, RD) to that of
the accounts data (the Urban District, UD). We explore the quantitative importance
of these differences for the towns in our sample below.
Table 3.7 reports the results of estimating Equation (3.4) with data at different
frequencies (annual or decennial) and geographical units (UD or RD). We look at
the effect of the square root of loans outstanding on all-cause mortality, as this is
Chapman’s baseline specification.21 For further comparability to Chapman’s (2019)
results, we have calculated the ‘decline explained’, i.e., the proportion of the decline in
mortality over the period that could be explained by multiplying the change in loans
over the period with the estimate of the effect of loans on mortality.22 Column (1)
is most similar to our baseline results in Table 3.5, with the only differences being:
the independent variable is loans outstanding square rooted (the variable used by
Chapman), the time period is 1870-1911 (reflecting the earlier availability of the loans
data), and the regressions are unweighted (as in Chapman’s specification). Importantly,
the geographical units for the mortality rate and the infrastructure variable are the
same (UD). The result is an insignificant effect of loans on mortality, with a very small
‘decline explained’. This result is comparable in magnitude and significance to column
(4) of Table 3.5, our baseline result. In column (2) of Table 3.7, we report a specifcation
of Equation (3.4) estimated with data at the decennial frequency, with the first decade
being 1861-1870, and the final decade being 1901-1910.23 The results do not change
20We explored whether weighted an unweighted regressions gave different results for our 16 Urban
District sample and found that generally the difference was small. This result will not necessarily
hold in Chapman’s (2019) larger sample, which contained considerably greater heterogeneity.
21We take Table 1 Column (3) to be Chapman’s (2019) baseline result. He finds the square root of
loans outstanding has a standardised coefficient of -0.17, significant at 1%. The ‘% decline explained’
by loans is 29%.
22To calculate the ‘decline explained’ we use the following formula: Decline explained =∑
i
Pitβˆ(Iit−Ii,1870)∑
i
Pit(Mit−Mi,1870) , where Pit is population in town i in decade t, βˆ the estimated regression coefficient,
Iit is the measure of infrastructure investment, and Mit is mortality. This is in spirit of the formula
Chapman (2019) reports (Equation (2) on p. 244), but different in that he uses final infrastructure
over the change in mortality, rather than the change in infrastructure over the change in mortality.
We cannot see that dividing a level by a change gives a meaningful measure.
23There is an issue with incomplete data when using the first decade of 1861-1870. No accounts
data exist before 1867, and hence the decade of ‘1861-1870’ is really an average of 1867-1870 at best.
Chapman (2019) does not address this, but it could potentially be seriously problematic. We follow
his method for consistency, while noting the potentially issues. When using mortality data at the UD
level, this problem takes the form of the decade ‘1861-1870’ being made up solely of the observation
for 1970, as this is the first year these data are available for.
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substantially: the effect of loans on mortality remains insignificant and the decline
explained remains small. In column (3), we report a specification with the mortality
outcome and all controls (other than any from the Local Taxation Returns) measured
at the Registration District level. The result is a significantly negative coefficient on
the loans variable, and an explained decline of 28%. This is comparable to Chapman’s
baseline result of 29% (he reports figures as high as 60% for other specifications). In
column (4), we restrict the time period to 1861-1900, so that it is the same as in
Chapman’s analysis. We find a less precisely estimated but larger negative coefficient,
and a larger decline explained of 35%.
In columns (5)-(8), we repeat this exercise but using the same control variables as
in Chapman.24 The results show a similar pattern: when using consistent geographical
units the effect of loans on mortality is small, positive and insignificant, whereas with
inconsistent geographical units we see large negative effects. While the coefficients
on the loans variable in columns (7) and (8) are not quite significant (the p-values
are 10.8% and 18.5%, respectively), this could be due to our smaller sample, and the
decline explained is similar to Chapman’s baseline result quoted above. Taken as a
whole, the results in Table 3.7 suggest that there are small differences between an
annual and a decennial analysis, whereas there are large differences between an analysis
with consistent and inconsistent geographical units. This has important consequences
for studies such as Chapman’s which use data from both the Local Taxation Returns (at
the Urban District level) and the Registrar-General’s Decennial, Annual or Quarterly
Returns (at the Registration District level).
Table 3.11 in Appendix 3.B repeats the above analysis but for different mortality
measures. For each mortality outcome, we see substantially more negative point
estimates for the specification with inconsistent spatial units. This suggests that
analyses with inconsistent spatial units are problematic for all outcome variables under
consideration.
24There are three differences in the controls used. First, we use information from the census to
construct control variables, at the right spatial unit, for manufacturing employment and textiles
industry employment. These are plausibly correlated with both water infrastructure and mortality.
Second, we include the birth rate as a demographic control. It is an important determinant of all-cause
mortality, and birth rates varied substantially over time and space during this period. Third, we use
population growth as a control variable, whereas Chapman uses the level of population. In our view,
population growth should proxy for unobservable time-varying characteristics of towns that affect
mortality considerably better than the level of population. This is particularly the case for our 16
panel towns, where there was relatively little variation in population size compared with Chapman’s
sample.
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3.6 Conclusion
Debates regarding the importance of public investment in urban public health for
mortality declines in British cities have been hampered by inadequate data with
which to test the strength of these relationships. A particular problem has been
the lack of fit between mortality data (available as decadal averages for Registration
Districts) and investment data (available annually for Urban Districts). In this paper,
we overcame this problem by using annualised mortality data for the 16 largest (non-
metropolitan) Urban Districts. We also used refined measures of investment based on
actual expenditures in public health-related areas (water and sewerage), in preference
to data on loans as deployed in previous studies. While our approach limited us to the
study of only 16 towns, these were the largest towns and constituted a major component
of the ‘urban penalty’ nationally in this period. We were able to replicate previous
findings of a strong relationship between loans and crude mortality improvements when
using data for non-comparable units (loans data for Urban Districts and mortality rates
for Registration Districts). However, any relationship between investment in public
health and health improvements disappeared when examined for the same geographical
units (Urban Districts). Our results therefore contradict those of Chapman (2019), but
are consistent with those of Harris and Hinde (2019).
Why did very substantial investments in water and sanitation over the period
1870-1911 apparently have so little effect on public health, as measured by mortality
rates? One obvious answer is that the investments made by urban sanitary districts
did not reflect accurately the provision of water and sanitary services to their urban
populations. We have already detailed in Section 3.3 why this might be the case. Water
supply was the largest component of sanitary expenditure in the aggregate, but some
towns had private waterworks, and the cost of obtaining water varied significantly
between towns. An additional factor may have been the extent to which domestic users
benefited from public investments in waterworks. There was some evidence in our
study that less industrial towns benefited more from investments in water, although
the effect was only evident in the case of crude all-cause mortality, and not diarrhoeal
or infant mortality (Table 3.8, column 2). This was consistent with the arguments
of Silverthorne (1884) and Hassan (1985) that industrial towns diverted a greater
proportion of their water to industrial uses (further distorting the relationship between
investment and public health outcomes).
An important limitation of our study was the restricted range of causes of death,
and age information, that were reported in the Weekly Returns. We have focussed
mainly on crude all-cause mortality rates because these provide a close comparison
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with Chapman’s study. However, crude death rates are strongly affected by changes in
both population age structure and age-specific death rates, and are therefore difficult
to interpret. It is notable that our more specific and robust measures of mortality
(diarrhoeal and infant mortality rates) indicated none or positive relationships between
sanitary investments and mortality (Tables 3.6, 3.9, and 3.10). This may be, as
suggested in Section 3.2, because infant and diarrhoeal mortality was fairly insensitive
to water quality. Our study did not include a specific measure of any more clearly
water-borne diseases, such as typhoid or cholera, and so we may have missed the impact
of sanitary measures on water-borne diseases. We think, however, that this is unlikely.
By 1870, when our study started, typhoid was already a minor cause of death, and
cholera and dysentery had virtually disappeared (Davenport, 2007; Hassan, 1985). This
left diarrhoeal mortality as the main component of ‘water-borne’ diseases between 1870
and 1911, and diarrhoeal rates remained stubbornly high in the face of large increases
in public investment (as indicated in Figure 3.4a,d).
An additional and complementary explanation for our failure to find a strong
(negative) relationship between sanitary expenditures and mortality is that mortality
outcomes were not linearly related to water quality and sewerage provision. As Hassan
(1985) has noted, ‘the chronologies of changes in water supplies and the relevant
disease-specific mortality rates often fail to exhibit the expected relationships’.25 It
may be the case that early investments by the largest towns in clean water supplies,
before 1870, were sufficient to weaken or sever the links between faecal disposal and
drinking water, and thus to cause dramatic reductions in mortality from water-borne
diseases. However, for diarrhoeal diseases that may have depended more on domestic
and fly-borne contamination of foods, much larger efforts to rid local environments of
contaminated faeces and flies may have been required. By 1911 all the towns in our
sample provided a constant and universal supply of clean water to their inhabitants.
However, the adoption of water-based faecal disposal and comprehensive sewage
treatment progressed more slowly, and flush toilets were not universal even in the
largest towns by 1911. Opportunities for fly-borne transmission also remained abundant.
These issues call for greater attention in future studies to the quantification of actual
sanitary provision, to the extent that this is possible, and to the multiplicity of potential
pathways for disease transmission.
25See also Bell and Millward (1998), Davenport (2007), Luckin (1986).
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Appendix 3.A Data construction
In order to obtain a series of capital expenditure data going back to 1875, it was
necessary to estimate capital expenditure during the period 1875-1882, for which only
combined expenditure was given in the Local Taxation Returns. We constructed esti-
mated data as follows. First, we estimated the relationship between capital expenditure
Iit and combined (current and capital) expenditure Cit during a period (defined below)
for which it was disaggregated, using Equation (3.3), where the function Fi is specific to
Urban District i. We tested a large number of possible functions Fi: linear, quadratic or
cubic in Cit; including controls for the change in i’s tax base or total loans outstanding;
and including up to five years of leads in Cit (since future current spending may be
a good predictor of today’s capital spending); and all possible combinations of these.
We then calculated the predicted values for capital investment using the estimated
function Fi. We assessed out-of-sample fit by calculating the residual sum of squares
(RSS):
RSS =
∑
i
∑
t
(Iit − Îit)2 (3.5)
We tested two possible sets of time periods for the estimation and out-of-sample
evaluation. First, motivated by the desire to capture the relationship between capital
and total spending as temporally close to the period 1875-82 as possible, we chose the
10 year window 1883-1992 to estimate the model and then considered the out-of-sample
performance of the model for the 10 years after that, 1893-1902. Second, motivated by
the desire to use the whole sample period, we estimated the model over all but the last
10 years of available data, 1883-1902, and then assessed out-of-sample performance for
the final 10 years, 1904-1913.
The results were as follows. When estimating over 1883-1892, for water and sewerage,
the function Fi that gave the lowest out-of-sample RSS included a linear, quadratic and
cubic in Cit, two leads in Cit, and no other controls. When estimating over 1883-1902,
this remained true, but the RSS (per out-of-sample year) was considerably higher. We
therefore chose to use the above function Fi estimated over 1883-1892 when calculating
the estimated capital expenditure for the period 1875-1882 to be used in our analysis.
As a robustness check, to see whether our final results were sensitive to our choice
of Fi in constructing our data, we re-estimated our baseline regression results using
different choices of Fi and different time periods of estimation. We compared our
minimum-RSS choice of Fi described above with the simplest possible choice, a linear
function (this was one of the worst based on our RSS evaluation). We also compared
3.B Further empirical results 135
both time periods described above for each Fi. The final regression results were very
stable: no significances in Table 3.5 changed, and the point estimates typically changed
a little only at the third decimal place. This gives us confidence that the way we
constructed our investment data for the early part of our period is not driving any of
the final results we report.
Appendix 3.B Further empirical results
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Table 3.11 Regression results showing the impact of variables’ spatial consistency and
frequency for different mortality rates.
All-cause Diarrhoeal Infant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loans square root 0.045 -0.226 -0.103 -0.355 0.081 -0.124
(0.123) (0.132) (0.145) (0.324) (0.127) (0.202)
Fixed effects X X X X X X
Time effects X X X X X X
Controls Chapman Chapman Chapman Chapman Chapman Chapman
R2 0.813 0.941 0.733 0.797 0.719 0.803
Geographical units UD RD UD RD UD RD
Frequency Annual Decennial Annual Decennial Annual Decennial
Decline explained -4 21 16 44 -8 17
Time period 1870-1911 1861-1910 1870-1911 1861-1910 1870-1911 1861-1910
No. observations 657 77 657 77 657 77
No. towns 16 16 16 16 16 16
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: All-cause mortality is rate per 1,000 population. Diarrhoeal and Infant mortality rates are per
1,000 births. ‘Chapman controls’ variables are: Tax base square root, Population, Female, Age 0-14,
and Age 15-44. All coefficients are standardised. Standard errors are clustered at the town level. R2
calculated for within variation. All regressions are unweighted.

Chapter 4
The Meaningful Votes: Voting on
Brexit in the British House of
Commons

Abstract
Why do politicians rebel and vote against the party line when high stakes bills come to the
floor of the legislature? To address that question, we leverage the three so-called Meaningful
Votes that took place in the British House of Commons between January and March 2019
on the Withdrawal Agreement that the Conservative government had reached with the
European Union. The bill was defeated decisively three times following a major revolt
amongst Conservative backbench Members of Parliament (MPs). We find that three factors
influenced their rebellion calculus: the MP’s own ideological views, constituency preferences
and career concerns. Somewhat paradoxically, the rebellion within the Conservative Party
came from MPs who had supported Leave in the 2016 Brexit referendum and from MPs
elected in Leave-leaning constituencies.
Keywords: Brexit, roll call votes, rebels, party discipline, party coherence, House of Commons
JEL codes: D72
4.1 Introduction
In January 2019 the United Kingdom’s Conservative government led by Prime Minister
Theresa May suffered the worst defeat ever recorded in the history of the House
of Commons. Its flagship policy, leaving the European Union (EU) in a way that
compromised between the polarized “Hard Brexit” and “Remain” factions in Parliament,
was defeated by 432 to 202 votes, a majority of 230. The principal reason for the defeat
was a huge rebellion by 118 Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs). In March
the government held two further votes, on the same policy, and again lost by large
margins: 149 and 58. Two months later the Prime Minister announced her resignation.
Those three so-called Meaningful Votes on May’s Withdrawal Agreement rank
among the great votes of British parliamentary history. They echo the vote on the
repeal of the Corn Laws, which put an end to trade protection of agricultural products
and split the Tory party in 1846 (Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006), and also the Great Reform
Act, which altered the system of parliamentary representation in 1832, with Tory MPs
who broke the party line playing a pivotal role (Aidt and Franck, 2013; Aidt et al.,
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2019). It is historically very rare for a UK government to lose with more than 100 votes
on a key piece of legislations. The last time was in 1924, when the minority Labour
government of Ramsay MacDonald was defeated by margins of 166, 161 and 140.
In this paper, we seek to explain why Conservative MPs rebelled and understand
what drove their individual decisions not to toe the party line. We argue that the
three Meaningful Votes potentially can provide valuable general insights into why MPs
rebel against their leaders and why the organizational structures and mechanisms that
normally ensure party discipline and unity occasionally break down, resulting in the
government being “rolled” and losing important votes. The sequence of Meaningful
Votes has at least four appealing features that allow us to do just that. First, as already
noted, it is rare that a high stakes government bill is defeated so decisively. Second, it
was not a so-called free vote on which the party leaders allow their co-partisan MPs
to vote as they like. On the contrary, both the Conservative Party and the Labour
Party “whipped”, demanding that MPs toe the respective party lines. It thus was not
costless for MPs to rebel. Third, as a consequence of the 2016 Brexit referendum, we,
uniquely, observe revealed preferences on the question of leaving the EU for each MP
(we know how they voted and campaigned) and for their voters in each of Britain’s 650
parliamentary constituencies (we know the shares voting Leave and Remain). Fourth,
the MPs effectively voted on the same bill three times, which also is highly unusual.
That information enables us to develop an innovative test of career concerns.
The purpose of the paper is, therefore, two-fold. First, we want to document the
correlates underlying the mass rebellion against the Withdrawal Agreement (May’s
deal) inside the Conservative Party. Second, we want to leverage the unique features
of the sequence of Meaningful Votes to test the “tripartite model” of party rebellion
(Muller and Strom, 1999). The model, which we outline in Section 4.4, postulates that
an MP’s voting decision is a function of three potentially conflicting factors: the MP’s
own preferences (his or her ideology), political career concerns, and the preferences of
their constituents. The fact that we observe plausible proxies for the revealed preference
of the MPs and their constituents enables us to contribute to the extensive literature
on party discipline and rebellion (see Kam, 2014; Kirkland and Slapin, 2018).
Our inquiry into the rebellion amongst Conservative backbench MPs yields the
following insights. First, we find evidence that MPs were influenced by their own
preferences, career concerns and constituency preferences, but that their own preferences
were almost twice as important as the other two factors. Specifically, MPs who had
voted and campaigned against leaving the EU in the referendum (Remain MPs) were
almost 40 percentage points more likely to support May’s deal than other (Leave)
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MPs, while MPs representing constituencies with (one standard deviation) more Leave
voters were 17 percentage points less likely to support the deal. MPs mindful of their
career prospects under a May government were about 20 percentage points more likely
to support May’s deal. We also present (suggestive) evidence that the prospect of
promotion to posts in a future government motivated the MPs. Somewhat paradoxically,
the rebellion within the Conservative Party that defeated May’s deal in the House of
Commons three times in a row originated from MPs who had supported Leave in the
referendum and from MPs elected in Leave leaning constituencies. Second, we find
that the effects are heterogeneous across different sub-samples of MPs in theoretically
interesting ways. MPs elected to safe seats placed more weight on career concerns than
MPs elected in marginal seats who placed more weight on constituency preferences
in their rebellion calculus. Leave MPs but not Remain MPs were motivated by
constituency preferences. This conclusion is consistent with two types of grandstanding:
Leave MPs could signal “ideological purity” to their Leave voters by opposing May’s
deal; Remain MPs could pander to their Leave voters by “converting” and voting for
May’s deal. MPs with a history of rebellion did not weight career concerns differently
from party loyalists in their voting calculus.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 offers a short literature
review that places our study in context. Section 4.3 sets out the background to the
three Meaningful Votes. Section 4.4 presents the “tripartite” model of partisan rebellion.
Section 4.5 presents the data. Section 4.6 explains our estimation strategy. Section 4.7
presents the results. Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Literature review
Our analysis of the sequence of Meaningful Votes contributes to two main strands
of literature. First, we contribute to the literature on party discipline and roll call
rebels (for overviews, see Kirkland and Slapin (2018) or Kam (2014)). The central
question in that literature is why individual politicians decide to defy the political
party to which they belong and vote against the party’s agreed policy in roll call
votes or parliamentary divisions (as they are known in the UK). Krehbiel (1993) views
rebellions as a competition between politicians’ ideological preferences, their concern
about re-election, and their loyalty to their party. Loyalty may, in turn, be induced by
political career concerns (Muller and Strom, 1999) or through a process of political
socialization (Crowe, 1986). We build on that theoretical framework. Empirical work
has focused on the United States where roll call rebellion is widespread and it is
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common for moderate legislators to “cross the aisle” (e.g., Kirkland and Slapin, 2018).
However, in spite of greater party discipline in many parliamentarian systems, it is
not uncommon for individual “backbench” politicians (i.e., those with no positions in
government) to revolt against their party in many other countries too (e.g., Morgenstern,
2003; Hix et al., 2007; Carey, 2008; Kam, 2009; Kauder et al., 2017). Unlike in US
politics, however, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere dicipline-breakers tend to
be politicians with ideologically extreme views (Kam, 2009), and they belong mainly
to the governing party (Kirkland and Slapin, 2018). The available evidence suggests
that voters pay some attention to how their representatives vote, at least when the
issue is controversial, and that they reward them for rebelling (e.g., Pattie et al., 1994;
Longley, 1998; Johnston et al., 2002; Bertelli and Dolan, 2009; Vivyan and Wagner,
2012; Campbell et al., 2019). The evidence also shows that career concerns play a
role (e.g., Benedetto and Hix, 2007; Eggers and Spirling, 2018) although the evidence
on whether parties actually punish individual politicians for voting against the party
line is mixed (Eggers and Spirling, 2016; Kauder et al., 2017). We contribute to that
empirical literature by studying how ideology, career concerns and voter preferences
shaped the pattern of rebellion within the Conservative Party in the British House
of Commons on an especially high stakes bill. In particular, we are able to leverage
the fact that we have plausible measures of both MP and voter preferences on the
issue to evaluate the relative importance of the three forces that generally influence a
politician’s decision to rebel.
Second, our analysis contributes to the fast emerging literature on the causes
of the Brexit referendum result itself.1 Becker et al. (2017), Arnorsson and Zoega
(2018), Zhang (2018) and Fidrmuc et al. (2019) use aggregate vote share results at
the local authority, constituency or ward level to study the socio-economic correlates
of the Leave vote share. Four groups of correlates were important. The first group
includes indicators of socio-economic deprivation. The Leave vote share was high in
areas with low levels of education, low incomes, historical reliance on manufacturing
employment, and high unemployment rates (Becker et al., 2017). The second group
includes demographic factors. Areas with large proportions of British male adults and
with high proportions of elderly voters predominately voted Leave (Zhang, 2018). The
third group of correlates relates to immigration, which played an important role for
the rhetoric of the referendum campaign. Areas with high net immigration were more
likely to vote Leave (Arnorsson and Zoega, 2018). The final group of correlates relates
to the direct benefits an area has received over the years from the EU’s Cohesion
1See Clarke et al. (2017) for a comprehensive analysis of the Brexit referendum and its background.
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Fund.2 Areas that received more money from the Cohesion Fund were moderately
more supportive of Remain, but this effect is dwarfed by the fact that those areas had
low turnouts in the referendum (Fidrmuc et al., 2019).
It is, of course, always a danger trying to infer individual vote intentions from aggre-
gate vote share data (the ecological fallacy), so the correlations should be interpreted
with caution. A better approach is to examine individual-level survey data and a
number of studies have done so previously. They largely confirm what the correlations
reported above suggest. Alabrese et al. (2019), for example, find that voting Leave is
associated with older age, white ethnicity, low educational attainment, infrequent use
of smartphones and the internet, receiving public benefits, adverse health, and low life
satisfaction. Others have found that negative attitudes towards immigration increases
the probability that an individual voted Leave (Arnorsson and Zoega, 2018) and that
the generational divide – younger individuals are less Eurosceptical than older ones
– reflects a combination of individuals’ experience of the EU during their formative
years and differences in access to education for different generations (Fox and Pearce,
2018). Another approach to understanding why many voters supported Leave in the
referendum is to study support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)–
a single-issue party that since the 1990s has campaigned for the United Kingdom to
leave the European Union. Using within individual variation in exposure to welfare
cuts, Fetzer (2019) shows that individuals were more likely to “feel close” to UKIP
after they were affected personally by the government’s austerity program. Insofar as
UKIP support is a good proxy for how an individual voted in the 2016 referendum, the
results suggest that austerity played a major role in bringing about the referendum
result. In conclusion, the evidence, both from the analysis of aggregate vote share
data and from the analysis of individual vote choices, suggest that socio-economic
deprivation, austerity, demographics, and attitudes to immigration contributed to the
referendum result favoring Leave. We add to that literature by studying another aspect
of the Brexit process – the sequence of Meaningful Votes. This provides new insights
into the link between the referendum result in particular constituencies and the ways
in which the MPs elected in those constituencies behaved in Parliament.
2The Cohesion Fund redistribute funds from the EU budget to Member States whose Gross National
Income (GNI) per inhabitant is less than 90% of the EU average. It aims at reducing economic and
social disparities.
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4.3 The narrative: what actually happened?
The relationship with Europe has been a major issue for the UK’s center-right Conser-
vative Party for the past 50 years. The UK joined the EU in 1973 under a Conservative
government, but with a broad base of political support: in a 1975 referendum on EU
membership 67% of voters and all major political parties supported joining.3 However,
over the next 40 years, the EU moved from being primarily a trading bloc, to a much
closer economic and political union. That process was bitterly, but unsuccessfully,
opposed by a minority of Conservative Party MPs, especially in the early 1990s when
the Maastricht Treaty (an expansion of EU powers with a corresponding loss of UK
sovereignty) came into force (Sowemimo, 1996). In parallel to those events, a minority
of generally right-leaning voters favoured leaving the EU. Support for that position
grew in response to migration from Eastern European countries that joined the EU
from 2004 onwards. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), a single issue
party advocating the UK’s departure from the EU, began to gain significant support,
principally at the expense of the Conservative Party: in EU Parliamentary elections,
UKIP came third in 2004, second in 2009 and first in 2014 (e.g., Clarke et al., 2016).
In an attempt to both neutralize growing voter support for UKIP and deal with in-
ternal divisions in the Conservative Party, Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron
offered a referendum on EU membership as part of his re-election campaign in 2015,
alongside an attempt to renegotiate the UK’s relationship with the EU.4 In the short
run, the policy was a successful: somewhat against expectations the Conservatives
won the 2015 election and UKIP support collapsed. In order to achieve Cameron’s
second aim of mending divisions within the Conservative Party, he allowed his MPs to
campaign for either side in the 2016 referendum, rather than requiring them to toe the
party line and support continued membership in the EU (“Remain”). A significant
minority of both backbench and frontbench, i.e., those serving in the government,
Conservatives campaigned subsequently for exiting the EU (“Leave”). The referendum
was held on 23 June 2016, and resulted in an unexpected victory for Leave, with 52%
of the vote (and considerable geographic and demographic heterogeneity; see Becker
et al. (2017)). Cameron resigned immediately, and was replaced as Prime Minister
3At the time the bloc was called the EEC (European Economic Community), becoming the EU in
1993. For simplicity this article uses EU throughout.
4Bernholz et al. (2004) propose a reform of EU institutions that would protect the subsidiarity
principle and create effective checks and balances by breaking the Commission’s agenda monopoly.
If that proposal had been adopted in the mid-2000s, the critique levied against the EU by many
British euro-sceptics regarding the risk of an EU super state and democratic deficits would have been
answered.
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by Conservative MP Theresa May, who began the process of withdrawing from the
EU. Under EU law, a member state can leave the union by triggering Article 50 of the
Lisbon Treaty. That provision gives that member state up to two years to negotiate a
Withdrawal Agreement with the EU, which sets out the terms under which it leaves
(covering everything from future customs arrangements to past pension liabilities). If
no agreement is in place at the two-year deadline, the member state can leave without
an agreement, or can ask for an extension of the negotiating period, during which the
country remains part of the EU.
Over the course of the two-year UK-EU negotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement,
divisions within the Conservative Party deepened. On one side, many Leavers became
“Hard Brexiteers”, such as senior government minister Boris Johnson and members of
the European Research Group (ERG), who increasingly favoured a policy of little or
no future cooperation with the EU (“no deal”). On the other side, a smaller group
of former Remainers favored a “Soft Brexit”, a close future relationship with the EU
resembling full membership. In November 2018, the final Withdrawal Agreement was
struck between May and the EU. Although that did not specify all aspects of the future
UK-EU relationship, generally speaking it was a compromise somewhere between Hard
and Soft Brexit. Over the course of the negotiations, Johnson and several other high
profile Hard Brexiteer government ministers resigned in protest at compromises made
by May.
The final step was for Parliament to pass the Withdrawal Agreement. That
requirement itself was the result of an earlier parliamentary setback for May, when
MPs succeeded - against the wishes the government - in securing a “Meaningful Vote”
on whatever terms the UK eventually left the EU on. Five full days of parliamentary
debate were set aside, with the vote to be held on 11 December 2018. The Whips, MPs
whose jobs it is to ensure internal party discipline, worked hard to persuade potential
rebels to back the government. The main tool at their disposal is the prospect of future
promotion in government. Over the course of the debate, it became clear that May
was not going to win the vote, so she delayed it to 15 January 2019, in an attempt to
buy more time in which to persuade potential rebels. That strategy was not successful:
the first Meaningful Vote was lost by the government by 432 to 202 votes, a majority
of 230, representing the most serious defeat of a UK government in the history of
Parliament.
Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of MPs’ votes on the three Meaningful Votes by
party (panel A) and for the Conservative Party between front- and backbenchers
(panel B). From these data, we see that a number of factors contributed to May’s
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defeat. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) - a socially conservative, pro-Brexit,
Northern Irish party - which had agreed to support the Conservative government
(having its majority in the 2017 general election), but rebelled because in their view
the Withdrawal Agreement treated Northern Ireland differently to the rest of the UK
(related to the so-called Irish backstop problem). Very few pro-Brexit MPs from the
center-Left opposition Labour Party ended up supporting the government.5 The centrist
Liberal Democrats (LD) and center-left Scottish National Party (SNP) opposed the
government unanimously, but that opposition had been anticipated. By far the main
factor behind May’s defeat was the huge scale of the rebellion by her own backbench
MPs. The frontbenchers with government posts, on the other hand, toed the line and
none of them rebelled (Table 4.1, panel B).
After the vote, the EU refused to renegotiate the Withdrawal Agreement; under
Article 50, time was running out before the UK would either have to ask for an extension
(politically very costly for the Conservatives) or leave without a deal (economically
very costly for the country). May, therefore, held a Second Meaningful Vote on 12
March 2019, essentially a repeat vote on the policy that had been rejected two months
before (some minor changes in interpretation of certain aspects of it were introduced).
May and her Whips worked hard to persuade rebel Conservative MPs, but again
unsuccessfully: the government lost by 391 to 242 votes, a majority of 149. Following
that defeat, she asked the EU for an extension, rather than leaving with no deal at
end of March.
On the day the UK originally was supposed to leave the EU, May held a Third
Meaningful Vote, again on essentially the same Withdrawal Agreement. She and her
Whips made a final push to persuade rebels, increasingly with the threat to Hard
Brexiteers that Brexit may not happen at all if the Withdrawal Agreement was not
passed. Again, the government lost, although it cut its margin of defeat, from 344 to
286 votes, a majority of 58. Boris Johnson was the most prominent rebel to change his
mind, and vote with the government for the first time on that final vote.
Immediately after losing the third vote, May had to ask the EU for another
extension of Article 50, a further major political humiliation. In local and EU elections
in May 2019, the Conservatives did exceptionally badly. With the central policy of the
5Some predictions at the time of the first vote had up to 30 Labour MPs intending to vote with
the government. More generally, Brexit has produced serious internal divisions in the Labour Party,
although they did not have a major impact on the Meaningful Votes. Hence, this article focuses on
the Conservative Party.
152 The Meaningful Votes: Voting on Brexit in the British House of Commons
government in disarray and her party falling apart, the Prime Minister announced her
resignation on 24 May 2019.6
Johnson, the frontrunner to replace May among Conservative Party members (who
select the party leader), won the ensuing leadership contest and became Prime Minister
in July 2019. A proponent of Hard Brexit, he replaced much of May’s relatively balanced
government with a group of Hard Brexiteers in all of the most senior government posts.
Johnson negotiated some changes to the Withdrawal Agreement concerning the Irish
backstop, and on 22 October 2019 MPs passed a second reading of the resulting bill by
a majority of 30. However, they also voted down Johnson’s attempt to rush through
the legislation in time for him not to have to extend the UK’s membership of the EU
past 31 October (politically costly for Johnson after his ‘do or die’ commitment to
leaving before that date). Hence, Johnson pushed for and eventually obtained a general
election on 12 December 2019. The parliament that rejected May’s deal three times,
therefore, never got a chance to have a final say on Johnson’s deal: passing a second
reading does not indicate that the bill necessarily would have become law. Many
MPs who voted for it at the second reading, for example, were said to be planning
amendments radically to soften the deal in ways Johnson had categorically ruled out.
4.4 Theoretical framework
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework that explains why politicians
(henceforth MPs) may decide to vote against their own party’s policy, and which we
use to structure our empirical investigation of the Meaningful Votes. For that reason,
we formulate the framework with reference to the Westminster system. This system is
charaterized by a high level of party unity in general, a clear government-opposition
divide, agenda control monopolized by the Cabinet within the governing party, and
MPs elected in single-member districts with local party organizations having significant
input into who is selected to represent the constituency (e.g., Baughman, 2004).7
6Three major aspects of the breakdown the Conservative party’s unity were the following. May
suffered a large number of resignations of both junior and senior ministers: from 11 June 2017
onwards, 33 ministers resigned over Brexit. Four Conservative MPs also defected from the party
over Brexit, either to new parties or to sit as independents. On 11 December 2018, the day the first
Meaningful Vote originally was to be held, Theresa May faced an internal Conservative Party vote
of No Confidence, brought by Hard Brexit ERG (European Research Group) members, which she
defeated.
7Broader legislative institutions and party structures help shape the costs and benefits for politicians
to deviate from the party line, along with the constraints that party leaders face in creating party
coherence (Krehbiel, 1993). The differences, for example, between a Westminster-type system and a
US-type system often are emphasised (Gaines and Garrett, 1993). Stratmann (2006) leverages the
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MPs are members of political parties and are elected under those party labels and
on the party manifesto. The members share policy preferences and have common goals,
but only up to a point. Within a party, in general, substantial preference heterogeneity
on particular issues exists, with extreme and moderate MPs both belonging to the
same party. Such heterogeneity creates a fundamental tension for party members
between supporting the party’s policy (selected by the party leadership), which will
appeal to some but not to all, and pursuing their own preferred policy. Party leaders
are, of course, well aware of that tension and will seek to devise incentives and rules to
enforce party discipline, create party coherence and avoid mass rebellion on critical
bills (Kam, 2014). Party leaders can, in principle, pursue that goal by controlling the
selection of candidates to be fielded (select only candidates who will toe the party line),
by controlling the policy agenda (make sure that proposals are agreeable to most party
members), by fostering socialization (Crowe, 1986), and by sharing and withholding
the perks of public office strategically.
Building on Muller and Strom (1999)’s tripartite model, we make a distinction
between three factors that affect an MP’s decision to rebel against his or her party.
The first consideration is ideology: MPs care about policy and their position on a
particular issue often deviates from the party’s official stance. That gap may motivate
an MP to rebel. The second consideration is career concerns: MPs usually want a
legislative career. In the Westminster system, where agenda control is monopolized
by the Cabinet, political promotion is about government posts for members of the
governing party and about posts in the shadow cabinet for opposition MPs. Such
allocation procedures make rebellion costly for backbenchers as well as for frontbenchers
(those with government or shadow government posts) because party leaders can with-
hold promotion for rebellious backbenchers and demote frontbenchers who do not toe
the line.8 The third consideration is constituency preferences and re-election. In the
Westminster system, MPs are elected to represent the voters in their constituency. As
mixed plurality and proportional election system in Germany to show that federal politicians who
are elected under plurality rule from single member districts are more likely than those elected on
a party list under proportional representation to vote against party lines in roll call votes. For a
comparative study of the UK and the US, see Kirkland and Slapin (2018) and for a study of the
European Parliament see Benedetto and Hix (2007). For a study of the consequences of government
ideology, see Aidt et al. (2018).
8Bertelli and Dolan (2009) present evidence from intervention in House of Commons’s debates
related to health care that is consistent with political careerism. The evidence on whether party
leaders in actual fact punish rebels by denying them promotion is mixed. Eggers and Spirling (2016)
study over 20,000 parliamentary divisions that took place between 1836 and 1910 in the British House
of Commons and show that more loyal MPs were more likely to obtain ministerial posts. In contrast,
Kauder et al. (2017) study 218 roll call votes in the German federal parliament (Bundestag) and ask
if rebels are punished by party leaders by being allocated a less attractive position on the party list in
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argued by, for example, Gaines and Garrett (1993), Kirkland and Slapin (2018), Kam
(2009) and many others, MPs in that system have an incentive, albeit not necessarily
as strong an incentive as US legislators, to develop a persona independent of their
party that connects them with their constituents and their local party organization.
They can do so publicly by deviating from their party’s policy on issues that their
voters and selectors in the local party organization care particularly about in parlia-
mentary divisions. Such grandstanding signals their ideological purity, integrity or
trustworthiness, gets them media exposure and can potentially insulate them from the
electoral unpopularity (in their constituency) of the party’s policy.9
Within the public choice tradition, MPs are viewed as rational decision makers
who need to navigate the foregoing three considerations when they decide if they
should rebel on a particular issue. More often than not, the forces pull in different
directions and MPs find themselves in the cross fire at the center of a triangle with
their voters, their ideological conviction, and their party (Hix et al., 2007; Morgenstern,
2003; Saiegh, 2011). Figure 1 illustrates this tripartite model of roll call voting.
The costs and benefits of rebellion differ systematically between the governing
and opposition parties on the one hand, and within the governing party (or coalition)
between the frontbenchers with government posts and backbenchers without on the
other. First, with regard to the government-opposition split, Kirkland and Slapin
(2018) argue that it is MPs with extreme preferences (far from the center) within the
governing party that stand to benefit the most from rebellion. That is because they
can signal to their constituents that they are “ideologically pure” by voting against
the party line and expect to be rewarded electorally for it. For opposition MPs, the
incentive to break the party line to signal “ideological purity” is weaker. Assuming
that the opposition policy will vote against the government’s policy, neither extreme
nor moderate (who are relatively close to the center) opposition MPs are likely to gain
electorally by breaking the party line because most of their voters would, in fact, prefer
the opposition party’s official policy stance to that of the government. All rebels, of
course, face the cost of the disciplinary actions taken by their party leaders in response,
but the benefit of rebellion between the party of government and the opposition clearly
the next election. They find that parties do not punish politicians who have voted against the party
line in that way.
9Campbell et al. (2019) and Vivyan and Wagner (2012) present evidence from the UK that
deviating from the party line can help MPs seeking re-election. Pattie et al. (1994) show that rebellion
on high profile issues, such as capital punishment or the poll tax, had affected re-election prospects
of the rebels, but otherwise they find no discernible consequences. Ragusa (2016) shows that US
legislators take more extreme positions if they won election to the Senate after representing a highly
partisan state.
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is asymmetric. That logic is consistent with the fact that it is MPs with extreme views
that tend to rebel in the House of Commons and that MPs from the governing party
are more likely to rebel than MPs from the opposition (e.g., Benedetto and Hix, 2007;
Kirkland and Slapin, 2018).
Second, the within-party difference between front- and backbenchers is important
and arises from the fact that frontbenchers have much more to lose from rebelling
(their perks and posts, the ability to formulate policy and so on). Backbenchers also
have to mind their political careers, but those who have been “passed over” for political
promotion or those who have been demoted from the frontbench previously have less
to lose (Kam, 2009). That logic suggests that it is amongst “old” backbenchers that
most rebels can be found. The cause of a backbench revolt by that group of MPs may
not just be that they are unhappy with the party’s policy, but also may be because
they hope to destabilize the leader under whom their political careers have stalled.
Such considerations give rise to two distinct career motives. On the one hand, MPs can
promote their careers by pleasing the current leadership of their party if the leadership
is sufficiently stable to justify the expectation of future rewards for good behaviour.
On the other hand, MPs can promote their careers by destabilising the current leader
of their party and encouraging a leadership challenge. If successful, the revolting MPs
reasonably may expect to be rewarded by the new leader.
Figure 4.1 MPs in the crossfire: The tripartite model
Notes: Own illustration.
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4.5 The data and operationalization
Our objective is to study how MPs resolved the tension among their personal ideolog-
ical views, career concerns and constituency preferences in the context of the three
Meaningful Votes on May’s deal. The raw numbers (reported in Table 4.1) clearly show
that party cohesion was strong among all opposition parties. All but six opposition
MPs in the first Meaningful Vote and nine in the third toed their respective party
lines.10 An implication, then, is that the rebellion that defeated May’s deal three times
in a row took place within the governing Conservative Party.11 Our focus is, therefore,
on the 317 Conservative MPs. We have recorded how each of them voted in the three
Meaningful Votes and coded the indicator variable VOTE as one if the (Conservative)
MP supported the Withdrawal Agreement, voting with the government, and zero if
the MP rebelled by voting against.
While, theoretically, the three factors of the tripartite model – ideology, career
concerns and constituency preferences – are distinct, in practice they often overlap and
it is a challenge to measure them independently. With that caveat in mind, we now
explain how we operationalize and measure those factors. First, we operationalize the
MPs’ ideological positions on the Brexit question by how they voted and campaigned
in the 2016 referendum on leaving the European Union. For Conservative MPs, the
referendum, arguably, was a “free vote” on which the MPs could vote and campaign
as they liked. The official policy of the Cameron government that had called the
referendum was to vote Remain, but many leading Tory MPs – most notably Boris
Johnson and Michael Gove – campaigned to leave. We code the dummy variable
REMAIN MP as one if the MP voted and campaigned for remain in the referendum
and zero otherwise. We argue that such an expressed preference is a good measure
of each MP’s personal judgment of the merits of leaving the EU.12 However, we
acknowledge that how the MPs voted in the referendum can, in principle, also reflect
career concerns and constituency preferences. In our judgment, it is unlikely that many
10Dewan and Spirling (2011) develop a game theoretical argument for why opposition parties are
able to act coherently in spite of the temptation of some of their MPs to support the government’s
policy. The source of such strategic opposition is that if the opposition as a block vote against the
government (and no opposition MP deviates from that), it can force the government to propose a
more moderate policy than otherwise and that outcome is in the interest of all opposition MPs.
11The “rebellion” by the 10 MPs from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) upon which May’s
government relied on for a parliamentary majority also was important but not pivotal.
12Moreover, it is plausible to argue that most of them were voting socio-tropically, i.e., were thinking
about what, in their view, was best for the country, rather than ego-tropically, i.e., were thinking
about the private benefit that they would derive from the result. See Nannestad and Paldam (1994)
and Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2013) for a discussion of the distinction between ego- and socio-tropic
voting.
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Conservative MPs viewed their position on the referendum question as a career move.
It was widely expected that the Remain side would win and the Cameron government
was unlikely to reward or punish the MPs the stance they took, as Cameron had called
the referendum, at least partly, to settle the “Europe question” within the Conservative
Party once and for all. It is harder to dismiss the possibility that a significant number
of MPs (who did not have strong views on the issue of Europe) chose their positions
to match the (perceived) preferences of their constituents. If that were the case, we
would expect to find a strong correlation between an MP’s position and that of his or
her constituents. In fact, the correlation between the leave stance of the MPs and the
Leave vote share of their constituents is just 0.129. That correlation does, of course,
not rule out that the dummy variable REMAIN MP captures a mixture of personal
and constituency preferences. To bolster our interpretation of the variable, we exploit
in a robustness check that Theresa May called a general election in 2017 and that we
can make a distinction between (current) MPs who were elected before (in 2015) and
after (in 2017) the referendum. It is reasonable to expect that constituency preferences
played little role in the stances taken by the “MPs” who did not get elected until after
the referendum; for them, the expressed preference in the referendum is a reflection
of their personal views. We also stress that we condition on a host of constituency
characteristics and on the share of leave voters in the estimations. That strategy helps
isolate the variation in REMAIN MP that represents the MPs’ personal preferences
from the variation that may relate to constituency preferences.
Second, to operationalize career concerns, we make a distinction between “junior”
and “senior” backbenchers, on the one hand, and between backbenchers and members
of the government (frontbenchers) on the other. As discussed above, the group of
“senior” backbenchers, i.e., those with long parliamentary tenures, consists of two
sub-groups: one group has been “passed over” for government jobs previously and
have little prospect of ever getting one under the current Prime Minister; the other
consists of MPs who previously have served in government but have resigned or been
dismissed. Either group has little to lose from rebellion because what the government
and its Whips can do to sanction them for such behavior is limited since they have
little chance of promotion under the current leadership. They are, therefore, ceteris
paribus more likely to rebel than “junior” MPs who are newly elected to their seats and
who are particularly concerned with their political career prospects under the current
leadership. On top of that, if the power base of the current leadership inside the party
is fragile, then MPs may anticipate that if they rebel, the current leadership eventually
will fall and a new Prime Minster will be appointed. Likely, the new leader will replace
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most of the old frontbenchers and promote MPs from the backbench. Consequently,
MPs who think they have a fair chance of being part of a new government have an
extra incentive to rebel. However, that strategy, arguably, is more appealing to “senior”
than to “junior” backbenchers who hope to get back into government. So, “junior”
MPs have two reasons to toe the party line: they fear sanctions from the current
government and they do not anticipate rewards from a new government should the
current government fall because of rebellion. We code two variables to capture those
calculations. The first, FRONTBENCH, is a dummy variable coded one if the MP
holds a position in government and zero otherwise. The second, JUNIOR MP, is a
dummy variable coded one if the MP was first elected in either in 2015 or 2017, and
zero otherwise.13 The fact that we observe the same MPs voting on the same policy
three times and we observe a change in Prime Minister (from Theresa May to Boris
Johnson) opens a window of opportunity for a more refined test of career concerns
related to destabilizing the current leader. We return to that issue in Section 4.7.2.
Third, the Brexit situation provides a unique opportunity for measuring the con-
stituency preferences since we know, in the aggregate, how voters in each constituency
voted in the 2016 referendum.14 We code the variable LEAVE VOTE SHARE as the
fraction of voters in each constituency who voted Leave in the referendum.
We also have collected information on many other MP and constituency specific
characteristics. The constituency specific control variables include population size, the
unemployment rate, the share of foreign-born residents, the share of residents with
higher education, the age structure of the constituency, and share of public employment,
all measured at the parliamentary constituency level. The MP specific control variables
include the MP’s age, gender and win margin in the 2017 election. We also enter a
rebellion index that proxies for the MP’s tendency to rebel against his or her own
party in the past. We have standardized these data so that all non-binary variables
have a standard deviation of one. Appendix A lists and defines all of the variables we
use in the statistical analysis and provides details on their sources. Table 4.2 reports
summary statistics.
13The most recent previous election was in 2010, so by the time of the Meaningful Votes in 2018 an
MP with JUNIOR MP=0 had served as an MP for at least eight years, long enough to be considered
for a government position.
14Given that actual numbers often are not reported at the parliamentary constituency level, we
follow the political science literature (see e.g. Heath and Goodwin, 2017) and use estimates constructed
by Hanretty (2017).
4.6 Estimation strategy 159
Ta
bl
e
4.
2
Su
m
m
ar
y
St
at
ist
ic
s
fo
r
sa
m
pl
e
of
C
on
se
rv
at
iv
e
Ba
ck
be
nc
h
M
Ps
Va
ri
ab
le
(1
) N
(2
)
M
ea
n
(3
)
St
d.
D
ev
.
(4
)
M
in
.
(5
)
M
ax
.
V
O
T
E
(B
in
ar
y)
66
2
0.
64
8
0.
47
8
0
1
V
O
T
E
C
H
A
N
G
E
1-
2*
(B
in
ar
y)
11
8
0.
33
1
0.
47
2
0
1
V
O
T
E
C
H
A
N
G
E
2-
3*
(B
in
ar
y)
11
8
0.
35
6
0.
48
1
0
1
M
ai
n
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
R
EM
A
IN
M
P
(B
in
ar
y)
22
2
0.
46
4
0.
50
0
0
1
JU
N
IO
R
M
P
(B
in
ar
y)
22
2
0.
36
5
0.
48
2
0
1
LE
AV
E
V
O
T
E
SH
A
R
E
(%
)
22
2
55
.1
8.
79
25
.7
75
.0
JO
H
N
SO
N
G
O
V
ER
N
M
EN
T
SE
N
IO
R
*
(B
in
ar
y)
11
8
0.
06
8
0.
25
2
0
1
JO
H
N
SO
N
G
O
V
ER
N
M
EN
T
JU
N
IO
R
*
(B
in
ar
y)
11
8
0.
07
6
0.
26
7
0
1
Co
ns
tit
ue
nc
y
Co
nt
ro
ls
FO
R
EI
G
N
(%
)
22
2
8.
56
6.
51
2.
40
46
.9
PO
PU
LA
T
IO
N
(N
o.
)
22
2
99
,5
58
11
,2
38
58
,8
73
14
0,
26
4
U
N
EM
PL
O
Y
ED
(%
)
22
2
1.
59
0.
79
5
0.
50
3
4.
81
PU
BL
IC
(%
)
22
2
18
.1
6.
75
5.
60
47
.1
ED
U
C
AT
ED
(%
)
22
2
27
.2
6.
94
12
.3
55
.2
W
O
R
K
IN
G
A
G
E
(%
)
22
2
60
.7
2.
86
51
.4
70
.3
M
P
Co
nt
ro
ls
A
G
E
(Y
rs
.)
22
2
52
.3
10
.8
27
.0
78
.0
FE
M
A
LE
(B
in
ar
y)
22
2
0.
17
6
0.
38
1
0
1
R
EB
EL
LI
O
N
(I
nd
ex
)
22
2
0.
72
3
1.
87
0
21
.8
W
IN
M
A
RG
IN
(p
p)
22
2
22
.6
12
.8
0.
06
6
49
.7
N
ot
e:
A
pp
en
di
x
A
lis
ts
th
e
de
fin
iti
on
so
ft
he
va
ria
bl
es
an
d
pr
ov
id
es
de
ta
ils
re
ga
rd
in
g
th
e
so
ur
ce
s.
A
pp
en
di
x
Ta
bl
e
4.
10
pr
ov
id
es
su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
ist
ics
fo
r
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
of
al
lC
on
se
rv
at
iv
e
M
Ps
.
*
T
he
se
va
ria
bl
es
ar
e
co
de
d
fo
r
th
e
su
b-
sa
m
pl
e
of
C
on
se
rv
at
iv
e
ba
ck
be
nc
h
M
Ps
w
ho
vo
te
d
ag
ai
ns
t
th
e
W
ith
dr
aw
al
A
gr
ee
m
en
t
in
th
e
fir
st
M
ea
ni
ng
fu
lV
ot
e.
Se
e
Se
ct
io
n
4.
7.
2
fo
r
m
or
e
de
ta
ils
.
160 The Meaningful Votes: Voting on Brexit in the British House of Commons
4.6 Estimation strategy
We want to estimate the following statistical model:
VOTEi,v = F [αv + β1IDEOLOGYi + β2CAREERi + β3CONSTITUENCYi + β4Xi]
(4.1)
where i is the index for a Conservative MP (and for his or her constituency since
all constituencies are single seat), v is the index for the three Meaningful Votes with
v ∈ {1, 2, 3} and Xi is a vector of control variables. We want to understand how the
three forces – ideology, career concerns and constituency preferences – influence the
decision to rebel by voting against May’s deal. We use REMAIN MP to proxy for
ideology, LEAVE VOTE SHARE to proxy for constituency preferences and JUNIOR
MP and FRONTBENCH to proxy for career concerns in the main specifications, but
consider a number of refinements aimed at validating those three proxies. We estimate
equation (4.1) with a probit estimator and, in specifications when we pool the three
votes, we cluster the standard errors at the constituency level to account for the fact
that we study a sequence of votes.
We know from Table 4.1 that all Conservative frontbench MPs supported the
government’s Withdrawal Agreement in the three Meaningful Votes. This implies that
we cannot include FRONTBENCH in the probit specification (the variable predicts
the outcome perfectly and is dropped). For that reason, the main analysis is restricted
to the sample of Conservative backbenchers where we observe variation in VOTE. To
compare the effect of the FRONTBENCH variable to the others, we estimate a linear
probability model on the sample of all Conservative MPs. We also know from Table 4.1
that 81 Conservative (backbench) MPs changed their votes from opposition to support
in the sequence of votes. To study why they did so, we estimate a version of equation
(4.1) where we replace VOTE with either VOTE CHANGE 1-2 or VOTE CHANGE
2-3. Those variables record whether the MPs changed their votes in the second or third
Meaningful Vote relative to the position they took in the previous vote, respectively.
4.7 Results
We present the results in three subsections. In Section 4.7.1, we discuss the main
results and a validation test of the proxy for the MPs’ personal preferences. In Section
4.7.2, we test for career concerns related to promotion to government posts in a future
administration. In Section 4.7.3, we investigate heterogeneity in the effects across three
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dimensions related to electoral competition, history of rebellion, and the MP’s personal
preferences.
4.7.1 Main results
Table 4.3 reports the main results. Column (1) shows a parsimonious specification
without any control variables other than the dummy variables for the three Meaningful
Votes, column (2) adds the constituency specific control variables, and column (3) adds
MP-specific control variables. We report marginal effects evaluated at the means of
the variables. In column (4), we report the results from a linear probability model
estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) wherein we can include all Conservative
MPs, including those serving on the frontbench in the sample.
Looking across Table 4.3, we observe that the four variables capturing personal
preferences (REMAIN MP), career concerns (JUNIOR MP and FRONTBENCH ), and
constituency preferences (LEAVE VOTE SHARE) are all strongly correlated with MP
support for May’s deal. The effects are stable across specifications as we add the control
variables, except for LEAVE VOTE SHARE which is very imprecisely estimated in
the parsimonious specification in column (1). That is, perhaps, not so surprising
because the constituency specific controls include many of the variables – such as the
unemployment rate and the share of highly educated residents in the constituency –
which we know are correlated with the share of Leave voters (see, e.g., Becker et al.,
2017). Specifically, we find that REMAIN MP and the two career concerns variables
JUNIOR MP and FRONTBENCH are positively correlated with the probability of
voting for May’s deal and that LEAVE VOTE SHARE is negatively correlated. That
is, MPs who had voted and campaigned against leaving the EU in the referendum
were almost 40 percentage points more likely to support May’s deal than other MPs,
while MPs representing constituencies with (one standard deviation) more Leave voters
were 15 percentage points less likely to support the deal. Junior MPs mindful of their
career prospects under a May government were about 22 percentage points more likely
to support her deal and so were frontbench MPs serving in the government (column
(4)). Relatively speaking, ideology (as captured by the MP’s revealed preference for
membership of the EU) appears to be about twice as important a factor as career
concerns and constituency preferences. In sum, we conclude that the rebellion did
not come from MPs with strong career concerns. That result is in line with previous
findings in the literature on roll call rebels (see, e.g., Benedetto and Hix, 2007). Rather,
and somewhat paradoxically, rebellion came from MPs who had supported Leave in
the referendum and from MPs elected in Leave leaning constituencies.
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Table 4.3 The probability of voting for the Withdrawal Agreement in the three Mean-
ingful Votes combined
Backbencher sample Full Sample
Outcome: VOTE (1)Probit
(2)
Probit
(3)
Probit
(4)
OLS
FRONTBENCH - - - 0.329***
(0.035)
[0.000]
REMAIN MP 0.379*** 0.369*** 0.393*** 0.264***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.034)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
JUNIOR MP 0.179*** 0.145** 0.223*** 0.146***
(0.053) (0.058) (0.069) (0.047)
[0.001] [0.012] [0.001] [0.002]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.002 -0.156** -0.151** -0.069*
(0.029) (0.066) (0.073) (0.036)
[0.949] [0.017] [0.038] [0.063]
Vote Dummies YES YES YES YES
Const. Controls NO YES YES YES
MP Controls NO NO YES YES
N 662 662 662 941
(Pseudo-)R2 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.33
Note: Columns (1)-(3) report Probit estimates (marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the
explanatory variables) for the sample of Conservative backbenchers and column (4) reports OLS
estimates for the sample of all Conservative MPs. The dependent variable (VOTE) is a binary variable
equal to 1 whenever an MP voted in support of the Withdrawal Agreement and zero when the MP
rebelled by voting against. REMAIN MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP voted for remaining
within the EU in the 2016 referendum; JUNIOR MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP was
elected to the House of Commons either in 2015 or 2017; LEAVE VOTE SHARE is the standardized
share of voters who voted Leave in the referendum in 2016 in each constituency; and FRONTBENCH
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP holds a position in government. All specifications include
vote dummies. Constituency controls include population size, the unemployment rate, the share of
constituents working in the public sector, the share of constituents with a higher education degree,
and the share of constituents who are of working age. MP controls include gender, age, an index of
the MP’s history of rebellion, and the MP’s win margin in the last election. Standard errors (in round
brackets) are clustered at the constituency level; p-values are given in [square brackets]; *p<0.10,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Table 4.4 reports the results (corresponding to the specification with the full set
of control variables in Table 4.3, column (3) for each of the three Meaningful Votes
separately. That evidence is important to consider because a significant shift in the
scale of the rebellion materialized from 118 Conservative MPs, dropping in the first
Meaningful Vote down to 37 in the third. The results are qualitatively similar across
4.7 Results 163
the three votes: the marginal effects have the same signs and are, with one exception,
statistically significant. Importantly, the tests for whether the marginal effects are the
same in the first and third vote reported in column (4), however, show the quantitative
importances of ideology and career concerns, but not constituency preferences, weakened
over time, in line with the fact that more and more backbenchers rallied behind May’s
deal as time went on.15 To illustrate, relative to the first Meaningful Vote, wherein the
MPs who had voted Remain in 2016 were 56 percentage points more likely to support
May’s deal, the marginal effect dropped down to 16 percentage points by the time of
the third Meaningful Vote. We also note that the fraction of the variance explained by
the three factors (as measured by the Pseudo-R2) drops from 31% to 17%.
As discussed above, we cannot fully rule out that the estimated marginal effect of
REMAIN MP, which records the stance of each MP in the 2016 referendum, captures
constituency as well as the MP’s personal preferences. The fact that we condition on
the LEAVE VOTE SHARE and, thus, estimate the effect of REMAIN MP holding the
preferences of the voters in each constituency for leaving the European Union constant
militates against that interpretation. Yet, it is important to consider the issue further.
The MPs who voted on the Withdrawal Agreement in the three Meaningful Votes
can be divided between those who also were part of the 2015 Parliament and, therefore,
were serving as representatives at the time of the referendum, and those who were not
members of the past legislative (i.e., those entering the House of Commons in 2017). If
the MPs’ stances in the referendum were selected strategically to match constituency
preferences, we conjecture that the incentive to do so would be much stronger for those
who already were MPs at the time of the referendum. After all the MPs elected in 2017
did not know in 2016 that they would be running in a general election shortly after the
referendum vote and, thus, their incentive to match their stances with those of future
voters arguably is much weaker. For them, it stands to reason that the referendum
vote does reflect their personal preference.
Given that consideration, we can isolate the effect of the MPs’ personal preferences
by restricting the sample to the Conservative backbench MPs who did not serve in
parliament at the time of the 2016 referendum and test if those who voted Remain are
more likely than those who did not to vote for the Withdrawal Agreement. Table 4.5
reports three specifications with different sets of control variables similar to Table 4.3.
We see that REMAIN MP is statistically significant in all specifications, and that the
15It is not straight-forward to compare coefficient in a non-linear model. We follow Mood (2010)
and use a one-sided z-test to calculate, for each variable, if one marginal effect (rather than the raw
probit coefficients) is large (smaller) than the other. We use the same procedure in the heterogeneity
analysis in Section 4.7.3.
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Table 4.4 The probability of voting for the Withdrawal agreement in each of the three
Meaningful Votes separately
Outcome: VOTE (1)1st Vote
(2)
2nd Vote
(3)
3rd Vote
(4)
Diff. p-value
REMAIN MP 0.556*** 0.399*** 0.158*** 0.000
(0.061) (0.059) (0.044)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
JUNIOR MP 0.327*** 0.209** 0.112** 0.031
(0.103) (0.087) (0.051)
[0.002] [0.016] [0.027]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.150 -0.165* -0.120** 0.414
(0.121) (0.088) (0.061)
[0.217] [0.061] [0.048]
Controls YES YES YES -
N 221 220 221 -
Pseudo-R2 0.31 0.22 0.17 -
Note: The table reports Probit estimates (marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory
variables) for the sample of Conservative backbenchers separately for the three Meaningful Votes.
The dependent variable (VOTE) is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever an MP voted in support of
the Withdrawal Agreement and zero if the MP rebelled by voting against. REMAIN MP is a binary
variable equal to 1 if the MP voted for remaining within the EU in the 2016 referendum; JUNIOR MP
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP was elected to the House of Commons either in 2015 or 2017;
and LEAVE VOTE SHARE is the standardized share of voters who voted Leave in the referendum in
2016 in each constituency. All specifications include vote dummies. Constituency controls include
population size, the unemployment rate, the share of constituents working in the public sector, the
share of constituents with a higher education degree, and the share of constituents who are of working
age. MP controls include gender, age, an index of the MP’s history of rebellion, and the MP’s win
margin in the last election. The p-value reported in column (4) is associated with the one-sided null
hypothesis that the marginal effect of the respective row variable is numerically smaller in the third
vote (column (3)) than in the first vote (column (1)). Robust standard errors (in round brackets);
p-values are given in [square brackets]; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
marginal effect is about 30 percentage points compared to 40 percentage points in the
full sample (see Table 4.3). The result bolsters our interpretation of REMAIN MP as
a plausible proxy for the MPs’ personal preferences.
4.7.2 Career concerns and leader replacement
So far we have assumed that the MPs’ career concerns are shaped by the ability of
the current party leadership to reward loyalty and punish rebellion. However, the
prospect of a career under a new party leader also can be a strong motivator for
rebelling against the current leadership, particularly so if its position is perceived to
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Table 4.5 The probability of voting for the Withdrawal Agreement for the Conservative
backbench MPs not serving in 2016
Outcome: VOTE (1)Probit
(2)
Probit
(3)
Probit
REMAIN MP 0.295*** 0.286*** 0.295***
(0.103) (0.093) (0.105)
[0.004] [0.002] [0.005]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.066* -0.148** -0.084
(0.037) (0.065) (0.082)
[0.076] [0.023] [0.303]
Vote Dummies YES YES YES
Const. Controls NO YES YES
MP Controls NO NO YES
N 104 104 104
Pseudo-R2 0.27 0.33 0.38
Note: The table reports Probit estimates (marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory
variables) for the sample of Conservative backbenchers who did not serve as representatives at the
time of the 2016 EU Membership Referendum. Due to limited variation, the variable JUNIOR MP
is omitted. The other variables are as in the specifications reported in Table 4.3, columns (1) to
(3). Standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the constituency level; p-values are given in
[square brackets]; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
be weak and rebellion is a means to weaken it further. In the context of the three
Meaningful Votes, it is clear that the position of the May government was fragile. This,
combined with the fact that she eventually was replaced by Boris Johnson as Prime
Minster, opens up a unique opportunity to test if the backbenchers’ vote choices in
the Meaningful Votes were influenced by the prospect of a promotion under a future
Johnson-led government. To do that, we note two points. Firstly, since Theresa May
had “survived” an internal vote of no confidence before the first meaningful vote, it is
reasonable to assume that expectations of a change in leadership were lower at the
time of the first vote than at the time of the last. This motivates investigating why
some Conservative backbenchers changed their positions on the Withdrawal Agreement
between the first, second and third votes. Secondly, Johnson widely was tipped as the
most likely candidate to replace May if her administration were to fall. He announced
just before the third Meaningful Vote that he would support it after having voted
against in the previous votes.16 We can use Johnson’s PM expectations to test if those
MPs who (ex post) got promoted by his new administration were “loyal” to him and
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also switched their votes when he did. If so, such vote switching would be consistent
with the prospect of promotion under a future government being a motivator.
To implement that test, we code the two variables JOHNSON GOVERNMENT
SENIOR and JOHNSON GOVERNMENT JUNIOR which are set equal to one if
an MP got a senior (Cabinet) or a junior (non-cabinet) post, respectively, in the
Johnson administration. We, then, test whether those variables can predict if the 118
Conservative backbench MPs who voted against the Withdrawal Agreement in the first
Meaningful Vote changed the way they voted in subsequent votes. Table 4.6 reports
the results. In column (1), the dependent variable (VOTE CHANGE 1-2 ) is a dummy
equal to one for MPs who voted against in the first Meaningful Vote and for in the
second (zero otherwise). In column (2), the dependent variable (VOTE CHANGE 2-3 )
is a dummy equal to one for MPs who voted against in the second Meaningful Vote and
for in the third (zero otherwise). While our results should be interpreted cautiously
because of the small sample size,17 we see that the MPs who were appointed to senior
positions in the Johnson administration were 36 percentage points less likely to change
their votes between the first and the second vote, but 36 percentage points more likely
to switch between the second and the third vote. Those appointed junior positions
were not more likely to change their vote than other MPs. That finding is consistent
with a “follow Johnson effect” whereby the rebels who anticipated (correctly) that they
might get senior posts in a Johnson administration changed their votes when Johnson
did. Although other explanations for that pattern are possible, it suggests that career
concerns related to rewards by a future leader were salient.
4.7.3 Heterogeneity
We explore three dimensions of heterogeneity in the main results: constituency com-
petitiveness, history of rebellion, and the MP’s personal preferences.18
16Since the DUP was sure to vote against for a third time, it would have required a major rebellion
in the Labour Party to create a majority for the Withdrawal Agreement, even if most of the rebels on
the Conservative backbench switched their votes. So, Johnson’s change of mind never was likely to
make a material difference in the outcome of the vote.
17Only about 7% of the backbenchers who voted initially against the Withdrawal Agreement are
now part of the Johnson Cabinet.
18Methodologically, we study heterogeneity by splitting the sample along the relevant dimension
and then test if the marginal effects of the core variables are different in the two sub-samples. An
alternative is to introduce interaction terms. However, since we are interested in heterogeneity across
many variables, that approach, despite the efficiency gain associated with a larger sample, is inferior
for our purposes.
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Table 4.6 Voting with Johnson: The probability that the 118 Conservative backbench
MPs who voted against the Withdrawal Agreement in the first Meaningful vote
subsequently switched their vote
Outcome: VOTE CHANGE (1)Switch in 2nd vote
(2)
Switch in 3rd vote
JOHNSON GOVERNMENT SENIOR -0.363*** 0.362**
(0.105) (0.161)
[0.001] [0.027]
JOHNSON GOVERNMENT JUNIOR 0.113 0.070
(0.188) (0.187)
[0.550] [0.712]
REMAIN MP 0.092 -0.028
(0.111) (0.108)
[0.407] [0.799]
JUNIOR MP -0.098 0.110
(0.153) (0.150)
[0.523] [0.463]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.010 -0.141
(0.136) (0.130)
[0.944] [0.283]
Const. Controls YES YES
MP Controls YES YES
N 118 118
R2 0.17 0.15
Note: The sample is restricted to Conservative backbencher MPs who voted against the Withdrawal
Agreement in the first Meaningful Vote. In column 1, the dependent variable (VOTE CHANGE
1-2 ) is a dummy equal to 1 for MPs who voted against in the first Meaningful Vote and for in the
second (zero otherwise). In column (2), the dependent variable (VOTE CHANGE 2-3 ) is a dummy
equal to one for MPs who voted against in the second Meaningful Vote and for in the third (zero
otherwise). The dummy variable JOHNSON GOVERNMENT SENIOR is equal to one if the MP was
appointed to a senior (Cabinet) position in the Johnson administration (zero otherwise). The dummy
variable JOHNSON GOVERNMENT JUNIOR is equal to one if the MP was appointed to a junior
(non-cabinet) governmental position in the Johnson administration (zero otherwise). The model is
a linear probability model estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The probit estimates are
similar. However, because no MP who got a senior position in the Johnson administration started
supporting Theresa May’s deal in the 2nd vote, we cannot estimate the specification in column (1)
with that estimator. REMAIN MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP voted for remaining
within the EU in the 2016 referendum; JUNIOR MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP was
elected to the House of Commons either in 2015 or 2017; LEAVE VOTE SHARE is the standardized
share of voters who voted Leave in the referendum in 2016 in each constituency. Constituency controls
include population size, the unemployment rate, the share of constituents working in the public sector,
the share of constituents with a higher education degree, and the share of constituents who are of
working age. MP controls include gender, age, an index of the MP’s history of rebellion, and the MP’s
win margin in the last election. Robust standard errors are reported in (round brackets); p-values are
given in [square brackets]; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Constituency competitiveness
The relative importance of ideology, career concerns and constituency preferences in
an MP’s rebellion calculus is likely to be influenced by the competitiveness the MP’s
seat. An MP elected to a safe seat by a large majority is likely to put more weight on
career concerns and ideology than on constituency preferences than an MP elected to
a marginal seat. To investigate that hypothesis, we split the sample of Conservative
backbench MPs into sub-samples defined by their win margins in the 2017 general
election and re-estimate equation (4.1) on these sub-samples. We define a seat as
marginal if it is in the bottom 25% of the distribution with win margins below 11
percentage points and safe if it is in top 50% of the distribution with a win margin
above 23 percentage points.
Table 4.7 reports the results. Column (1) repeats the baseline model estimated on
the entire sample of backbench Conservative MPs. In columns (2) and (3), we report the
results for safe and marginal seats separately. We observe a remarkable difference in the
relative importance of career concerns and constituency preferences between MPs elected
in safe versus marginal seats. Specifically, the effect of career concerns is significantly
weaker in marginal constituencies, while the influence of constituency preferences is
significantly stronger. The results align with previous findings by Baughman (2004),
who associates the greater attention paid to constituency preferences by MPs under
electoral threat by pandering to local party officials whose support is essential for
future electoral success. Likewise, Kauder and Potrafke (2019) show that conservative
politicians elected in safe rather than in contested districts were less likely to support
same-sex marriage in a roll call vote in the national German parliament (Bundestag).
While those results should not necessarily be interpreted causally because win
margins may be correlated with unobserved mediating factors, we do believe that they
bring credibility to our main findings. If the main results from Table 4.3 were wholly
spurious, we would have no reason to expect the particular pattern we observe when
the sample is split between safe and marginal seats. Hence, while making a causal
claim is not possible with the data at hand, the results in Table 4.7 are in line with
what we would expect theoretically, which is reassuring.
History of rebellion
While many MPs are loyal, some MPs are serial rebels and have long histories of
voting against their parties. Famous examples include the now leader of the Labour
Party Jeremy Corbyn and the shadow Chancellor John McDonnell and, amongst the
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Table 4.7 The probability of voting for the Withdrawal Agreement in safe versus
marginal seats
Outcome: VOTE (1)Baseline
(2)
Safe
(3)
Marginal
(4)
Diff. p-value
REMAIN MP 0.393*** 0.493*** 0.431*** 0.278
(0.048) (0.076) (0.085)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
JUNIOR MP 0.223*** 0.271*** -0.048 0.034
(0.069) (0.105) (0.139)
[0.001] [0.010] [0.730]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.151** -0.055 -0.314*** 0.076
(0.073) (0.154) (0.095)
[0.038] [0.722] [0.001]
Vote Dummies YES YES YES -
Controls YES YES YES -
N 662 330 164 -
Pseudo-R2 0.27 0.30 0.46 -
Note: The table reports Probit estimates (marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory
variables) for the sample of Conservative backbenchers and for the three votes combined. Column (1)
replicates the full baseline results from Table 4.3. Columns (2) and (3) estimate the model separately
for safe (top 50 percent of the distribution) and marginal (bottom 25 percent of the distribution).
The dependent variable (VOTE) is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever an MP voted in support of
the Withdrawal Agreement and zero if the MP rebelled by voting against. REMAIN MP is a binary
variable equal to 1 if the MP voted for remaining within the EU in the 2016 referendum; JUNIOR MP
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP was elected to the House of Commons either in 2015 or 2017;
and LEAVE VOTE SHARE is the standardized share of voters who voted Leave in the referendum in
2016 in each constituency. All specifications include vote dummies. Constituency controls include
population size, the unemployment rate, the share of constituents working in the public sector, the
share of constituents with a higher education degree, and the share of constituents who are of working
age. MP controls include gender, age, an index of the MP’s history of rebellion, and the MP’s win
margin in the last election. The p-value reported in column (4) is associated with the one-sided null
hypothesis that the marginal effect of the respective row variable is larger (smaller) in one sub-sample
than in the other. Standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the constituency level; p-values
are given in [square brackets]; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Conservatives, the MP Philip Hollobone. We conjecture that an MP with a history of
rebellion would respond differently to, in particular, career concerns than an MP who
always has been loyal. An MP who has rebelled at least once may, from a career point
of view, perceive another rebellious vote differently from an MP who has been loyal in
the past.
Based on the the “rebellion history index” constructed by the website The Public
Whip from divisions in the House of Commons over the period from June 2017 to
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November 2018 (i.e., before the first Meaningful Vote), we have divided the sample of
Conservative backbench MPs into two groups: those who never rebelled in the past and
for whom a vote against the Withdrawal Agreement would be their first rebellious vote
(first-time rebels) and those who rebelled at least once prior to the first Meaningful
Vote (serial rebels). We re-estimate equation (4.1) on the two sub-samples. Table 4.8
reports the results. From columns (2) and (3), we observe that based on a comparison
of the marginal effects (28 versus 19 percentage points), career concerns do appear to
matter more for first-time than for serial rebels, but the difference is not statistically
significant. An MP’s history of rebellion, thus, did not make much of a difference for
how they voted on Brexit.
The MPs’ personal Brexit preference
We already have established that conservative backbench MPs who supported Remain
in the 2016 referendum were more likely to support May’s deal in the three Meaningful
Votes than Leave MPs. We split the sample into Leave and Remain MP sub-samples in
order to investigate if the two groups of MPs reacted differently to career concerns and
to constituency preferences. Table 4.9 reports the results. We observe that Remain
MPs reacted to career concerns and not to constituency preferences, while for Leave
MPs, career concerns appear to play no role, but they were more likely to vote against
the deal if elected in constituencies with large fractions of Leave voters. However,
despite the fact that the marginal effect on JUNIOR MP is insignificant for Leave
MPs and significant for Remain MPs, the difference between the two marginal effects
is not statistically significant. For LEAVE VOTE SHARE the difference is significant.
One interpretation of that evidence is that Leave MPs, many of whom belong to
the European Research Group (ERG) led by Jacob Rees-Mogg, signalled “ideological
purity” to the Leave voters and local party officials in their constituencies by voting
against May’s deal which they considered to be too “soft” (involving a risk of locking
the UK into a customs union through the so-called Irish backstop). Remain MPs with
political careers to look after, on the other hand, could signal purity to their Leave
voters and local party officials by “converting” (accepting the result of the referendum)
and supporting May’s attempt to get a deal through.
4.7.4 Johnson’s October 2019 Brexit deal
As discussed in Section 4.3, Prime Minister Johnson put a new Brexit deal before
Parliament which passed its second reading on 22 October 2019 with a majority of 30.
4.7 Results 171
Table 4.8 The probability of voting for the Withdrawal Agreement, breakdown by
history of past rebellion
Outcome: VOTE (1)Baseline
(2)
First-time rebels
(3)
Serial rebels
(4)
Diff. p-value
REMAIN MP 0.371*** 0.397*** 0.399*** 0.491
(0.049) (0.064) (0.074)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
JUNIOR MP 0.227*** 0.280*** 0.189** 0.257
(0.068) (0.101) (0.096)
[0.001] [0.006] [0.048]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.154** -0.115 -0.197* 0.298
(0.072) (0.116) (0.101)
[0.034] [0.321] [0.052]
Vote Dummies YES YES YES -
Controls YES YES YES -
N 662 306 356 -
Pseudo-R2 0.26 0.32 0.26 -
Note: The table reports Probit estimates (marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory
variables) for the sample of Conservative backbenchers and the three Meaningful Votes combined.
Column (1) replicates the full baseline results from Table 4.3, excluding the rebellion index control.
Column (2) restricts the sample to MPs who had not rebelled prior to November 2017 (first-time
rebels); column (3) restricts the sample to MPs who had rebelled at least once before (serial rebels).
The dependent variable (VOTE) is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever an MP voted in support of
the Withdrawal Agreement and zero if the MP rebelled by voting against. REMAIN MP is a binary
variable equal to 1 if the MP voted for remaining within the EU in the 2016 referendum; JUNIOR MP
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP was elected to the House of Commons either in 2015 or 2017;
and LEAVE VOTE SHARE is the standardized share of voters who voted Leave in the referendum in
2016 in each constituency. All specifications include vote dummies. Constituency controls include
population size, the unemployment rate, the share of constituents working in the public sector, the
share of constituents with a higher education degree, and the share of constituents who are of working
age. MP controls include gender, age, and the MP’s win margin in the last election. The p-value
reported in column (4) is associated with the one-sided null hypothesis that the marginal effect of
the respective row variable is larger (smaller) in one sub-sample than in the other. Standard errors
(in round brackets) are clustered at the constituency level; p-values are given in [square brackets];
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 4.9 The probability of voting for the Withdrawal Agreement for Remain and
Leave MPs
Outcome: VOTE (1)Baseline
(2)
Leave MPs
(3)
Remain MPs
(4)
Diff. p-value
JUNIOR MP 0.211*** 0.135 0.231*** 0.233
(0.069) (0.118) (0.060)
[0.002] [0.254] [0.000]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.155** -0.253** 0.008 0.013
(0.069) (0.100) (0.061)
[0.026] [0.011] [0.893]
Vote Dummies YES YES YES -
Controls YES YES YES -
N 662 354 308 -
Pseudo-R2 0.15 0.21 0.27 -
Note: The table reports Probit estimates (marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory
variables) for the sample of Conservative backbenchers for the three Meaningful Votes combined.
Column (1) replicates the baseline result from Table 4.3, excluding REMAIN MP. Column (2) restricts
the sample to MPs who voted Leave in the 2016 referendum (Leave MPs). Column (3) restricts the
sample to MPs who voted Remain in the referendum (Remain MPs). The dependent variable (VOTE)
is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever an MP voted in support of the Withdrawal Agreement
and zero if the MP rebelled. REMAIN MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP voted for
remaining within the EU in the 2016 referendum; JUNIOR MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
MP was elected to the House of Commons either in 2015 or 2017; and LEAVE VOTE SHARE is the
standardized share of voters who voted Leave in the referendum in 2016 in each constituency. All
specifications include vote dummies. Constituency controls include population size, the unemployment
rate, the share of constituents working in the public sector, the share of constituents with a higher
education degree, and the share of constituents who are of working age. MP controls include gender,
age, an index of the MP’s history of rebellion, and the MP’s win margin in the last election. The
p-value reported in column (4) is associated with the one-sided null hypothesis that the marginal effect
of the respective row variable is larger (smaller) in one sub-sample than in the other. Standard errors
(in round brackets) are clustered at the constituency level; p-values are given in [square brackets];
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
It got no further because a general election was called. As explained, passing a second
reading is not equivalent to passing one of the Meaningful Votes considered above,
but some interesting patterns nevertheless should be noted. The 30 MP majority was
achieved largely thanks to 24 Labour MPs defying their party and either voting for
Johnson’s deal (19) or abstaining (5). By comparing descriptive statistics, these rebel
Labour MPs appear to be guided by motivations similar to those of the Conservative
rebels analyzed above. Rebel Labour MPs had substantially higher constituency Leave
vote shares than loyal Labour MPs (62.2% versus 50.1%), they were less likely to have
campaigned for Remain (87.5% versus 98.2%), and less likely to be junior (33.3% vs
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42.4%). Hence, we see patterns of rebellion by Labour MPs consistent with our findings
for Conservative MPs.
4.8 Conclusions
We study the three Meaningful Votes that took place in the British House of Common
between January and March 2019 in which the Conservative government’s Withdrawal
Agreement with the European Union was defeated decisively. Instrumental for that
result was a major revolt on the Conservative backbench. We argue that the high-stakes
situation can provide insights into why politicians revolt against their own parties
more generally. We find evidence that personal preferences (ideology), constituency
preferences and career concerns mattered. We also find (suggestive) evidence that the
rebellion on the Conservative backbench was, in part, motivated by the prospect of
bringing the May government down. An interesting question for future research is
to study the electoral consequences of the rebellion for individual MPs. That is, do
voters reward or punish them for the ways they voted on the highly contentious Brexit
issue? A related question that also deserves attention is how the Conservative Party
internally rewards or punishes rebellious MPs, i.e., how will the rebellion affect their
long-term career prospects?
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Appendix 4.A Definitions and sources
This appendix lists and defines the variables we use in the statistical analysis and gives
the sources.
• VOTE is a dummy variable coded one if an MP voted for the government’s deal
and zero if they voted against; coded separately for each of the three votes. This
coding takes into account that the Tellers, the Speaker and the deputy Speaker
do not cast a vote. Note: Data retrieved April 2019. Source: House of Commons
Votes
• VOTE CHANGE 1-2 (VOTE CHANGE 2-3 ) is a dummy equal to one for MPs
who voted against in the first (second) Meaningful Vote and for in the second
(third) (zero otherwise). Note: Data retrieved April 2019. Source: House of
Commons Votes
• REMAIN MP is a dummy variable coded one if the MP voted and campaigned
to remain in the referendum and zero otherwise. Note: Data retrieved November
2018. Source: SkyNews Analysis
• FRONTBENCH is a dummy variable coded one if the MP holds a governmental
position and zero otherwise. Note: Data retrieved November 2018. Source: House
of Commons Library
• JUNIOR MP is a dummy variable coded one if the MP first entered Parliament
either in 2015 or 2017 and zero otherwise. Note: Data retrieved November 2018.
Source: House of Commons Library
• LEAVE VOTE SHARE records the (estimated) share of the electorate in each
constituency who voted to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum. Note: Data
retrieved November 2018. Source: Hanretty, 2017
• FOREIGN records the share of people residing within a constituency that have
not been born within the UK. Data for March 2015. Note: Data retrieved
November 2018. Source: Office for National Statistics
• PUBLIC records the share of people residing within a constituency employed in
the public sector. Data for March 2015. Note: Data retrieved November 2018.
Source: Office for National Statistics
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• EDUCATED records the March share of people residing within a constituency
that have a degree of higher education. Data for March 2015. Note: Data
retrieved November 2018. Source: Office for National Statistics
• POPULATION records the number of people residing within a constituency.
Data for June 2016. Note: Data retrieved November 2018. Source: House of
Commons Library Local Data
• WORKING AGE records the share of people residing within a constituency that
are between 16 and 64 years old. Data for June 2016. Note: Data retrieved
November 2018. Source: House of Commons Library Local Data
• UNEMPLOYED records the unemployment rate within a constituency. Data for
June 2016. Note: Data retrieved November 2018. Source: House of Commons
Library Local Data
• AGE records the representative’s age in years. Note: Data retrieved November
2018. Source: House of Commons Library
• FEMALE is a dummy variable coded one if the MP is female. Note: Data
retrieved November 2018. Source: House of Commons Library
• REBELLION is an index variable which proxies for the number of times a
representative has voted against the majority vote of the representative’s party.
Note: Data retrieved November 2018. Source: The Public Whip
• WIN MARGIN records, for each constituency, the difference between the vote
share of the winning candidate and the vote share of the runner up. Note: Data
retrieved November 2018. Source: House of Commons Library
• JOHNSON GOVERNMENT SENIOR is equal to one if the MP was appointed
to a senior (Cabinet) position in the Johnson administration (zero otherwise).
Note: Data retrieved July 31 2019. Source: BBC News
• JOHNSON GOVERNMENT JUNIOR is equal to one if the MP was appointed
to a junior (non-cabinet) governmental position in the Johnson administration
(zero otherwise). Note: Data retrieved July 31 2019. Source: BBC News
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Appendix 4.B Additional data and estimation re-
sults
Table 4.10 Summary Statistics for sample of all Conservative MPs
Variable (1)N
(2)
Mean
(3)
Std. Dev.
(4)
Min.
(5)
Max.
VOTE (Binary) 941 0.752 0.432 0 1
Main Determinants
FRONTBENCH (Binary) 317 0.300 0.459 0 1
REMAIN MP (Binary) 317 0.546 0.499 0 1
JUNIOR MP (Binary) 317 0.300 0.459 0 1
LEAVE VOTE SHARE(%) 317 55.0 8.77 25.7 75.0
Constituency Controls
FOREIGN (%) 317 8.86 6.94 2.30 52.0
POPULATION (No.) 317 100,324 11,371 58,873 140,264
UNEMPLOYED (%) 317 1.53 0.770 0.393 4.81
PUBLIC (%) 317 17.8 6.56 5.60 47.1
EDUCATED (%) 317 27.6 7.14 12.3 55.2
WORKING AGE (%) 317 60.8 2.79 51.4 73.6
MP Controls
AGE (Yrs.) 317 51.6 9.85 27.0 78.0
FEMALE (Binary) 317 0.211 0.409 0 1
REBELLION (Index) 317 0.636 1.59 0 21.8
WIN MARGIN (pp) 317 23.2 13.1 0.066 49.7
Note: Appendix A lists definitions of the variables and provides details regarding the sources. The
sample is used to estimate the specification in Table 4.3, column (4).
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Table 4.11 The probability of voting for the Withdrawal Agreement in the three
Meaningful Votes combined, Linear Probability Model
A. All Conservatives B. Conservative Backbenchers
FRONTBENCH 0.305*** 0.311*** 0.329*** - - -
(0.031) (0.031) (0.035)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
REMAIN MP 0.264*** 0.256*** 0.264*** 0.346*** 0.329*** 0.341***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
JUNIOR MP 0.122*** 0.099** 0.146*** 0.143*** 0.115** 0.174***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.047) (0.045) (0.049) (0.062)
[0.001] [0.011] [0.002] [0.002] [0.019] [0.006]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE 0.0001 -0.081** -0.069* -0.005 -0.102** -0.085*
(0.016) (0.034) (0.037) (0.023) (0.045) (0.048)
[0.993] [0.018] [0.063] [0.842] [0.023] [0.078]
Vote Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Const. Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
MP Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
N 941 941 941 662 662 662
R2 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.26 0.28 0.30
Note: The table reports the results from a linear probability model estimated with Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) on the sample of all Conservative MPs (panel A) and for the sample of backbench MPs
(panel B). The dependent variable (VOTE) is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever an MP voted in
support of the Withdrawal Agreement and zero when the MP rebelled by voting against. REMAIN
MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP voted for remaining within the EU in the 2016 referendum;
JUNIOR MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP was elected to the House of Commons either
in 2015 or 2017; LEAVE VOTE SHARE is the standardized share of voters who voted Leave in the
referendum in 2016 in each constituency; and FRONTBENCH is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
MP holds a position in government. All specifications include vote dummies. Constituency controls
include population size, the unemployment rate, the share of constituents working in the public sector,
the share of constituents with a higher education degree, and the share of constituents who are of
working age. MP controls include gender, age, an index of the MP’s history of rebellion, and the MP’s
win margin in the last election. Standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the constituency
level; p-values are given in [square brackets]; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 4.12 The probability of voting for the Withdrawal Agreement in the three
Meaningful Votes combined (Probit coefficients)
Backbencher sample Full Sample
Outcome: VOTE (1)Probit
(2)
Probit
(3)
Probit
(4)
OLS
FRONTBENCH - - - 0.329***
(0.035)
[0.000]
REMAIN MP 1.14*** 1.12*** 1.22*** 0.264***
(0.170) (0.174) (0.170) (0.034)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
JUNIOR MP 0.533*** 0.433** 0.695*** 0.146***
(0.165) (0.181) (0.231) (0.047)
[0.001] [0.017] [0.003] [0.002]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.005 -0.447** -0.439** -0.069*
(0.083) (0.0187) (0.212) (0.037)
[0.949] [0.017] [0.038] [0.035]
Vote Dummies YES YES YES YES
Const. Controls NO YES YES YES
MP Controls NO NO YES YES
N 662 662 662 941
(Pseudo-)R2 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.33
Note: Columns (1)-(3) report Probit estimates (rather than marginal effects) for the sample of
Conservative backbenchers and column (4) reports OLS estimates for the sample of all Conservative
MPs. The dependent variable (VOTE) is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever an MP voted in
support of the Withdrawal Agreement and zero when the MP rebelled by voting against. REMAIN
MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP voted for remaining within the EU in the 2016 referendum;
JUNIOR MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP was elected to the House of Commons either
in 2015 or 2017; LEAVE VOTE SHARE is the standardized share of voters who voted Leave in the
referendum in 2016 in each constituency; and FRONTBENCH is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
MP holds a position in government. All specifications include vote dummies. Constituency controls
include population size, the unemployment rate, the share of constituents working in the public sector,
the share of constituents with a higher education degree, and the share of constituents who are of
working age. MP controls include gender, age, an index of the MP’s history of rebellion, and the MP’s
win margin in the last election. Standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the constituency
level; p-values are given in [square brackets]; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 4.13 Breakdown of Meaningful Votes by Party and Government Positions (Alter-
native Affiliation Definition)
First Vote Second Vote Third Vote
For Against Abstain For Against Abstain For Against Abstain
Panel A - Vote by Party
Conservative 196 118 3 235 75 4 277 34 3
Labour 3 248 5 3 238 5 5 234 7
LD 0 11 0 0 11 0 0 11 0
SNP 0 35 0 0 35 0 0 34 1
DUP 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0
Other 3 10 8 4 22 8 4 21 9
Total 202 432 16 242 391 17 286 344 20
Panel B - Conservatives by Govt. Position
Frontbench 93 0 2 93 0 2 93 0 2
Backbench 103 118 1 142 75 2 184 34 1
Total 196 118 3 235 75 4 277 34 3
Note: This table shows the distribution of votes across the three Meaningful Votes taking into account
that three Conservative MPs and seven Labour MPs resigned and became independent between the
first and the second Meaningful Vote.
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